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10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STA	
11	COUNTY OF SAN	
12	COUNTI OF SAN	MATEO
13	In re	CAPITAL CASE
14	SCOTT LEE PETERSON,	San Mateo Case No. SC055500A
15		Case No.: S230782 Related Case No. S132449
16 17	On Habeas Corpus.	RETURN TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;
17		MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; AND EXHIBITS
19		Dept: TBD
20		Judge: Hon. Anne-Christine Massullo
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	RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

# TO: THE HONORABLE ANNE-CHRISTINE MASSULLO, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO:

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Respondent makes this return to the Order to Show Cause issued by the California Supreme Court on October 14, 2020 as follows:

On or about December 23 or 24, 2002, Petitioner Scott Peterson killed his wife Laci Peterson who was eight and a half months pregnant with their unborn son, Conner.

#### II.

I.

On November 12, 2004, Peterson was found guilty of first-degree murder of Laci Peterson and second-degree murder of their unborn son, Conner. On December 13, 2004, the jury returned a verdict of death. On March 16, 2005, the San Mateo County Superior Court imposed a judgment of death in case number SC055500A which was vacated on August 24, 2020 by the California Supreme Court on automatic appeal in case number S132449.

#### III.

In a separate Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus matter (this matter herein) the California Supreme Court has ordered the Respondent to show cause as to "why the relief prayed for should not be granted on the ground that Juror No. 7 committed prejudicial misconduct by not disclosing her prior involvement with other legal proceedings, including but not limited to being the victim of a crime, as alleged in Claim 1."

Respondent contends that Petitioner's juror misconduct claim is not supported by competent or admissible evidence that would warrant an evidentiary hearing as to Claim I.

#### V.

IV.

Respondent contends that Juror No. 7's answers or omissions to the questions in the juror questionnaire do not evidence bias against Petitioner.

## VI.

27 Respondent contends that, even assuming that Juror No.7 answered questions incorrectly
28 creating an inference of juror misconduct, the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted

1	because the offending conduct alleged by Petitioner does not present a substantial likelihood	
2	that Juror No. 7 was actually biased against Petitioner.	
3	VII.	
4	Except as expressly stated, Respondent denies each and every allegation of the petition	
5	for writ of habeas corpus, for the reasons stated in the memorandum of points and authorities	
6	filed herewith and incorporated herein by this reference.	
7	VIII.	
8	Respondent denies that Petitioner's statutory or constitutional rights were violated in any	
9	manner.	
10	IX.	
11	If Petitioner disputes any fact in this Return deemed by this Court to be material,	
12	Respondent respectfully requests that this Court set this matter for an evidentiary hearing on the	
13	material disputed questions of fact related to the Supreme Court's Order.	
14	WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully requests that this Court deny Petitioner's request	
15	for an evidentiary hearing, discharge the Order to Show Cause and deny the alleged juror	
16	misconduct claim made in the petition for writ of habeas corpus.	
17		
18	Dated: December 11, 2020 Respectfully Submitted,	
19	BIRGIT FLADAGER District Attorney	
20	County of Stanislaus	
21	David P. Harris	
22	DAVID P. HARRIS Assistant District Attorney	
23	Attorneys for Respondent	
24	Automeys for Respondent	
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	RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES	

### STATEMENT OF FACTS FROM THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S OPINION AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AS TO GUILT

On August 24, 2020, the California Supreme Court affirmed the verdict as to guilt, reversed the judgment as to the sentence of death, and remanded the matter for a new penalty determination. Thus, guilt is not at issue in this habeas proceeding. The sole question here is whether "Juror No.7 committed prejudicial misconduct by not disclosing her prior involvement with other legal proceedings" in order to be selected for jury service. Petitioner has the burden to show that she did so. The following facts of the case are taken directly from the Opinion of the California Supreme Court:

*A. Guilt Phase Trial* 

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*1. Prosecution Evidence* 

Peterson and Laci Rocha met in San Luis Obispo, where Laci was attending college and
Peterson was working in a restaurant. They married in 1997. They opened and ran a
restaurant together in San Luis Obispo. In 2000, they moved to Modesto and bought a house.
Laci took a job as a substitute teacher, while Peterson ran a start-up fertilizer company name
TradeCorp U.S.A. out of a leased warehouse. Some years after the two married, Laci became
pregnant; the baby – whom the couple had name Conner – was due in February 2003.<sup>1</sup>

18 On December 23, 2002, Laci went grocery shopping around midday. She also had a 19 prenatal medical checkup. In the later afternoon, both Laci and Peterson went to a salon where 20 Laci's sister, Amy Rocha, worked. Amy mentioned that she had ordered a gift basket for a 21 family member that needed to be picked up the next day by 3:00 p.m. Peterson volunteered to 22 get it for her, as he was going golfing nearby. Peterson also invited Amy to dinner, but she 23 declined because she had prior plans. That night, Laci and her mother, Sharon, spoke on the phone and confirmed that Laci and Peterson would join Sharon and Sharon's longtime partner, 24 25 Ron Grantski, for dinner the following night, Christmas Eve.

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At 10:18 the following morning, a neighbor, Karen Servas saw the Petersons' dog,

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RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For clarity, we generally will refer to Laci Peterson (neé Rocha) and Conner by their first names. We will also sometimes refer to members of Laci's immediate family – her mother, Sharon Rocha; her sister, Amy Rocha; and her brother, Brent Rocha – by their first names. No disrespect is intended to any of these individuals.

McKenzie, wandering unaccompanied on the street, wearing his leash. Peterson's truck was 1 2 gone; Laci's car was still in the driveway. There were no signs of activity at the house, so Servas put McKenzie in the Petersons' backyard and closed the gate. That afternoon, Grantski 3 4 tried to reach Laci, without success. Around 3:45 p.m., Amy received a call that her gift basket 5 had not been picked up. She was unable to reach Peterson. Neighbors reported Peterson's truck still absent at 4:05 p.m., but back by 5:30 p.m. 6

7 At around 5:15 p.m., Peterson called Sharon and asked if Laci was there. He described 8 Laci as "missing." Sharon suggested he check with friends and neighbors. Peterson called 9 Sharon back shortly afterwards and reported the people he had spoken to had not seen Laci 10 either. Sharon told Grantski to call the police. Officers soon met Peterson, Sharon, and 11 Grantski at a nearby park. Neighbors and other relatives gathered at the park as well. Grantski 12 spoke with Peterson and asked if he had gone golfing that day. Peterson said he had changed 13 his mind and gone fishing instead. Told what time Peterson had gone, Grantski suggested it was an unusually late time to be fishing. Peterson walked off without responding. Peterson told a 14 15 cousin of Sharon's and two neighbors that he had been golfing all day. He volunteered to Sandy 16 Rickard, a friend of Sharon's, that he would not be surprised if the police found blood in his 17 truck because he cut his hands all the time.

18 *Police inspected the Peterson home. There were no signs of forced entry, nothing* 19 appeared missing, and Laci's purse was still there. Peterson told officers he and Laci had 20 watched television that morning, and Laci had planned to walk the dog and go grocery shopping. Peterson decided to go fishing in the San Francisco Bay. He went to his company 22 warehouse where he stored a boat, drove to the Berkeley Marina, fished for two hours, and quit 23 because the day was cold and rainy. He tried calling Laci on the home phone and her cell phone 24 but did not reach her. Peterson got home around 4:30 p.m. He washed his clothes, ate some 25 pizza, and then called Sharon to track down Laci.

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26 Officer Matthew Spurlock asked what time Peterson was fishing. He also asked what 27 Peterson was fishing for and what lure he used. According to Spurlock and Officer Derrick 28 Letsinger, Peterson gave slow and initially noncommittal answers. He "really didn't give a

responsive time" and, when asked what he was fishing for, paused, gave a blank look, and "mumbled some stuff" without really answering. Peterson likewise responded with a blank look when asked about his lure, but after some delay came up with a size and color description.

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4 Detective Allen Brocchini was called to the Peterson home. He found wet towels on top 5 of the washing machine. Peterson explained that he had taken them out so that he could wash the clothes he had worn that day. Inside the washing machine were Peterson's jeans, shirt, and 6 7 green pullover jacket. In the bedroom, officers observed a laundry hamper nearly full of clothes. 8 With consent, Detective Brocchini examined Peterson's truck and saw large patio umbrellas and 9 a tarp in the truck bed. Inside the truck cab, he found a fishing rod and a bag containing a 10 package of unused fishing lures and a receipt indicating the items had all been purchased on 11 December 20. Peterson handed him a Berkeley Marina parking receipt that indicated Peterson 12 had entered at 12:54 p.m. On the backseat was a camouflage jacket Peterson said he had worn fishing that day. Brocchini and Peterson then went to Peterson's warehouse. There, Brocchini 13 observed what he described as a "homemade anchor" made of concrete in Peterson's boat, but 14 15 no long rope to attach it to the boat.

16 Peterson agreed to a further interview at the Modesto police station. Peterson repeated 17 that Laci had planned to walk the dog and go grocery shopping. For his part, Peterson decided to go fishing because it was too cold to golf. He went to his warehouse, then to the Berkeley 18 Marina around 1:00 p.m., and fished for 90 minutes near an area that was later identified as 19 Brooks Island.<sup>2</sup> Peterson did not pack a lunch or stop to eat on the way to or from the marina. 20 21 On the way back, Peterson called Laci on their home phone and left two messages on her cell phone.<sup>3</sup> He dropped off his boat at the warehouse and went home. Peterson told officers that 22 23 there were no problems in his marriage.

Peterson had a follow-up interview with Detective Craig Grogan and an investigator from the state's Department of Justice on Christmas Day, December 25. Peterson explained that

RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Peterson said he left the house with no jacket on, put on a green pullover jacket, and then put the camouflage 27 jacket over that when it started raining. The camouflage jacket, when Detective Brocchini saw it in Peterson's truck a few hours later, was dry. 28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> When messages on Laci's cell phone were played, only one voice message from Peterson was found.

he had never fished on the San Francisco Bay before but wanted to test out his boat. He troll 1 2 fished<sup>4</sup> for an hour on the way out to Brooks Island from the marina dock. Peterson suggested 3 Laci might have been robbed of her jewelry by a transient and then kidnapped. He denied being 4 involved in an affair with anyone. Later that day, Peterson called Detective Brocchini to check 5 on the investigation. He asked if the police would be using cadaver dogs<sup>5</sup> to search for Laci. Brocchini explained that they would not, because no one assumed Laci was dead. 6

In the days after Christmas, the Modesto Police Department executed search warrants on the Peterson home and Peterson's warehouse. Police confirmed that there had been no 9 forced entry at the house. None of Laci's jewelry was missing, other than one pair of diamond earrings. Traces of Peterson's blood were found on a comforter in the master bedroom. In sheds 10 in the backyard, police found the cover to Peterson's boat, smelling heavily of gasoline,<sup>6</sup> as well as a blue tarp. The boat cover had chunks of concrete in it. In Peterson's truck, police found 13 additional spots of Peterson's blood. Peterson explained that he had cut his hand on the truck door. Police found small chunks of cement and a claw hammer with cement powder on it in the 14 truck's bed. 15

16 At the warehouse, the police inspected the boat and found a pair of pliers under the middle seat. The pliers had hair clamped in their teeth. Subsequent mitochondrial DNA testing 18 of a hair fragment determined that the hair matched a reference sample from Sharon, which meant that its donor had the same maternal lineage as Sharon. The hair did not match 20 Peterson's.

21 During the search of the Peterson home, articles that Laci would have touched were 22 collected to give to trailing dogs to enable them to search for Laci's scent. These included a 23 slipper and a pair of sunglasses. On December 28, four days after Laci disappeared, Trimble, a 24 trailing dog, was presented Laci's sunglasses at the Berkeley Marina. Trimble alerted to Laci's 25 scent along a path that led out onto a dock and ended at the water.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Troll fishing involves dragging a baited line through the water.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Cadaver dogs are trained to scent and alert to decomposing human remains.

<sup>28</sup> <sup>6</sup> At trial, evidence was introduced that gasoline makes it extremely difficult for trailing dogs to identify a human scent.

1 On December 30, a woman named Amber Frey contacted the police after a friend 2 advised her that Peterson, who she thought was unmarried with no children, and with whom she 3 had been having a relationship since November, was connected to the disappearance of his 4 pregnant wife. Frey and Peterson had had their first date on November 20 and had immediately 5 become sexually intimate. Their relationship had progressed to the point where Peterson had stayed over at Frey's home, picked up Frey's young daughter from daycare, gone to various 6 7 parties with Frey, alone and with her daughter, picked out a Christmas tree with Frey, and 8 discussed their views on having children. Peterson initially told Frey he had never been married 9 and had no children, but on December 6 a friend of Frey's discovered otherwise and gave him an ultimatum to tell Frey by December 9 or else she would. On December 9, Peterson explained 10 11 to Frey that he had in fact been married, but had "lost" his wife, and the upcoming holidays 12 would be his first without her. On December 15, Peterson told Frey he would be in Europe on 13 business through the rest of the month and much of January. On December 23, after Frey asked where she should send him things while he was away, Peterson rented a private mailbox to 14 15 which Frey could send letters. He called Frey that day, claiming to be in Maine duck hunting 16 with his father, and again on Christmas Day, supposedly still from Maine.

After meeting with police, Frey agreed to cooperate and tape future calls from Peterson. On New Year's Eve, Peterson called Frey from a vigil for Laci, claiming to be in Paris watching fireworks over the Eiffel Tower. He called Frey again on New Year's Day and in the days after, maintaining the fiction that he was in Europe. On January 3, 2003, when police confronted Peterson with a picture of himself and Frey, Peterson denied that it was him in the photo and that he was having an affair.

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On January 6, at the instigation of police, Frey dropped hints that a friend had learned the truth and would tell her in a matter of hours.<sup>7</sup> In response, Peterson finally admitted to Frey that he was married to a woman named Laci and had been in Modesto the entire time. The next day, when Frey asked if Peterson had told Laci about her, Peterson said he had and that Laci

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Laci's disappearance swiftly became the subject of widespread media attention. To maintain the pretense that she did not know the truth about Peterson yet, Frey denied watching the news.

was "fine" with his having an affair. Later in the month, once news media had made the affair
 public, Peterson, in an interview aired nationwide, repeated that Laci was fine with his having
 an affair and said he had disclosed the affair to the police immediately. On February 19, at the
 direction of police investigators, Frey told Peterson they should stop talking.

5 In January, after obtaining a warrant, police placed a surveillance camera outside the Peterson home and GPS tracking devices on Peterson's vehicles, including a series of cars and 6 7 trucks Peterson rented for a few days at a time. Surveillance data from these devices and visual 8 surveillance by the police showed Peterson driving the approximately 90 miles from his home to 9 the Berkeley Marina at least five times in January, each time using a different vehicle. On 10 January 5, he drove there in a gray Subaru, spent five or ten minutes, and left. On January 6, he 11 returned to the marina in a red Honda and again spent only a few minutes. On January 9, 12 Peterson drove there in a white pickup truck. On January 11, after determining that their cover 13 had been blown, the Modesto Police Department shut down surveillance at the Peterson home. Nonetheless, from tracking data supplied by the automobiles' manufacturers, police were able 14 15 to determine that Peterson returned to the marina on January 26 in Laci's Land Rover and on 16 January 27 in a rented Dodge Dakota.

17 During the same period, Peterson began to make various changes to his work and living 18 situations. On January 13, Peterson gave 30 days' notice that he was terminating his warehouse 19 lease, which was not up until October. That same month, he started discussions to sell the 20 Peterson home. On January 29, Peterson sold Laci's car, trading it in for a Dodge Dakota 21 pickup truck. On January 30, he stopped home mail delivery and directed that all mail be 22 delivered to the post office box he had set up on December 23. The nursery for Conner was 23 converted into storage space. On February 18, satellite television service to the Peterson home 24 was canceled; the satellite company's records indicated the customer had explained he was 25 moving overseas.

A \$500,000 reward was posted by a private foundation for information leading to Laci's
return. For months, no useful leads turned up. Even when potentially promising sightings were
reported, Peterson appeared to show little interest. For example, the prosecution presented

evidence collected from an authorized wiretap of Peterson's phone that showed he took days to
 follow up with police about a possible sighting in Washington, though he told others —
 including his mother — that he had followed up with police immediately. Peterson similarly told

4 a business associate he was waiting near the airport in case he needed to fly up to Washington,
5 though at the time, Peterson was not near any airport.

In mid-April, a significant storm hit the San Francisco Bay Area. On April 13, after the 6 7 storm had passed, a couple walking their dog came upon Conner's badly decomposed body, 8 apparently washed ashore along with other storm debris. The location was just over a mile from 9 the southern tip of Brooks Island. The next morning, Laci's body was discovered on the 10 shoreline at Point Isabel, south of Conner's body and again just over a mile from Brooks Island. 11 Laci's body had barnacles and duct tape on it. From residual clumps of fabric, it was possible to 12 determine that she had been wearing light-colored capris. The clothing was consistent with the 13 recollection of Amy, who testified that Laci was wearing cream-colored pants when she last saw 14 her sister on December 23. It was, however, inconsistent with the recollection of Peterson, who 15 told police that Laci was wearing black pants when he last saw her on December 24. Days later, 16 DNA testing confirmed the identities of the two bodies.

17 Dr. Brian Peterson (no relation to the Petersons) performed autopsies on both bodies. 18 Laci's body had several parts missing, including her head, forearms, and one lower leg. 19 Changes to the tissue suggested her body had been in a marine environment. Tidal action and 20 marine animals could explain the missing body parts. Laci's uterus was still enlarged, her birth 21 canal was closed, and there was no evidence of a birth, which indicated she had died while still 22 pregnant. Dr. Allison Galloway, a forensic anthropologist given the remains to analyze, testified 23 that Laci had been in water for three to six months. Given the condition of the body, it was not 24 possible to determine a cause of death.

Conner's body was intact. There was tape on his neck but no associated injuries, which
led Dr. Peterson to conclude the tape was just debris that had become attached to Conner after
his death. There was no clothing on the body. Conner still had part of his umbilical cord and
meconium in his intestines, which indicated he had died before birth. Based on his size and the

softness of his tissue, Dr. Peterson opined that Conner must have remained protected inside
 Laci's uterus for some time after death; had he spent a significant period of time exposed in the
 water, he would have been eaten by marine animals.

As mentioned, Laci had had a prenatal checkup on December 23. Based on ultrasounds,
Conner was at 32 to 33 weeks of gestation. Post-mortem measurements of his bone growth
allowed Dr. Greggory DeVore to estimate Conner's date of death as falling between December
21 and December 24, with an average of December 23. Both Dr. Esther Towder, Laci's
gynecologist who conducted the December 23 checkup, and Dr. Peterson testified that based on
his age and health, Conner would have survived had he been born that day.

10Dr. Ralph Cheng, a hydrologist with the United States Geological Survey, was contacted11by the Modesto Police Department in February, while Laci was still missing, and again in May,12after she and Conner had been found. The first time, he was asked to assume that Laci's body13had been dumped with weights into the San Francisco Bay and, based on that assumption, to14estimate where the body might be found. The second time, after the bodies had been found, Dr.15Cheng was asked to estimate where they might have originated. He was able to estimate a16location for Conner near the southern tip of Brooks Island, but no likely location for Laci.17Divers searching the bay at Dr. Cheng's target location were unable to find any relevant18evidence.

On April 12, the day before Conner's body was found, Peterson bought a car using his mother's name, Jacqueline, as his own, providing a fake driver's license number, and paying \$3,600 in cash. He had grown a goatee and mustache and appeared to have dyed his hair. On April 15, when Sharon called him about the discovery of the (as-yet unidentified) bodies of Conner and Laci, Peterson did not return her call. Believing Peterson might flee, police arrested him on April 18. When arrested, Peterson had nearly \$15,000 in cash, foreign currency, two drivers' licenses (his own and his brother's), a family member's credit card, camping gear, considerable extra clothing, and multiple cell phones.

27 The prosecution introduced evidence concerning the Petersons' finances. The Petersons'
28 expenses were high in relation to their current income. TradeCorp U.S.A. had never been

profitable, posting operating losses of \$40,000 and \$200,000 in consecutive years; the company
 was not meeting sales goals, and it owed its parent company \$190,000. Peterson had signed
 multiple credit card applications in the company's name containing misrepresentations as to the
 company's income.

5 In fall 2002, Laci inherited jewelry and, at Peterson's request, had some of the items appraised. They were valued at more than \$100,000. Computers seized from the Peterson home 6 7 and the warehouse showed e-mails sent from an account bearing the username "slpetel" 8 discussing the sale of jewelry, and eBay records likewise showed Peterson had posted jewelry 9 items for sale. Laci also stood to inherit one-third of the proceeds from the sale of her 10 grandfather's house, an interest estimated to be worth around \$140,000. Laci's interest would 11 terminate on her death, with no right of survivorship to Peterson, but it was unclear whether 12 Peterson was aware of the limitation; Brent, the cotrustee of the grandparents' estate, had not 13 told Peterson about the provision.

14 The prosecution also submitted additional background concerning Peterson's fishing. 15 *Computers seized from the Peterson home and the warehouse showed that someone had* 16 conducted searches of classified advertisements for boats on December 7, the day after 17 Peterson learned he would no longer be able to conceal his marriage from Frey. That same day, 18 Peterson called Bruce Peterson (no relation) about a boat for sale. Peterson inspected the boat 19 the next day and bought it on December 9, without the anchors that came with the boat. 20 Peterson never registered the boat, nor did he ever mention the purchase to his father; to 21 Grantski, an avid fisherman who had invited Peterson to fish several times; to other members of 22 the Rocha family; or to his friend Gregory Reed, with whom he frequently discussed fishing. 23 *Review of the seized computers' browser histories also showed someone conducting searches on* 24 December 8 for boat ramps on the Pacific Ocean, then examining nautical charts, currents, and 25 maps for the Berkeley Marina and San Francisco Bay, including the area around Brooks Island. 26 There were also visits to fishing-related websites.

December 24, the day Peterson said he was fishing, was gray, damp, and cold with a bit
of wind. Few people were at the Berkeley Marina. When questioned by police, Peterson would

not say what he was hoping to catch, but the fishing searches performed from his computer 1 2 earlier in the month had included searches relating to sturgeon and striped bass. Angelo 3 Cuanang, a published author on fishing in the San Francisco Bay who was accepted by the 4 court as an expert fisherman, testified that Brooks Island was the wrong place to seek sturgeon, 5 which congregated in a different part of the bay that time of year. Sturgeon also preferred live bait to lures, and Peterson's rod was too weak to catch them. Anchoring was essential to reel in 6 7 sturgeon; the homemade cement anchor in his boat would have been inadequate. Finally, it was 8 illegal to troll for sturgeon, as Peterson claimed to have done. Peterson's lures and the time of 9 year he was fishing were also wrong for catching striped bass.

10 The prosecution's theory was as follows: Peterson killed Laci sometime on the night of December 23 or morning of December 24. On the morning of the 24th, Peterson let their dog 11 12 McKenzie out with his leash on to make it appear something had happened while Laci was 13 walking him. He wrapped Laci's body in a tarp in the bed of his truck, covered her with the patio umbrellas, drove to the warehouse, and then moved her body into his boat.<sup>8</sup> He drove to 14 15 the Berkeley Marina, motored out to an area near Brooks Island, and slipped her body, 16 attached to homemade concrete weights like the homemade anchor Peterson had made, into the 17 bay.<sup>9</sup> Peterson then returned to Modesto, dropped off the boat at the warehouse, put the boat 18 cover out back under a leaky gas blower so that any scent would be obscured, washed his 19 clothes, and proceeded with the ruse that Laci was missing, hoping her body would never be 20 discovered.

2. Defense Evidence

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The defense argued the police had not diligently pursued whether a person or persons
other than Peterson were more likely responsible for Laci's disappearance and murder. The
defense presented evidence that a burglary had occurred on the Petersons' street the week of
her disappearance and argued that the police failed adequately to follow up on whether that

<sup>27 &</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The prosecution introduced photographs of a district attorney's office employee, at approximately the same stage of pregnancy and weight as Laci at her disappearance, fitting into the bottom of Peterson's boat.
28 <sup>9</sup> Through an engineer for the company that manufactured the boat, the prosecution introduced stability tests the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Through an engineer for the company that manufactured the boat, the prosecution introduced stability tests the boat model underwent to obtain certification before it was sold.

1 burglary had any connection to Laci's disappearance. It also presented evidence that a stranger 2 had gone to several houses on December 23 asking for money and, one neighbor thought, 3 casing houses for burglaries, and so might have had something to do with her disappearance. 4 *Testimony was presented that the same neighbor, walking with a police officer on Christmas* 5 Day to look for the stranger, had seen a pair of sandals lying in the road 150 feet from the Petersons' home; the neighbor wondered at the time if they might have any connection to Laci's 6 7 disappearance, but the officer just left them there. To support the possibility of a third party's 8 involvement, the defense challenged the prosecution's theory that Conner died December 23 or 9 24, presenting its own expert who testified based on ultrasounds and other evidence that Conner 10 lived until after Christmas.

11 The defense also sought to challenge other aspects of the prosecution's case. To rebut 12 the dog-trailing evidence, the defense called Ronald Seitz, a second dog handler who also had 13 his dog try to find Laci's scent at the Berkeley Marina on December 28. The dog, T.J., was given 14 Laci's slipper as a scent object, but discovered no scent trail. To rebut the inference that 15 Peterson had a financial incentive to kill Laci, the defense presented a financial expert who 16 testified that TradeCorp U.S.A. and the Petersons were both reasonably financially healthy. To 17 portray the prosecution's theory as physically impossible, the defense also sought to introduce 18 video of a demonstration with a weighted 150-pound dummy in a boat on the bay in which a 19 defense firm employee, trying to dump the dummy out, sank the boat. As will be discussed 20 below, the trial court excluded the video.

The defense offered explanations for the circumstances of Peterson's behavior in
April. His use of his mother's name to purchase a car was at her suggestion, to avoid having it
impounded. He had large amounts of cash because she gave it to him to reimburse him for
money erroneously withdrawn from his bank account rather than hers. Finally, he had his
brother's driver's license because the club where he was going to golf that day gave discounts
for local residents such as his brother.

27 3. Guilt Phase Verdict

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The jury found Peterson guilty of murder in the first degree for killing Laci and

murder in the second degree for killing Conner. (See cal, 189.) It found true the sole charged special circumstance, for multiple murder. (See id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)

#### **PEOPLE'S RESPONSES** TO THE FACTS ALLEGED BY PETITIONER THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS FIFTH. SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY, AND A RELIABLE DETERMINATION OF PENALTY BY A SEATED JUROR'S CONCEALMENT OF BIAS DURING VOIR DIRE.

The People will recount Petitioner's 41 alleged facts as to Claim One (Petition, pp. 96-108) and will provide their response to the alleged fact in bold directly after each alleged fact or its subpart.

1. The facts and allegations set forth in all other claims in this petition are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

The People deny this allegation. The Order to Show Cause requires resolution of 13 only Claim I. The facts and allegations of the other claims are irrelevant. "A court issues 14 15 an order to show cause in a habeas corpus matter only when the petitioner has stated a 16 prima facie case for relief on one or more claims. The order, and the new cause thereby created, is limited to that specific claim or claims, and the petitioner bears the burden of 18 establishing the invalidity of the underlying judgment. (See *People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 19 Cal.4th 464, 474, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252; People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 20 728, 737-740, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388.)" (*People v. Superior Court* (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 572.) Accordingly, Petitioner's claim is now limited to whether 22 Juror No. 7 committed misconduct.

2. "[O]ne accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. (U.S. Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16 [citations].) The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution." (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110-112.)

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The People deny this allegation, since there are no facts alleged. (See Petition, p.

96-97.) However, Petitioner's statements are references to law cited by *In re Hitchings*(1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, at page 110. The citation used by Petitioner to pages 110-112 of *In re Hitchings* must be either meant as legal argument or a discussion of the facts of that case and not a matter that must be admitted or denied.

3. A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process, impairing the defendant's ability to exercise forcause and peremptory challenges. Such a juror commits misconduct. (*Ibid.*)

The People deny this point, since there are no facts alleged. As with the prior statement, Petitioner has not alleged facts, but merely cites to the same law. If the court were to treat this as a factual allegation, the People deny that Juror No. 7 concealed or gave false answers during voir dire examination nor did she commit misconduct.

4. Prior to voir dire, the prospective jurors in this case filled out a questionnaire. (See Clerk's Transcript, Main Juror Questionnaires [an unsealed volume containing a copy of the jury questionnaires filled out by the 12 jurors picked for the jury and the six alternates].) (Footnote 23: The questionnaires do not bear the names of the jurors; rather they are identified by juror number. Seated Jurors were identified by numbers 1 through 12, alternates by numbers 1 through 6. (E.g., "Juror # 1," "Juror # 7," and "Alternate Juror # 2.) (See Clerk's Transcript, Main Juror Questionnaires, at p. 1.)

The People admit that prior to voir dire prospective jurors filled out the questionnaire; the People also contend this was done without the aid of any person present to answer clarifying questions the jurors might have had to any unclear portions of the questionnaire at the time the form was completed. The People admit that the questionnaires bear the assigned juror number instead of the individual juror's name. The People do not dispute that jurors were identified by number, rather than by name, but add that alternate jurors were seated during the trial resulting in some jurors being identified by the same number (during different time periods) which also resulted in the court using

1	additional identifying information to differentiate the jurors.	
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3	5. The questionnaires asked jurors to describe their experience with the legal system. The	
4	following questions were relevant to this inquiry:	
5	54a. Have you ever been involved in a lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)?	
6	YesNo	
7	54b. If yes, were you:The plaintiffThe defendantBoth	
8	72. Have you ever participated in a trial as a party, witness or interested	
9	observer?YesNo.	
10	If yes, please explain:	
11	74. Have you, or any member of your family, or close friends, ever been the	
12	VICTIM of a crime or a WITNESS to any crime?	
13	If yes, please explain:	
14	The People admit the questionnaires asked jurors to describe their experience with	
15	the legal system. The People also admit that questions 54a, 54b, 72 and 74 <u>may have been</u>	
16	relevant to this inquiry. The People also contend that these were not the only questions on	
17	the questionnaire that pertained to experience with the legal system. For example,	
18	question 31 asked the jurors if they had received any training in law, law enforcement or	
19	criminology.	
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21	6. On March 9, 2004, Juror 6756, Richelle <sup>24</sup> filled out a questionnaire. (CT Main Juror	
22	Questionnaires 300-332, attached hereto as Exh. 44 [Juror Questionnaire for Richelle ] at	
23	HCP-000882-000902.) [Pet.'s Footnote 24: Petitioner identifies Ms. by name rather than	
24	by juror number in light of the fact that Ms. , along with six other jurors, published a book	
25	in their own names about their experiences as jurors in Mr. Peterson's case. [See Exh. 8 ("We	
26	the Jury"] 8.] In that book, Ms. identified herself as Alternate Juror No. 2, who eventually	
27	became Juror No. 7. (Exh. 8 at HCP-000140, HCP-000142, HCP-000163.) According to the	
28	index of the Clerk's Transcript, Main Juror Questionnaires, the jury questionnaire for Alternate	
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Juror No. 2 appears at pp. 300-322.]

The People admit that Juror 6756 filled out the questionnaire. The People contend they are required by law to refer to the juror as Juror No. 7 or 6756. "Upon the recording of a jury's verdict in a criminal jury proceeding, the court's record of personal juror identifying information of trial jurors, as defined in Section 194, consisting of names, addresses, and telephone numbers, <u>shall be sealed until further order of the court</u> as provided by this section." (Civ. Proc. Code § 237, subd. (a)(2); emphasis added.) "For purposes of this section, "sealed" or "sealing" means extracting or otherwise removing the personal juror identifying information from the court record." (Civ. Proc. Code § 237, subd. (a)(3).) The California Supreme Court referred to the juror as Juror No. 7, and the People will continue to do so until further order of the court; whether the juror disclosed his or her name voluntarily under other circumstances is irrelevant.

7. In response to Question 54a, Ms. checked "No." (*Id.* at HCP-000889.)

The People admit that Juror 6756 checked the "No" box to Question 54a, however, the People contend that this in no way communicated to the court what the juror's understanding of the question was or her intent in marking it as such. This factual point will be addressed in the People's Points and Authorities, much as was discussed in *In re Cowan* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 235.<sup>10</sup> The People contend that Juror No. 7 by checking Question 54a as "No" did not answer the question incorrectly in her mind. In her affidavit, Juror No. 7 states that she did not believe that a restraining order was a "lawsuit" as meant in that question. (Exhibit #1 - Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.) She did not lie or otherwise intentionally withhold information. She believed that "lawsuit" referred to a suit for money or property. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 10.) The wording of the question itself adds credibility to her understanding – "Have you ever been involved in a lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)?" The People further contend that the lack of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Any factual point that has a legal component to it will be addressed in the People's Points and Authorities. This is done to keep the distinction between facts that must still be proven by competent evidence and case law that is readily available to the court.

training in the law (referenced above as an answer to Question No. 31) eliminates any illintent that might be inferred.

8. Ms. left Question 54b blank. (*Id.* at HCP-000890.)

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The People admit that Juror 6756 left Question 54b blank; however, the People contend leaving this subpart of Question 54 blank lacks any meaning based on Juror No. 7's understanding of what she thought a "lawsuit" was. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.) She did not lie or otherwise intentionally omit information; she believed she had no response.

9. In response to Question 72, Ms. checked "No." (*Id.* at HCP-000894.)

The People admit that Juror 6756 checked the box to Question 72 as "No." It is important to look at the specific wording of the question – "Have you ever participated in a trial as a party, witness or interested observer?" The People contend that Juror No. 7 answered the question truthfully as, by legal definitions, at the time of her answers to the questionnaire she had never participated in a <u>trial</u> as a party, witness or interested observer. As stated in her declaration, prior to her jury service in this case, Juror No. 7 had never participated in a trial. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.)

10. In response to Question 74, Ms. checked "No." (*Id.* at HCP-000894.)

The People admit that Juror 6756 checked "No" for Question 74, which asked if she ("you"), "or any member of your family, or close friends, [have] ever been the VICTIM or WITNESS to any crime?" The People contend that Juror No. 7 did not consider herself to have been a victim or witness and she still does not, as she explains in her Declaration. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22, 24-25.) We further contend that Juror No. 7's view in this regard was, and remains, objectively reasonable.

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11. These answers were false.

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The People deny the truth of Petitioner's allegations referenced in this subpart of Claim One. These questions were answered according to Juror No. 7's understanding of them. Her answers were not false but based upon her understanding of the terms used. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22, 24-25.) Petitioner's contention is self-serving in that it is based on what he wanted the questions to mean. Uncertainty and ambiguity can lead to incorrect or incomplete answers but for them to be false he must establish an intent to deceive. "Jurors are not automatons. They are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues. If the system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection short of actual bias. To demand theoretical perfection from every juror during the course of a trial is unrealistic." (*People v. Miles* (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 513, 601–02.)

12. Case files obtained from the San Mateo Superior Court disclose that on November 27,

2000, Ms. filed a lawsuit, entitled "Petition for Injunction Prohibiting Harassment" against one, M**REE** K**REE**. (Exh. 45 [*Richelle* **V**. **REE**, San Mateo Superior Court Case No. 415040, filed Nov. 27, 2000].)

The People deny the truth of Petitioner's allegation. The petition request was not titled a "lawsuit". As Petitioner acknowledges, it was entitled "Petition for Injunction Prohibiting Harassment". (HCP-000905, Ex. 45.) The People do not have enough information to admit or deny that case files obtained from the San Mateo Superior Court disclose that on November 27, 2000 that Juror No. 7 applied for an Injunction; the People may accept the exhibits attached (Ex. 45) and believe that Petitioner may be able to establish the legal foundation for the admission of the exhibit. The People contend that nowhere in the document's title are there facts that would lead an ordinary citizen to believe the petition was a lawsuit. Juror No. 7 did not believe this proceeding was a lawsuit. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 10-12.)

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- 13. In this lawsuit, Ms. made the following allegations:

A.

"M is my ex-boyfriend's ex girlfriend." (*Id.* at HCP-000905.)

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The People deny the truth of Petitioner's allegation; the petition request was not titled a "lawsuit" and the People do not concede the allegation in the context it is stated. As for Part A., the People contend that the document speaks for itself, assuming that Petitioner can establish the admissibility and content of the document. "A court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file." (People v. Sur. Ins. Co., (1982) 136 Cal. App. 3d 556, 564; citations omitted.) "As was stated in Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914, (a) trial court may properly take judicial notice of the records of any court of record of any state of the United States. But, as is stated in Jefferson, California Evidence Benchbook (1972) Judicial Notice, section 47.3, at page 840: Caveat: Limitations on judicial notice of court records. What is meant by taking judicial notice of court records? There exists a mistaken notion that this means taking judicial notice of the existence of facts asserted in every document of a court file, ... a court Cannot take judicial notice of Hearsay allegations as being true, just because they are part of a court record or file...." (People v. Rubio, (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 757, 766, disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 434; internal quotations and citations omitted; "Cannot" capitalized in *Day*.)

B. "On Sept.23, 2020 at about 10:30 am M came to Richelle's house and slashed her ex-boyfriends tires yelled and screamed in front of her house. Kicked in her front door while she (I) was on the phone with police. M came to nake threats to Richelle. On Nov. 11<sup>th</sup> M called her house. Then on Nov. 12<sup>th</sup>, M called up behind Richelle in her work van yelling things and pointing at her, ended up following her to work then drove off. She has told Richelle that she knows where she lives and she will handle things on the streets when she (M called her." (*Id.* at HCP-000907.)

For part B., the People contend that the document speaks for itself if Petitioner can 25

establish the admissibility and content of the document, as specified above. However, this portion of the document appears to have been crossed out. (Ex. 45, HCP-000907 box 19.)

C. "Richelle is about 4-1/2 months pregnant. Methods knows this. Still is making threats towards [sic] her ... She has for the last month put stress on Richelle and my unborn child and family." (*Id.* at HCP 000907-000908.)

For part C., the People contend that the document speaks for itself if Petitioner can establish the admissibility and content of the document, as specified above, in addition to establishing that the handwritten quote is from Juror No. 7. This statement is not correctly quoted, but more importantly is a continuation of the handwritten statement that was crossed out as set out above.

D. As a result, "Richelle really fears for her unborn child. ... As a result in all the stress she has caused Richelle, she started having early contractions..." (*Id.* at HCP-000908.)

For part D., the People contend that the document speaks for itself if Petitioner can establish the admissibility and content of the document, as specified above, in addition to establishing that the handwritten quote is from Juror No. 7. This statement is not correctly quoted, but more importantly is a continuation of the handwritten statement that was crossed out as set out above in part B.

E. "Richelle does not want Market to be able to come anywhere near her child after it is born. Richelle feels like Market would try to hurt the baby, with all the hate and anger she has for Richelle." (*Id.* at HCP-000909.)

For part E., the People contend that the document speaks for itself if Petitioner can establish the admissibility and content of the document, as specified above.

14. Following an evidentiary hearing at which both Juror and defendant Martin weresworn and testified, the superior court entered an order prohibiting Martin Kara from

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harassing both Richelle and her unborn child for a period of three years. (Id. at HCP-1 000914.) 2

The People admit some portions of this statement and deny others. Although Petitioner cites to HCP-000914 there are two separate forms/exhibits relating to the facts he alleges. There is a "Minute Order [HCP-000914] and the "Order After Hearing On Petition For Injunction Prohibiting Harassment (CLETS)" [HCP-000912 to 000913]. Both forms refer simply to "hearing," not an evidentiary hearing. Further, the testimony at hearings for a restraining order is not subject to the state evidentiary rules. For example, persons testifying routinely engage in the use of hearsay without application of hearsay exceptions. Further, HCP-000914 does not say "three years" as alleged by Petitioner; it is HCP-000912 that states that the order shall expire on midnight on "12/13/03" which is a period of three years after the hearing.

15. Further, as a result of her malicious conduct against Ms. Ms. K was convicted of the crime of vandalism and was sentenced to a week in county jail. (HCP-000916.)

The People deny this statement. Ms. K 's malicious conduct was against E (slashing his tires) (HCP-000905). The People contend that the very letter cited W by Petitioner to make his allegation, if quoted correctly, would prove his allegation to be false. In Ms. Karry's letter to the judge, she wrote that "Finally I got tired of it and went over to her house to obtain my house key from Mr. W got into a verbal heated argument with him which resulted in my doing some things to Mr. W vehicle that I am not proud of. As a result of my actions I was punished for vandalism and served one week in the Elmwood facility at the Santa Clara County Jail." (Ex. 45, page HCP-000916.)

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16. During the jury selection process, including her jury questionnaire (Exh. 44), and oral voir dire, which appears at Exhibit 46 [Voir Dire of Richelle ], Juror failed to disclose that 28 she and her boyfriend had been victims.

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The People deny this statement. As stated above, Juror No. 7 had not been a victim of Mattices crime. Mattices's crime was vandalism and Juror No. 7's ex-boyfriend was the victim of the crime. Juror No.7 was never asked during oral voir dire about question No. 74, nor any other similar type of question. Question 74 asked specifically "Have you, or any member of your family, or close friends, ever been the VICTIM or WITNESS to any crime?" As alleged by Petitioner above (in item 13A) Mr. Wattices was an exboyfriend, which most people would not immediately consider to be family or a close friend. As stated in her declaration, Juror No. 7 does not believe she has ever been a victim. She believes she answered the question correctly based on what she thought was true at the time. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22, 24 and 25.)

17. During the jury selection process, including in her jury questionnaire and oral voir dire, Juror failed to disclose that she had filed a lawsuit against M to prevent M from harming Richelle and her unborn child.

The People deny this statement. Juror No. 7 was never asked during oral voir dire about question No. 54a, nor any other similar type of question. As stated above in items 7 and 11, the action was not titled "lawsuit". Juror No. 7 filed a "petition". She did not believe that it was a lawsuit. Lawsuits, she believed, were for money or property. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 10.) The People's prior contentions on this point are applicable here as well.

18. During the jury selection process, including in her jury questionnaire and oral voir dire,
Juror failed to disclose that she was sworn and testified in court in order to obtain a
restraining order against Mathematic prevent Mathematics from harming Richelle and her unborn child.

The People deny this statement. Juror No. 7 did not "fail" to disclose if she had
been sworn and testified in court, because that was not what the questions asked.
Petitioner merges the concepts of the different questions contained in the questionnaire

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RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

into concepts that were not specifically asked. The proceeding for the restraining order was a hearing, not a trial. (See Code of Civil Proc., § 527.6.) Juror No. 7 did not testify at a trial, and she did not view herself as a victim.

19. Juror wanted to be on Petitioner's jury. She declined to be excused from serving despite enormous financial hardship it would cause her. When the court began voir dire, it asked Ms. how long her employer would pay her while she was on jury duty.

The People deny this statement. The transcript of the oral voir dire refutes this assertion. During the exchange between Juror No. 7 and the trial judge, Juror No. 7 was being excused from service due to a hardship. (RT 4599 marked as HCP-000924.) Juror No. 7 accepted the court's finding stating, "Thank You." (*Ibid.*) It was Mr. Geragos who wanted Juror No. 7 to be on Petitioner's jury asking the court to further examine her hardship request. (HCP-000924-000925.) Juror No. 7 told the court she would only be paid for two weeks. Mr. Geragos said, "Yeah, but we've got a couple of others who have said the same thing." (HCP-000925, lines 6-7.) The People deny that at the time of the oral voir dire Juror No. 7 was facing enormous financial hardship, if she was selected to be on the jury. Juror No. 7 was asked about her hardship by the court and stated her significant other would "carry the load." (HCP-000935.) When Mr. Geragos asked if her significant other would "shoulder [the load]," Juror No. 7 confirmed that he would. (HCP-000952.) The People agree that Juror No. 7 was asked by the judge how long she would be paid by her employer.

20. The extremely lengthy trial imposed a financial hardship on Ms.
Was forced to borrow money from a fellow juror, who loaned her \$1000. (Exh. 8 at HCP-000244.)

The People deny this statement as it relates to Juror No.7 at the time of jury selection. Later circumstances are irrelevant to the question before this court. If the court wishes to explore this content, then based on Petitioner's Exh. 8, where this assertion

comes from, the court will find immediately after that allegation, in the very next paragraph of Petitioner's document, "The credit union agreed to pay her salary and medical benefits for the duration of the trial." (HCP-000244, third paragraph up from the bottom.) Furthermore, the court during voir dire had told Juror No. 7 that he could not let her go, if something developed saying, "Gee, Judge, I need the money. You're here for the duration; do you understand that." (HCP-000925.) Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that Juror No. 7 was suffering a financial hardship.

9 21. The juror who loaned Ms. the \$1000 made a gift of it to her and told her that she did
0 not have to repay it. (*Ibid.*)

The People deny this statement as it relates to Juror No.7 at the time of jury selection. It is not relevant, and the juror said, "If you want to pay me back someday that's fine but I'm not asking for it." (HCP-000245.)

22. Petitioner alleges that Ms. wanted to sit in judgment of Mr. Peterson, in part to punish him for a crime of harming his unborn child – a crime that she personally experienced when
Matrix Karra threatened Richelle's life and the life of Richelle's unborn child.

The People deny this statement. The two situations are not even remotely similar. Juror No. 7 denies this contention.

23. For this reason, Juror was actually biased against Petitioner.

The People deny this statement. Juror No. 7 denies that she had or has ever had any bias against Petitioner. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 31.)

24. Juror 's bias, based on her own victimization as a woman whose unborn child was
threatened by another, was confirmed during deliberations. Ten jurors voted to convict Mr.
Peterson of second degree murder of the unborn child. Juror was a holdout juror, who
strenuously argued that the killing of the unborn child was first degree murder. (Exh. 8 at HCP-

RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

000238.) During deliberations, Juror passionately, and personally, argued to her fellowjurors, "How can you not kill the baby?, said, pointing to her stomach." (*Ibid.*) As the jurors recounted the deliberations, "The issue of fetus versus a living child also came into play for some jurors, but not for Richelle . 'That was no fetus, that was a child,' said. 'Everyone heard I referred to him as 'Little Man.' If he could have been born, he would have survived. It's unfair. He didn't give that baby a chance.'" (*Ibid.*)

The People deny these statements and subparts. The allegation that Juror No. 7 had a bias, based on her own victimization as a woman whose unborn child was threatened by another, was confirmed during deliberations as untrue and not supported by any declarations of the other jurors. (The declaration of Juror No. 6 at page HCP-000987 does not support this allegation.) The remaining parts of this allegation relate to jury deliberations and according to Evidence Code section 1150(a) such evidence is <u>not</u> admissible to show the effect of statements or events on the mental processes of a juror when inquiring into the validity of a verdict. If the court were to find that such evidence is not barred, the People contend the allegations are still false. First this court may take notice that the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder of Conner meaning that all 12 jurors voted to convict, not 10 as stated. The fact that a juror argues during deliberation in support of a position does not demonstrate bias, actual or otherwise. In fact, Juror No. 7 was not the only juror who argued in favor first degree murder of Conner. Juror No. 4 argued, "[Conner] was a living, breathing entity." (HCP-000238.) Juror No. 4 asserted the murders were more directed at Conner than at Laci. (Ibid.) And according to Petitioner's proffered exhibit, Juror No. 4 was the "last one" to hold out for a first degree finding before he "relented" and voted with the other jurors. (HCP-000238.)

25. Following petitioner's conviction and death sentence, Ms. took the extraordinary step
26 of beginning correspondence with petitioner. Between 2005 and 2007, Ms. sent petitioner
27 at least 28 letters.

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The People cannot determine the accuracy of this allegation. Factually, it is

irrelevant. However, in context, according to Petitioner's proffered document it was Juror 1 2 No. 7's therapist who suggested that her client tell Petitioner about her life, because she 3 had had two breakdowns since the end of trial. (HCP-000264.) 4 5 26. In letters to petitioner, Ms. disclosed an obsessive interest in the death of Petitioner's unborn child. 6 7 The People deny this allegation. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal 8 foundation for the admission of the letters, Juror No. 7's letters did not show an obsessive 9 interest. Juror No. 7's letters covered a range of topics and her concern for Laci and 10 Laci's family as well as for Conner is apparent throughout the letters. (E.g. HCP-000967; 11 **HCP-000972.**) The People's full argument as to the letters sent to Petitioner is in Section V, 12 infra. 13 27. In one letter, for example, Ms. stated: 14 15 "My heart aches for your son. Why couldn't he have the same chances I [sic] life as you were given? You should have been dreaming of your son being the best at whatever he did in life, not planning a way to get rid of him! Now, 16 you will never know the feeling and joy of being a father. To be able to experience the feeling inside when a father or mother witness their child's first 17 steps, the sound of their laugh, the excitement in their eyes when their 18 Mommy/Daddy walk in from being at work all day, the pain you feel in your heart when you child is hurt, whether physically or emotionally, etc ..... May not sound like much to you as you sit in there standing by your selfish lies .... 19 But as a parent myself, these feeling are much more intense than the feeling you get for any man/woman you might ever meet in life and fall in love or lust with. 20 Those feelings can't even match the passion and unconditional love a parent 21 feels for their child. And to know no matter what you do in life, your child will always have the same kind of love and loyalty right back. You, Scott, messed that up for yourself, and to me, that is very sad and unfortunate. You really have 22 no idea. You never will!" 23 24 The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also irrelevant as to whether 25 Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal foundation 26 for the admission of the letters, the letters were written to Petitioner after Juror No. 7 had 27 heard the evidence in the case, and Petitioner was convicted and sentenced. Further, the 28 cited passage focuses on the loss to Petitioner of the joys of being a parent, not an

"obsessive interest in the death of [Conner]." 1

28. In letters that followed, Juror repeatedly described her intense, emotional feelings

about petitioner's deceased child. In one letter, she told petitioner,

"It's not easy raising 4 boys on your own!! It's so much fun and could be better!! [¶] You would have loved being a Dad, Scott! I wish you just would have tried. Your kids would never known [sic] what it's like to struggle. You & Laci would have been wonderful parents. We can't turn back time, what's done is all ready [sic] done but you would have loved it!"

(*Id.* at HCP-000964-000965.)

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9 The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also irrelevant as to whether 10 Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal foundation for the admission of the letters, all of letters were written to Petitioner after Juror No. 7 had heard the evidence in the case. The quoted passage does not discuss the deceased child, but the loss of the joy of parenthood to Petitioner. Many of the jurors were affected by this case. One former juror, Juror No. 9, corresponded with the court to inquire about 14 15 counseling services and the court replied, "The court does not offer these services." (HCP-000262.) Juror No. 9 said she thinks about the case every day. (HCP-000263.) Post-trial 16 events do not show pre-trial bias.

29. In another letter, Juror wrote, "I just pray god has givin [sic] Laci arms to hold her presous [sic] baby." (Id. at HCP-000965.) And "I hope Laci & Conner will be able to hold each other on the 23<sup>rd</sup>." (*Id.* at HCP-000964.)

22 The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also irrelevant as to whether 23 Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal foundation 24 for the admission of the letters, Juror No. 7 is simply echoing Laci's mother's testimony at 25 the penalty phase. (Petn.'s Exh. 8. HCP-000249 to HCP-000250.) Juror No. 7 was not the 26 only juror impacted by the trial evidence. Juror No. 4 said he still thinks about the 27 autopsy photos of Laci and Conner, which brought him a flashback from his military 28 service of a young brother marine's body shattered during a grenade attack. Juror No. 4

also said, "I can't look at the bay without being reminded that part of Laci is still out there." (HCP-000271.) Juror No. 8 still has nightmares. (*Ibid.*) Juror No. 8 also says "the San Francisco Bay used to represent serenity. But now it beckons with the hollow cries of Laci and Conner Peterson. All I can think of is Laci's head still on the floor San Francisco Bay looking up to God and asking why." (HCP-000265.) Juror No. 9 said, "I haven't celebrated one Christmas since then. I just can't get into it." (HCP-000267.) Also, she can no longer walk along the bay which is near where she works without thinking about where they found the bodies. *We the Jury* also stated as to Juror No. 9 that, "[s]he doesn't have flashbacks from seeing the gruesome autopsy photos, but they had one culinary impact, she no longer eats ribs." (HCP-000267.) "It just bothers me now," Juror No. 9 said. "When they talked about the dogs chewing on Laci, that was disturbing. Seeing the baby's face really got to me. Every once in a while I see the little baby. It had a little face. It wasn't just a fetus, it was a person." (*Ibid.*) The letter was written after Juror No. 7 had seen the evidence presented at trial and Petitioner was convicted and sentenced. As such, it shows no bias before the trial.

30. In another letter, Juror described learning that her son had been near a drive-by shooting in East Palo Alto, and how upset she was. She then wrote, "Damit [sic] Scott that was your son! Your first born. If you never wanted children you should have married someone with the same wants as you." (*Id.* at HCP-000968.) Then she added, "The fear that runs over a parent when they can't help [their child] is the worst fear ever. You just remember that." (*Ibid.*)

The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also irrelevant as to whether Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal foundation for the admission of the letters, the letter was written after Juror No. 7 had seen the evidence presented at trial.

731. In another letter, Juror wrote about her inability to provide for her children. She then8told petitioner, "Conner would have never had to go through this. He would have had a

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wonderful life." (*Id.* at HCP-000973.) She then told Petitioner, "Laci and Conner have been on my mind so much these last few days. I think of them daily, but these past few days have been hard. I keep praying for them and you Scott." (*Id.* at HCP-000976.)

The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also irrelevant as to whether Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. Assuming Petitioner can establish a legal foundation for the admission of the letters, it simply demonstrates Juror No. 7's compassion for all parties, the victims and Petitioner.

32. In another letter, Juror wrote, "You know what, Scott, I see your son. I can visualize him. Dark hair, dark skin, beautiful little boy. I can see him. I see Laci's big smile shining down on him." (*Id.* at HCP-000974.)

The People deny this allegation. This allegation is also not relevant to whether Juror No. 7 was biased before trial. The letter was written after Juror No. 7 saw the evidence presented at trial and represents the same kind of ruminations as the other jurors described in the People's Response to paragraph 29 above.

33. Juror concealed on voir dire a subject that was extremely important and emotionally critical to her: that she had personally experienced the threat of losing a child through the intentional, harassing conduct of her ex-boyfriend's girlfriend.

The People deny this allegation. Juror No. 7 did not conceal information. She answered the question as she interpreted it. Juror No. 7 had no bias against Petitioner before the start of the trial; after hearing all of the evidence she reached a reasonable decision regarding the guilt of Petitioner along with her co-jurors. The allegation that harassment by an ex-girlfriend of her ex-boyfriend is the same as being murdered by her husband is a stretch. Juror No.7 did not think the questions applied to her and did not consider any of the circumstance of her past to fall within the questions asked. (Juror No. 7's Declaration.)

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34. Juror sexperience of a juror deeply concerned about losing an unborn child through intentional misconduct of another was material to the issue in petitioner's case, which similarly involved the death of an unborn child through misconduct of another.

The People deny this allegation and cannot determine how this differs from Petitioner's paragraph number 33, above.

35. Petitioner's trial counsel was extremely concerned that Petitioner's right to a fair and impartial jury required him "to ferret out and challenge for cause jurors whom [he] believed had prejudged the case and wanted to get on the jury in order to punish Mr. Peterson for the alleged crimes of killing his wife and unborn child." (Exh. 49 [Supp. Declaration of Mark Geragos] at HCP-000981.)

The People cannot confirm or deny counsel's thoughts at trial. Even Mr. Geragos stated in his declaration that he did not recall Juror No. 7's answers in the questionnaire and that he had to review it recently.

36. During jury selection, Mr. Geragos reviewed Ms. **11**'s jury questionnaire. (*Ibid.*) He recalled that Ms. **11**'s stated on her questionnaire that she had never been a victim of a crime, had never been involved in a lawsuit, and had never participated in a trial as a party or witness. (*Ibid.*)

The People deny this assertion, as his declaration, depending on its admissibility, speaks for itself. Mr. Geragos stated he only recalled Juror No. 7's answers in the questionnaire after a recent review of it. Further, Juror No. 7 has never considered herself the victim of a crime. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.) Neither did Juror No. 7 believe that she had been involved in a lawsuit. She believed the term "lawsuit" referred to a suit for money or property. (*Id.* at paragraph 10.) Finally, Juror No. 7 had never participated in a trial as a party or witness. The taking of testimony for the purpose of deciding the issuance of a restraining order is not the equivalent of a trial. Juror No. 7 never participated as a witness in a prosecution.

1	37. Habeas counsel has provided Mr. Geragos with the case file of <i>Richelle</i> v. M		
2	<i>K</i> , appearing at Exhibit 45. After reviewing that file, Mr. Geragos unequivocally states:		
3	Had I known about Ms. ""'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''		
4	malicious acts of another, I would absolutely have challenged her for cause. The state was alleging that Mr. Peterson had harmed his unborn child. There is		
5 6	no way in the world I would have wanted a juror to sit in judgment of Mr. Peterson, when that juror had been a victim of the very crime for which Mr. Peterson was on trial.		
7	(Exh. 49, at HCP-000982.)		
8	The People deny this assertion, as Mr. Geragos's declaration, depending on its		
9	admissibility, speaks for itself. Mr. Geragos opines based upon an assumption of the facts		
10	that have not been established. Juror No. 7 has never considered herself the victim of a		
11	crime. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.) And, clearly, she had never been the		
12	victim of murder.		
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14	38. Mr. Geragos further states that he believes the challenge for cause would have been		
15	sustained. If it had not "[he] would have exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Ms.		
16	from the jury."		
17	The People deny this assertion, as they are unable to confirm or deny Mr.		
18	Geragos's thought processes. The defense left a juror on who had been married to a		
19	murderer who, while in prison, had been murdered. (HCP-000161.)		
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21	39. Juror suppression of this material information constituted juror misconduct.		
22	The People deny this assertion. Juror No. 7 suppressed no material information.		
23	(Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.)		
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25	40. Such misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice, (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273,		
26	295; People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578), which places the burden on the State to show		
27	that there was no substantial likelihood that the juror was not actually biased against the		
28	defendant.		
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The People deny this allegation. This is not a fact but a statement of law. 1 2 Petitioner contends that his 41 points are alleged facts, but many on their face are not facts 3 but self-serving inferences. The inferences still do not support the facts as he alleges them to be. In any event, In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, specifically holds, 4 5 Still, whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or irregularity is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. Any presumption of prejudice is 6 rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the 7 particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were 8 actually biased against the defendant. 9 10 (Id. at 296; internal citations and quotations omitted.) This issue is discussed further in 11 Respondent's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, post. 12 41. In view of the surrounding circumstances of Juror 's suppression, and her conduct 13 thereafter, the State cannot carry this burden. 14 15 The People deny this allegation. Juror No. 7 answered the questions according to her understanding of them, which is objectively reasonable. She did not lie. She 16 17 suppressed nothing. Her conduct after the trial is irrelevant, as it occurred after she had 18 heard the evidence presented at trial. 19 20 The People contend that Petitioner has been lawfully convicted, as evidenced by the 21 opinion of the California Supreme Court. (The People request this court to take Judicial 22 Notice of the opinion in People v. Scott Peterson, Case No. S132449 pursuant to Evidence 23 Code §452(d) and §453.) The People further contend Petitioner's confinement is legal in 24 that he has failed to demonstrate by the appropriate burden of proof that prejudicial juror 25 misconduct occurred. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 38 RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

# **INTRODUCTION**

The only question for this court is whether Juror No. 7 committed prejudicial misconduct by not disclosing her prior involvement with other legal proceedings, including but not limited to being the victim of a crime, as alleged in Claim 1.

Petitioner has attempted to characterize an average person in the community who was randomly contacted for jury service as a person who was out to get him. He believes this one person who responded to a notice for jury service did so solely to persecute him.

However, this prospective juror was like all the others who responded to the notice for jury service. She was an average person doing her civic duty. She completed a 20-page questionnaire of 116 questions, and she did so to the best of her ability, having a high school education. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 3.) That the breadth of her vocabulary is different from a person who has been to college, three years of law school, passed the bar examination and spent their career in the legal field, should surprise no one. Who could be surprised that a lay person might have a different notion of what a "lawsuit" is? Who could be surprised that an ordinary citizen does not consider a hearing to be a trial? Who could be surprised that an ordinary citizen does not remember the "labels" given to participants of events from years earlier? The court forms provided by Petitioner ironically show the juror's uncertainty as to what her role was. (See HCP-000903.)

No person was present when any of the jurors answered the long questionnaires; therefore, none of them could ask anyone for assistance with the meanings of the words and questions. The prospective juror in question returned to the courthouse several weeks after the completion of the questionnaire, and was about to walk out of the courtroom after being released by the judge because her employer would only pay her for two weeks of jury service, when Mr. Geragos asked, "Did you ask her if it was a hardship?" (HCP-000924.) The judge told her to sit back down. (*Id.*) She turned around and went back to the seat. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 14.) Petitioner casts aspersions at Juror No. 7 for being willing to do her civic duty (implying that is proof of her bias), but notably Mr. Geragos was the one who pointed out that "we've got a couple of others who have said the same thing." (HCP-000925.)

1	During voir dire, Mr. Geragos could have asked the prospective juror anything he			
2	wished about her questionnaire. But Mr. Geragos focused on her fairness:			
3	Q. Okay. The do you have as you sit here – I asked another one of the jurors this			
4	morning, and she actually quantified it, she said that she believed kind of that she had a			
5	suspicion that he was guilty as he sits here. Do you have that, do you think? Do you walk in			
6	here with a suspicion that he's guilty?			
7	A. A suspicion that he's guilty?			
8	Q. Yeah.			
9	A. No, because I don't know, I wasn't there.			
10	Q. Okay. Do you think you can keep an open mind when are you the kind of person			
11	you gave a nice explanation to the prosecutor about prejudging and being prejudged.			
12	Do you think that because of that experience that your whatever it is that people			
13	prejudge you on, that you can you've got a unique ability to not prejudge people? Or at least			
14	fight against the urge?			
15	A. I wouldn't say unique, but I would say I try my hardest to really look at things from			
16	all areas. I mean, like I said to the prosecutor, I'm not perfect but I really I really try. (HCP-			
17	000951, RT page 4626, lines 4-24.)			
18	Try as he might, Petitioner is unsuccessful in painting a picture of a sophisticated,			
19	stealth-like citizen with an axe to grind against him. Instead, Juror No. 7 was not any different			
20	from any of the other prospective jurors who appeared for jury service and answered the			
21	questions on the questionnaire as they each understood them. As the Supreme Court has said,			
22	jurors are not automatons and mistakes are to be accepted. (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th			
23	634, 654-655.) Simple mistakes do not establish bias and Petitioner bears the burden of			
24	showing more. To do so, he has searched post-jury selection conduct but has been unable to find			
25	any admissible evidence that Juror No. 7 harbored a bias against him, even after 17 years of			
26	digging into her past and present. Unlike with most cases, Petitioner had an extraordinary			
27	opportunity in this case to read a book about the inner-workings of his trial jury. Eight of the			
28	jurors published a book about their collective experience, including Juror No. 7. Assuming the			

contents are considered competent evidence in the first instance, nowhere in the book does an 2 example of bias appear. Juror No. 7's conduct since the trial demonstrates nothing other than 3 what she saw and heard as evidence that was presented at trial. Petitioner had the opportunity to delve into his allegations of bias with Juror No. 7 because she corresponded with Petitioner. 4 5 However, her letters, if properly authenticated, never admitted to bias and Petitioner is left to allege that she obsessively focused on Petitioner's child. There was no obsession, rather, Juror 6 No. 7's letters show compassion and concern for all of the victims, including Laci and her 7 8 family. (See Section V, *infra*.) The same compassion and heartache that many of the former 9 jurors continue to live with is demonstrated by one juror's comment that she still sees Laci's head at the bottom of the bay staring up at God and asking "Why?" (HCP-000265.) 10

# HABEAS CORPUS STANDARDS

"'[H]abeas corpus is an extraordinary, limited remedy against a presumptively fair and valid final judgment' [citation]." (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 451, quoting People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260.) "If a criminal defendant has unsuccessfully tested the state's evidence at trial and appeal and wishes to mount a further, collateral attack, "all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them. Society's interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and due process is not thereby offended." " (Id. at p. 451, quoting *People v. Duvall* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.)

The California Supreme Court's issuance of an Order to Show Cause merely "signifies the court's preliminary determination that Petitioner has pleaded sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief." (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 475.) In response to an Order to Show Cause, Respondent is required to file a Return alleging facts tending to show Petitioner's confinement is legal and responding to Petitioner's factual allegations. (Id. at p. 483.)

25 "When an order to show cause does issue, it is limited to the claims raised in the petition 26 and the factual bases for those claims alleged in the petition," and "directs the respondent to 27 address only those issues." (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 781, fn. 16.) "[T]he return 28 should also, 'where appropriate, ... provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other

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1 materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.'" (*Duvall*,
2 *supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 476, quoting *In re Lewallen* (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278, fn. 2.)

Petitioner may then file a Traverse admitting or disputing the factual allegations in the Return, or stipulate to the Petition serving as a Traverse. (*Duvall, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 476-477.) The Traverse, however, cannot expand the scope of the proceeding by introducing "additional claims or wholly different factual bases for those claims" on which the Order to Show Cause was issued. (*Id.* at p. 478, quoting *In re Clark, supra*, 5 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 16.) In this manner, the factual and legal issues are defined and joined for review. (*Id.* at p. 478.)

The court will not order an evidentiary hearing unless it determines there are material facts in dispute. (*Duvall, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 478, 480.) An evidentiary hearing is required only if, after consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, and declarations, "the court finds there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner may be entitled to relief and Petitioner's entitlement to relief depends upon the resolution of an issue of fact." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.574(d).) At an evidentiary hearing, the burden of proof remains with Petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the facts asserted as grounds for relief. (*In re Bacigalupo* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 312, 333; *Duvall, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 483.)

## MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

# I.

# GOOD FAITH WHEN ANSWERING VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR THAT THERE WAS NO BIAS

Due process means a jury composed of persons capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it..." (*Smith v. Phillips* (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217.) The jury's verdict must be based on the evidence presented at trial in order to satisfy the defendant's due process rights. (*In re Boyette* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 890.)

Voir dire examination serves to protect a defendant's constitutional rights "by exposing
possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of the potential jurors." (*McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood* (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 554.) Lying about or omitting

1	material facts during voir dire can demonstrate prejudgment of the case, and thus, actual bias.			
2	(People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 585-586, 588.) However, the California Supreme			
3	Court has held that "good faith when answering voir dire questions is the most significant			
4	indicator that there was no bias" and that "an honest mistake on voir dire cannot disturb a			
5	judgment in the absence of proof that the juror's wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror's			
6	actual bias." (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 300; People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th			
7	1; In re Boyette, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Courts "must be tolerant, as jurors may forget			
8	incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid			
9	embarrassment." (Boyette, supra, at pp. 880-881.)			
10	In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, specifically holds,			
11	Still, whether an individual verdict must be overturned for jury misconduct or			
12	irregularity is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. Any presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict			
13	will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.			
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15	( <i>Id.</i> at p. 296; internal citations and quotations omitted.)			
I	П.			
16	II.			
16 17	II. JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH			
17	JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH			
17 18	<b>JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH</b> Several of the questions in the questionnaire asked jurors to describe their experience			
17 18 19	JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH Several of the questions in the questionnaire asked jurors to describe their experience with the legal system. Juror No. 7's answers to the following three questions (54, 72 and 74) are			
17 18 19 20	JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH Several of the questions in the questionnaire asked jurors to describe their experience with the legal system. Juror No. 7's answers to the following three questions (54, 72 and 74) are those to which Petitioner takes exception:			
17 18 19 20 21	JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH Several of the questions in the questionnaire asked jurors to describe their experience with the legal system. Juror No. 7's answers to the following three questions (54, 72 and 74) are those to which Petitioner takes exception: 54a. Have you ever been involved in a lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)?			
<ol> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> </ol>	JUROR NO. 7 ANSWERED THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE IN GOOD FAITH Several of the questions in the questionnaire asked jurors to describe their experience with the legal system. Juror No. 7's answers to the following three questions (54, 72 and 74) are those to which Petitioner takes exception: 54a. Have you ever been involved in a lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)? YesNo			
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If yes, please explain: Juror No. 7 attests in her sworn declaration, "I responded to the juror questionnaire candidly, truthfully, and to the best of my ability." (Juror No. 7's Declaration, No. 5.)			
candidly, truthfully, and to the best of my ability." (Juror No. 7's Declaration, No. 5.)			
A. Juror No. 7's Lack of Understanding of the Term "Lawsuit"			
Juror No. 7 placed an "X" next to "NO" to question 54a which asked, "Have you ever			
been involved in a lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)?" Juror No. 7 left blank question			
54b which asked, "If yes, were you: The plaintiff, the defendant or both? Please explain."			
Petitioner argues that Juror No. 7's answer was false, as a restraining order was issued			
against M K on December 13, 2000, and Juror No. 7 and her unborn child were the			
protected persons. (Petitioner's Exh. 45, p. HCP-000912.)			
Juror No. 7 attests in paragraphs 9 through 12 and 16 through 18 of her declaration that,			
9. Because I had answered no to '54a.,' I left '54b.' blank.			
10. At the time that I answered these questions—together and right in the middle of a twenty-page questionnaire—I understood the word "lawsuit" to			
mean and refer to a suit for money or property. I did not think that the question was a reference to any other appearance in court.			
11. I am not a lawyer and have no legal education, so my understanding of the word "lawsuit" at the time that I filled out the form excluded other types of court proceedings. I also looked to the language of question "54b.," which referred to a "plaintiff" and "defendant" to confirm my understanding of the questionnaire.			
12. I was not asked to clarify this written response by the judge or either of the parties or their representatives. No one followed up with me to explain			
what the word "lawsuit" meant to me. No one defined the word "lawsuit" to include being in court for any reason.			
16. I answered all the questions that were asked of me by the judge, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys. I clarified my oral responses when I was			
asked to do so, an opportunity I was not given when I filled out my written questionnaire.			
17. I do not remember being orally questioned about my answers to "54a." and "54b." on the questionnaire.			
18. At no time during the selection process did any court case in which I was involved cross my mind.			
(Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraphs. 9-12 and 16-18.)			
Not only laypersons need to be told the definition of a lawsuit, and whether or not one $44$			

had commenced. The Court of Appeal has had to define it for persons in the legal profession as 1 2 well. In Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, the appellate court explained, 3 In the trial courts, civil actions (such as lawsuits for damages or equitable relief) and special proceedings (such as writ petitions) are commenced when the plaintiff's complaint or petition is filed with the court. (§§ 411.10 ["A civil action 4 is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."], 350 [an action is 5 commenced "when the complaint is filed"], 1109 [except as otherwise provided, rules governing civil actions apply to special proceedings], 363 [the word " 'action' " as used in title of code on statute of limitations is construed whenever 6 necessary to include a special proceeding]; see, e.g., Allen v. Humboldt County 7 Board of Supervisors (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 877, 884-885, [34 Cal.Rptr. 232] [writ of mandate petition was subject to same rules regarding 8 commencement of civil actions]; Barnes v. Glide (1897) 117 Cal. 1, 6, [48 P. 804] [a mandamus proceeding is subject to applicable statute of limitations].) 9 The same rule of commencement applies with respect to federal court actions. (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 3[civil actions are commenced by filing a complaint 10 with the court].) 11 (*Id.* at p. 411, fn. omitted.) In sum, the definition of a lawsuit is a complex subject. An "action" 12 is commenced with the filing of a complaint. The forms submitted by Juror No. 7 for a 13 restraining order were titled, "Petition for Injunction Prohibiting Harassment," (HCP-000905) 14 "Order to Show Cause," (HCP-000903), "Order After Hearing on Petition for Injunction 15 Prohibiting Harassment" and "Civil Case Cover Sheet," (HCP-000911). She checked none of 16 the 39 boxes in No. 1 on the "Civil Case Cover Sheet," that would have indicated "the case type 17 that best describes this case". She checked only that it was not a class action suit in No. 5; this 18 is probably because she knew only the type of case that it was not. 19 Further, it is clear that Juror No. 7 was confused as to party designations. This is 20 demonstrated on the "Order to Show Cause" form upon which Juror No. 7 put M 21 K 's name after "Plaintiff" and then appears to have written her own name, darker, over 22 's name. (Petitioner's Exh. No. 45, p. HCP-000903.) After "Defendant," it can be Ms. K 23 seen that Juror No. 7's first name is written lightly under "Merror". (*Ibid.*) In other words, 24 she did not know who the plaintiff was or who the defendant was and had to switch their 25 positions by writing over them.

In her declaration, Juror No. 7 attests in paragraph 8, "I had never been a plaintiff or defendant to my memory, and therefore placed an "X" in the response field to question "54a." The Legislature apparently came to understand that "plaintiff" and "defendant" are not the

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proper terms to apply to parties to a petition for a restraining order, as a "petition" quite
 logically involves a "petitioner." In 2012, section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
 governs the procedure for restraining orders, was amended so that the parties were henceforth to
 be referred to as "petitioner" and "respondent," not "plaintiff" and "defendant."

(4) "Petitioner" means the person to be protected by the temporary restraining order and order after hearing and, if the court grant the petition, the protected party.

(5) "Respondent" means the person against whom the temporaryrestraining order and order after hearing are sought and, if the petition isgranted, the restrained person.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(4)-(5).)

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Based on the evidence before this court, petitioner has not established that Juror No. 7 believed the "lawsuit" question was applicable to her. It is questionable at best to say that the question was applicable to her. Her interpretation is objectively reasonable.

Assuming the question did apply to her circumstances, Petitioner cannot establish actual bias. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly found that mere mistakes are insufficient to overturn a verdict. In the case of *In re Manriquez* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, the foreperson, Juror C.B., neglected to disclose that she had been molested from the age of five until she was 13 or 14 (*id.* at p. 795) when asked the following questions on her questionnaire, "Have you or anyone close to you been the victim of a crime, reported or unreported?" (*Id.* at p. 793); "Have you or any relative or friend ever experienced or been present during a violent act, not necessarily a crime?" (*Id.* at p. 794); "Have you ever seen a crime being committed?" (*Ibid.*); or "Have you ever been in a situation where you feared being hurt or being killed as a result of violence of any sort?" (*Ibid.*).

After the Supreme Court issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, "the referee found that, in her mind, Juror C.B.'s childhood sexual and physical abuse were not criminal and violent acts, but rather were simply a part of life. As such, and despite their presumably traumatic nature, he determined, when completing the pretrial

1	juror questionnaire, C.B. did not believe they constituted crimes or acts of violence." ( <i>Id.</i> at p.				
2	802.)				
3	The Supreme Court first set out the standards to apply and stated:				
4	Although juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice [citations], we				
5	determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by applying a substantial likelihood test. That is, the 'presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the				
6	is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the				
7	surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.' [Citation.] In other words, the test asks not				
8	whether the juror would have been stricken by one of the parties, but whether the juror's concealment (or nondisclosure) evidences bias.				
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10	( <i>Id.</i> at pp. 1093-1094, quoting <i>In re Boyette</i> (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 889-890.) The court then				
11	went on to examine the requisite proof of bias:				
12	In addition, there is no evidence in the record before us that Juror C.B. could not or would not deliberate with her fellow jurors; rather, her undisputed testimony indicated that she participated in the jury's deliberations. Nor is there any evidence that she had prejudged the case or otherwise entered deliberations with an impermissibly closed mind: Because jurors may form preliminary				
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14	assessments about the case, that these assessments are not later swayed by their fellow jurors' opinions is not necessarily a form of prejudgment indicative of				
15	bias. (See [ <i>People v.</i> ] Allen and Johnson,[(2011)] supra, 53 Cal.4th [60]at pp. 75-76.)				
16	Although it was misconduct for Juror C.B. not to answer the pretrial juror				
17	questionnaire accurately, there is no substantial likelihood she was actually biased against petitioner. Rather, as permitted, C.B. applied her life experiences				
18	when she interpreted petitioner's mitigating evidence and weighed it against the evidence in aggravation, that is, his four convictions of first degree murder, as				
19 20	well as evidence of his involvement in three additional killings and raping a friend's babysitter at gunpoint. As such, we reject petitioner's suggestion that				
20 21	C.B. was predisposed to reject the defense mitigation evidence, or was otherwise unable to act impartially.				
	We therefore accept the referee's findings (except as otherwise indicated) with				
22	respect to the fourth question because they are supported by substantial evidence, and we independently conclude that petitioner has not shown a				
23	substantial likelihood that Juror C.B. was actually biased against petitioner [footnote omitted]. Accordingly, petitioner has not established that he is entitled				
24	to habeas corpus relief on his claim of prejudicial juror misconduct.				
25	A similarity between a juror's life experiences and some aspect of the litigation may so call into question a juror's impartiality as to warrant exercising a				
26	peremptory challenge or otherwise discharging that juror. And because voir dire is intended in part to allow the parties to explore the prospective jurors' possible				
27	biases, we acknowledge that Juror C.B.'s nondisclosure deprived petitioner of the opportunity to do so. Regardless of her misconduct, however, the "'				
28	"criminal justice system must not be rendered impotent in quest of an ever- elusive perfection [Jurors] are imbued with human frailties as well as virtues. 47				

1 2	If the system is to function at all, we must tolerate a certain amount of imperfection short of actual bias." '" ( <i>Boyette</i> , supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 897, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 301 P.3d 530.) Such is the case here.			
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4	(In re Manriquez, (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 818–819, cert. denied sub nom. Manriquez v. Diaz,			
5	(2019) 139 S. Ct. 2637, 204 L. Ed. 2d 283.)			
6	Manriquez is not alone in setting the bar so high. In the case of In re Cowan (2018) 5			
7	Cal.5th 235, the Court considered another death penalty case where a juror failed to disclose a			
8	misdemeanor conviction and probationary term (which the juror was still on during the trial) on			
	his questionnaire. A referee was appointed and during the evidentiary hearing the following			
9	facts were established:			
10	After reviewing the court file and police report regarding his conviction for			
11	public fighting at the Valley Plaza Mall in 1995, the juror recalled that he fought with the ex-boyfriend of the juror's then-girlfriend; that the fight was			
12	broken up by mall security; that the person he fought was handcuffed and			
13	arrested; that he was not allowed to return to the mall; that he was given a citation and later went to court; and that he was placed on probation but did not recall for how long. The juror explained that, to him, being arrested means that a person is "[c]uffed, detained, taken off in a patrol unit," "[b]ooked," "[t]aken			
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15	downtown," "[f]ingerprinted," and has "[m]ugshots" taken, none of which he experienced after the mall fight.			
16	(In re Cowan (2018) 5 Cal.5th 235, 240.)			
17	The Court went on to find:			
18	As explained above, the referee's finding that the juror's failure to disclose his			
19	1995 misdemeanor conviction was "neither intentional nor deliberate supplies sufficient support for the ultimate conclusion that [the juror] was not biased			
20	against [Cowan]." ( <i>Boyette, supra</i> , 56 Cal.4th at p. 890, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 301 P.3d 530.) Cowan argues that the juror intentionally omitted his			
21	misdemeanor conviction so that he could be selected as a juror, lobby for a conviction and death sentence, and thereby earn good will with the District			
22	Attorney in the event he violated probation or sought early termination of his probation. This theory, however, is speculative and contrary to the evidence.			
23	The juror testified that his response to question 30, which asked about his attitude toward serving on this jury, reflected his belief that this would be "a			
	great opportunity to serve on a jury, to do something like that" and that			
24	"[p]robation didn't even cross my mind." He also testified that he was not trying "to fill out or not fill out any information on the questionnaire so [he] could be			
25	selected as a juror." The referee was entitled to credit the juror's testimony on these points. The fact that the juror never actually asked for favorable treatment			
26	further supports the referee's finding. Having found no substantial likelihood that the juror harbored actual bias against Cowan, we conclude that Cowan is			
27	not entitled to relief based on his claim of juror misconduct.			
28	( <i>In re Cowan, supra</i> , 5 Cal.5th 235, 248.)			
	48			
	RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES			

These two cases make it clear that even an unambiguous question that is answered incorrectly is not sufficient by itself to overturn a verdict. In the instant case, Juror No. 7 reasonably believed the question did not apply to her, and Petitioner has not established any facts that remotely approximate the circumstances in *Cowan* or *Manriquez*. Juror No. 7's oral voir dire disproves any bias, much like that of the juror in *Cowan*. Juror No. 7 was asked by Mr. Geragos – "Q… but I assume you take this seriously because you believe it's a civic duty? I mean the idea of serving on a jury? A. Serving, yeah." (HCP-000952, starting at line 2.)

# **B.** Juror No. 7 Had Not Participated in a Trial as a Party or Witness

Question number 72 of the questionnaire asked,

"Have you ever participated in a trial as a party, witness or interested observer?

\_\_\_Yes \_\_\_No

If yes, please explain: \_\_\_\_\_

Juror No. 7 placed an "X" next to "No." She left the "please explain" portion blank.

Juror No. 7 answered the question truthfully as she had never participated in a trial. The proceeding for a petition for injunction prohibiting harassment cannot be construed as a trial. It is a hearing. The word "hearing" appears 34 times in the current version of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, and the word "trial" does not appear at all. In the 2000 version of section 527.6, in effect at the time Juror No. 7 petitioned for a restraining order, the word "hearing" appeared six times and the word trial did not appear at all. Petitioner's argument that the hearing was a "trial" has no legal basis to support it. Juror No. 7 answered the question truthfully.

Having failed to establish that Juror No. 7 was a participant in a "lawsuit" based on the restraining order petition, Petitioner goes even further out on the limb of speculation by asserting that somehow Juror No. 7 must have been involved in a trial because Ms. K was prosecuted for vandalism. (Claim 1, item 15, *ante*.) This court can take judicial notice that the vast majority of criminal cases resolve prior to any trial. As Juror No. 7 states in her declaration, she did not know what happened to Ms. K and that she (Juror No. 7) never testified against

Ms. K . (Juror No. 7 Declaration, paragraph 22.) Dispositively, Petitioner has not presented this court with any evidence that Juror No. 7 participated in a trial involving Ms. K

As stated *ante*, the letter cited by Petitioner to make his allegation that Ms. K was prosecuted (and therefore Juror No. 7 had to be involved) is refuted by the very letter Ms. K wrote to the judge: "Finally I got tired of it and went over to her house to obtain my house key from Mr. W (sic) got into a verbal heated argument with him which resulted in my doing some things to Mr. We (sic) vehicle that I am not proud of. As a result of my actions I was punished for vandalism and served one week in the Elmwood facility at the Santa Clara County Jail." (Exh. 45, p. HCP-000916.)

If Petitioner had proof that Juror No. 7 testified or that Ms. K 's case did not resolve by a plea, they should be able to offer a court document as they have with the restraining order petition. He has failed to do so, and once again has failed to meet his burden.

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#### Juror No. 7 Was Neither a "Victim" of, or a "Witness" to, a Crime С.

15 Question number 74 asked, "Have you, or any member of your family, or close friends, 16 ever been the VICTIM of a crime or a WITNESS to any crime? Yes No If yes, please explain: ." Juror No. 7 checked "No" and left the "please explain" section blank. Juror No. 17 18 7 answered the question truthfully, as she reasonably believed she had never been a victim or a 19 witness to a crime. In her Declaration, Juror No. 7 attests,

> 22. I did not and still do not personally know what resulted of M K 's behavior the night that she disturbed my peace. I did not testify against her in any criminal action and cannot state with any level of certainty whether her actions resulted in any conviction or otherwise. Based on the fact that I did not participate in any criminal proceedings, I did not consider myself a victim of a crime. I still do not. I never sought to prosecute Martin K for her behavior for that very reason.

23. I did not interpret the circumstances leading to the petition for a restraining order as a crime. I still do not.

24. Minor indignities, shoving matches, raising of voices, and other undignified means of communicating frustration do not stick out to me, let alone cause me to feel "victimized" the way the law might define that term.

25. I have been involved in many loud verbal disagreements. I have never considered myself a victim and I do not know whether lawyers and judges would agree or disagree with my opinion.

(Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraphs 22-25.)

As explained before, Juror No. 7 was not a victim or a witness to Ms. K vandalism of Juror No. 7's ex-boyfriend's car or the landlord's door. Juror No. 7 obtained a civil restraining order against Ms. K and did not seek a criminal prosecution because she "did not consider myself a victim of a crime." Moreover, a "witness" is defined as a person who testifies under oath. (Evid. Code, § 710 ["Every witness before testifying shall take an oath or make an affirmation or declaration in the form provided by law..."].) As Juror No. 7 stated in her Declaration, she did not testify against M K in any criminal action. (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraph 22.)

If this court wishes to interpret the terms "victim" and "witness" in a broader sense, then there is another incident that may fall within a broader characterization. After our Supreme Court issued the Order to Show Cause in this matter, the Stanislaus County District Attorney's Office took steps to locate Juror No. 7 to obtain a declaration from her. It was discovered that her ex-boyfriend was arrested on November 2, 2001 and later charged with several misdemeanor violations including domestic violence. Although the San Mateo court file, district attorney file and police reports had been purged years ago, there were some records available that showed the ex-boyfriend pleaded nolo contendere on January 2, 2002 to a single misdemeanor count of Penal Code section 242, simple battery. The court issued a restraining order against the ex-boyfriend to stay away from a person with a similar, but non-matching name to Juror No. 7. However, an entry in the East Palo Alto Police Department's record system has an entry for the same case that matches Juror No. 7's name.

Juror No. 7 is represented by counsel and the People have not been able to question her directly as to this issue but have obtained a declaration from her addressing this incident. She stated the following:

24. Minor indignities, shoving matches, raising of voices, and other undignified means of communicating frustration do not stick out to me, let alone cause me to feel "victimized" the way the law might define that term.

25. I have been involved in many loud verbal disagreements. I have never considered myself a victim and I do not know whether lawyers and judges would agree or disagree with my opinion. 51

26. By way of example, I recall getting into a heated argument with W in November of 2001, my boyfriend at the time.

27. During the argument, he threatened and did call the police. I did not call the police and did not consider doing so because I did not consider Mr. W so behavior a crime, nor did I think my own conduct was a crime.

28. Nonetheless, police officers arrived at my residence. Since I did not call them and did not believe they would alleviate the situation, I refused to allow them into my residence and I did not cooperate in any investigation.

29. I did not seek any assistance from law enforcement that night or anytime thereafter regarding this incident. I was never consulted by law enforcement, the District Attorney, or any court regarding the incident. No one followed up with me to address the incident, to inquire whether I believe a crime was committed, or to otherwise consult me about any decision to reject or prosecute a criminal offense.

30. No one has ever contacted me about this incident and it never crossed my mind during jury selection or the trial of Scott Peterson. This incident did not stick out to me as anything out of the ordinary, nor did it ever cross my mind when I was responding to the juror questionnaire. Had it crossed my mind, or had I been asked about it, I would have immediately disclosed the incident.

|| (Juror No. 7's Declaration, paragraphs 24 - 30.)

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The only questionnaire question that may have been applicable to such circumstance

16 would have been question No. 74, because she did not attend a trial (he pleaded no contest), and

17 || she was not a party to a "lawsuit." There were no questions asked of her during her oral voir

18 dire that touched upon any circumstance that could have raised this issue. In her mind, as she

19 has stated, she was not a victim or a witness, and her answer to Question 74 on the juror

questionnaire was answered in good faith.

Juror No. 7's situation is similar to a juror in the case of *People v. San Nicolas* (2004) 34

22 Cal.4th 614. In that case, the juror (Robert R.) failed to disclose information that resulted in an

23 || evidentiary hearing. The following comes from that case:

Robert R., who was 34 years old at the time of the new trial hearing on August 27, 1992, admitted that 22 years before—when he was 12 or 13 years old—a group of five Latino youths had stabbed him about 15 times in the side, the head, and under the chin. He suffered broken ribs, and still has scars on his forehead and buttocks. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: The Court: "Have you ever been the victim of a crime? Robert R.: "No, not that—not that I can remember." The Court: "How about an assault on your person, any kind of assault, battery on your person?" Robert R.: "No." The Court: "As a youth or as an adult?" Robert R.: "No." The Court: "You have never personally been the victim or the subject of any violence of any kind, is that

1	correct?" Robert R.: "That's right."
2	At the evidentiary hearing, Robert R. stated that he did not disclose this information to the court "because I just never thought about it, to be honest
3	with you." He added that "It just never came to me or else I would have put it down. I mean I had no reason not to put it down." He left question 19 of the
4	juror questionnaire blank, where he was asked if he had ever been a crime victim. When asked why the answer was left blank, Robert R. stated, "Like I
5 6	said, I, my mind just went—I never thought about it." Defense counsel then asked whether the incident had come back to him when he heard the victims in this case had been stabbed. He replied, "No, I never thought about it, to be
7	honest with you. My focus was to be [unbiased]. I thought like, like we was supposed to be." He also stated: "[W]hen I was chosen as a juror, I mean [its]
8	like anything else I do, I try to do to the best of my ability, and I think I, my main thing was trying to listen to the testimony, and listen to the Court's
9	instructions and to everybody in general here, not nothing to do with nothing outside." Robert R. told defense counsel that the only reason he told him of
10	these incidents after the trial is because the juror thought "there was nothing, there would never be nothing else said about it."
11	(People v. San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th 614, 645–646.)
12	The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the referee and found the following:
13	We defer to the trial court's judgment on Robert R.'s credibility. The court noted that Robert R. cooperated fully with defense investigators, and ultimately
14	concluded that Robert R. was a credible witness at the evidentiary hearing and "a fair and impartial juror in this case." On this basis we conclude that it was not
15 16	an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that no such bias was apparent and no misconduct occurred. (See <i>People v. McPeters</i> , [1992] <i>supra</i> , 2 Cal.4th [1148] at p. 1175.)
17	In so concluding, we distinguish two cases with a factual background similar to
18	this one. In <i>Diaz, supra</i> , 152 Cal.App.3d 926, a case involving a defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon (knife), a juror concealed during voir dire that she had been assaulted at knifepoint during an attempted rape 13 years
19	before, notwithstanding having been specifically asked. ( <i>Id.</i> at p. 931.) During the last day of the four-day trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case,
20	the juror revealed to court personnel her prior knife attack. She stated initially that "she did not remember being specifically asked whether she had been a
21	victim of any similar type of incident involving a knife," but later stated that "it never occurred to her the assault on her was an assault with a deadly weapon."
22	( <i>Ibid.</i> ) Both the bailiff and clerk testified that the juror seemed to be "prejudiced as to violent crimes." ( <i>Ibid.</i> ) As the trial had not yet ended and no alternate
23 24	jurors had been selected, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he was willing to proceed with 11 jurors. Defense counsel refused to stipulate, and the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the juror. The defendent was convicted
24 25	trial court denied the motion to dismiss the juror. The defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. ( <i>Id.</i> at p. 930.)
26	The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the juror pursuant to former section 1123, now Code of Civil
27	Procedure section 233. ( <i>Diaz, supra</i> , 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 932.) The court found that "when a juror has been victimized by the same type of crime," the
28	"probability of bias" is substantial and often unconscious and thus unlikely to be admitted during an evidentiary hearing. ( <i>Id.</i> at p. 939.) When this occurs, the court reasoned that bias "should be implied as a matter of law" (ibid.), 53
	PETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HAREAS CORPLIS: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHOR

rebuttable "'by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist 1 or by a reviewing court's examination of the entire record to determine whether 2 there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party resulting from the misconduct." (*Id.* at p. 934.) The Court concluded that the prosecutor failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. (*Id.* at pp. 936–937.) 3 Assuming *Diaz* is correct that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises when 4 jurors fail to disclose their material prior history as crime victims, we conclude 5 that the presumption was rebutted in the present case. In contrast to the juror in *Diaz*, Robert R. was consistent in his explanation that he "never thought about" the stabbing during voir dire or trial. The trial court found him credible based on 6 its specific observations of his demeanor and on the fact that it made no sense 7 for him to disclose this information voluntarily to defense counsel six months after the verdict if he intentionally failed to disclose it. Nor was there in the present case any evidence affirmatively indicating juror bias, as there was in 8 *Diaz*. Thus, unlike in *Diaz*, any presumption of prejudice was surmounted by 9 substantial evidence that Robert R. was in fact an unbiased juror. (*People v. San Nicolas, supra,* 34 Cal.4th 614, 646–647.) 10 11 Juror No. 7 in the instant matter did not believe she had any information to provide to the specific question asked. She was not extensively examined as juror Robert R. was, leaving 12 13 no ambiguity about what was being asked of him. Yet the court still found his belief to have 14 been in good faith and thus did not demonstrate any bias. Juror No. 7's answers demonstrate no 15 prejudgment of the case and, thus, no actual bias. If this court determines that she should have provided the information, Juror No. 7's honest mistake on voir dire still cannot disturb the 16 judgment. 17 18 III. 19 **PETITIONER'S AUTHORITY** 20 Petitioner begins his argument of alleged juror misconduct citing *In re Hitchings* (1993) 21 6 Cal.4th 97, 110-111 (Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus, "Memo," p. 10), discussing the significance of the defense's need to 22 23 examine prospective jurors. Immediately following the *Hitchings'* court's discussion of this significance, the Court states, "A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during 24 25 voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct." 26 (*Hitchings, supra*, 6 Cal.4th at p. 111.) *Hitchings* was not followed by *Manriquez* or *Cowan* as set out above.

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Hitchings is significantly different from the instant case because it involved a concern

about a juror's knowledge of the case before becoming a juror, the statements of the juror in relation to that knowledge, the juror's statements in responses to the questionnaire prior to being sworn for jury duty and the juror's conduct during the guilt phase.

In the *Hitchings* case, which occurred in Loleta, a town in Humboldt County, the defendant beat an elderly couple in their 80s to death with a baseball bat. (*Hitchings, supra*, 6 Cal.4th 97 at pp. 102-103.) The juror had discussed the *Hitchings* case with her coworkers at the bank she worked at multiple times before being called for jury duty. (*Id.* at p. 106.) In those conversations, the juror, along with her fellow coworkers, had stated their belief that the defendant was guilty. (*Ibid.*) At least two coworkers opined the juror and their fellow coworkers were all biased against *Hitchings*. (*Id.* at p. 107.) When answering the juror questionnaire, the juror stated she was unfamiliar with the defendant, despite working in a bank where Hitchings maintained his money and despite the aforementioned conversations with the juror's coworkers. (*Id.* at pp. 104, 107.) On voir dire, the juror stated she knew little about the case but told the court she said she could be fair and when asked if she had formed an opinion, she stated she did not know anything about the case. (*Id.* at p. 104.)

During the guilt phase, the juror went to the bar with her coworker and her coworker testified that juror said that petitioner Hitchings should be "taken out, strung up or lynched up..." (*Hitchings, supra,* at p. 106.)

In *Hitchings*, the California Supreme Court found they did not need to decide whether the juror's concealment was intentional to decide whether it rose to the level of misconduct, because from the record the juror's concealment was clearly intentional. (*Hitchings, supra,* at pp. 115-116.) The Court also found the juror prejudged the case and discussed it with her coworker during the guilt phase and that there was not substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice. (*Id.* at p. 119.)

However, *Hitchings* is readily distinguishable, as Juror No. 7 did not intentionally conceal her previous contacts with the court system. The questionnaire did not ask if she had ever obtained a restraining order nor did the questionnaire ever ask if she had ever been to court in any type of matter. The questionnaire asked if she had "been involved in a lawsuit,"

"participated in a trial" or had "been a victim of a crime or a witness to any crime." Juror No. 7 answered no, because as set forth *ante* she did not pursue a "lawsuit" for money, nor did she engage in a trial and she did not consider herself a victim.

4 Petitioner here tries to meet his considerable evidentiary burden by alleging that Juror 5 No. 7 had a nickname for baby Conner. The conduct of Juror No. 7 when she entered deliberations regarding her statement of "Little Man" comes nowhere near the level of what 6 7 transpired in *Hitchings*. Unlike *Hitchings*, before Juror No. 7 made the statement, she had just 8 finished sitting through five months of evidence which supported, in Juror No. 7's mind, and 9 clearly in the minds of her fellow jurors, the conviction of Petitioner. Also, unlike *Hitchings*, Juror No. 7 is not alleged to have made any statements prior to her questionnaire completion 10 11 and/or voir dire regarding Petitioner's potential guilt or what fate he should face given the 12 charges that were not disclosed during the jury selection process.

Petitioner argues the test in *People v. Blackwell* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 925 is somehow availing to him. That case, at page 930, provides:

[T]he trial court, when hearing a motion for new trial, should "... determine whether the question propounded to the juror was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination; (2) whether it was unambiguous; and (3) whether the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. If the trial court's determination of these inquiries is in the affirmative, the court should then determine if prejudice to the defendant in selecting the jury reasonably could be inferred from the juror's failure to respond. If prejudice reasonably could be inferred, then a new trial should be ordered.

20 Petitioner identifies this test within his Memo but does not ferret out the issue of whether the questions made to Juror No. 7 were unambiguous. In *Blackwell*, the ambiguity issue was 22 discussed. "In response to general and collective voir dire questions concerning alcoholism and 23 domestic violence, Juror R. indicated that she had no prior experience or exposure to such 24 problems within her family." (Blackwell, supra, at. p. 928.) "When asked how she and her husband resolved their differences, she said, "by either one out talking the other or someone 25 26 going outside and sulking." (Ibid.) Appellant Blackwell had shot and killed her husband but 27 had alleged she was victim to battered wife syndrome. (Id. at p. 927.)

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The *Blackwell* court opined, "Falsehood, or deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of

facts and attitudes deprives both sides of the right to select an unbiased jury and erodes the basic integrity of the jury trial process." (*Blackwell, supra,* at p. 929.) *San Nicolas, Manriquez* and *Cowan* were all decided after *Blackwell*.

In *Blackwell*, a declaration before the trial court on the new trial motion, from Juror R. stated her former husband physically abused her and since she believed since she was able to escape the abuse without violence, then appellant Blackwell could have done so as well. (*Blackwell, supra,* at p. 928.) The trial court denied appellant Blackwell's motion for new trial, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling, finding the questions asked of Juror R. were sufficiently specific and free from ambiguity and that Juror R. deliberately concealed the information by giving false answers. (*Id.* at p. 930.)

As argued above, the questions before Juror No. 7 were not as sufficiently specific as those propounded to Juror R. in *Blackwell*, nor has Juror No. 7 ever made any statements to support an allegation of deliberate concealment. *Blackwell* is distinguishable for these reasons, even assuming it applies in this circumstance.

Petitioner argues that *People v. Diaz* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, helps his cause. Petitioner only provides a very short summary of the facts in *Diaz* (Memo, p. 13), and it is clear why. In *Diaz*, the trial court did not empanel any alternate jurors. When the juror in *Diaz* recalled the incident wherein the juror stabbed an assailant who tried to rape the juror 13 years before the trial, the juror immediately informed the bailiff and the courtroom clerk. (*Id.* at p. 931.) The trial court held an *in camera* hearing and the bailiff and the courtroom clerk testified they believed the juror was prejudiced against defendant. (*Ibid.*) When asked by the trial court if the defense would stipulate to an 11-person jury, the defense declined and then the trial court denied the defense's motion to dismiss the juror. (*Ibid.*) The context of the events in *Diaz* is significant. The implication is that the trial court believed there was a concern about the juror when addressed, thus the question for a stipulation to an 11-person jury.

Much like many of the jury voir dire cases, it is the totality of the circumstances in
which the alleged juror misconduct must be viewed. This is further reinforced when the *Diaz*court addressed the issue of the presumption of prejudice, as it cited to *Hasson v. Ford Motor*

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RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

*Co.* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 417, which stated, "Some of the factors to be considered when determining whether the presumption is rebutted are the strength of the evidence that misconduct occurred, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the probability that actual prejudice may have ensued."

The *Diaz* court also focused on the manner of questioning of the juror, "The failure of a juror to respond to a relevant, direct, and unambiguous question leaves the examining attorney uninformed and unable to ask any follow-up questions to elicit the necessary facts to intelligently reach a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge or to challenge a juror for cause." (*People v. Diaz* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 935.) The *Diaz* court found the juror failed to respond to a direct and unambiguous question and found the trial court erred in not discharging the juror. (*Id.* at p. 936.)

In issuing its decision, the court in *Diaz* disagreed with the holding of the established decision of *People v. Resendez* (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 1, in a footnote. In *Resendez*, the Second District Court of Appeal found "no substantial influence upon the ultimate verdict" where the juror recalled during jury deliberations of a molestation case that when the juror was 14 years old, the juror's stepfather rubbed up against the juror while the juror and the stepfather were fully clothed and asked whether it felt good. (*Id.* at pp. 10-12.) Even though the juror remarked to fellow jurors that, because of the juror's experience, the juror believed defendant to be guilty, the *Resendez* court reasoned, "[N]o individual comes to jury duty with his mind a blank slate, and it is in the balanced wisdom of group experience applied to collective deliberation that the strength of the jury system theoretically lies. In fact, free expression during jury deliberation is to be encouraged ..." (*Id.* at p. 11.)

A year after the decision in *Diaz*, the Second District Court of Appeal decided the case of *People v. Jackson* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 700. In *Jackson*, a case involving possession of 113 pounds of marijuana for sale, defense counsel asked the jurors the following, "Is there anybody in the jury who up to this point has had anything in their background come to mind who's wondering if I asked you a question where you would have to tell me about it? This is what's known as the skeleton in the closet question." (*Id.* at p. 702.) The juror did not respond to

defense counsel's question, but during the third day of deliberations, the juror recalled the 1 2 juror's nephew died of an overdose and immediately informed the trial court. (Id. at pp. 702-3 703.) The trial court found the juror to be conscientious and denied the defense motion to excuse the juror. (*Id.* at p. 703.) 4 5 The Jackson court stated they could not accept the rationale in Diaz and instead relied on 6 the rationale used in *Resendez*, *supra*. The court opined, 7 [T]o find misconduct where "concealment" is unintentional and the result of misunderstanding or forgetfulness is clearly excessive. It is with good reason that the law places severe limitations on the ability to impeach a jury's verdict. 8 To hold otherwise would be to declare "open season" on jury verdicts not to a 9 party's liking. A green light would be given for every unsuccessful litigant to root out after-the-fact evidence of any "subconscious bias." 10 (*Id.* at p. 705.) 11 As in *Diaz*, the *Jackson* court discussed the vagueness of the question posed by defense. 12 The court stated, "[w]e must admit that we are entirely unsure what information counsel was 13 soliciting with this question or how it could be answered. If counsel's query can confound a 14 panel of appellate justices, it is not unreasonable to assume that it might confuse an average 15 juror as well. To regard such misunderstanding as juror misconduct—and presumptively 16 prejudicial—is an entirely unwarranted result." (*Id.* at pp. 705–706.) 17 The court in Jackson found "the proper test to be applied to unintentional "concealment" 18 is whether the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find under 19 Penal Code sections 1089 and 1123 that he is unable to perform his duty." (Id. at p. 706.) The 20 court found the juror's nondisclosure was unintentional and affirmed the trial court's decision 21 that the juror was not biased. (*Ibid.*) 22 After the *Diaz* and *Jackson* cases, the Fifth District Court of Appeal weighed in stating: 23 We find that the majority opinion in *Diaz* is too far reaching and broad and could result in *frequent unjustified reversals*. We are in accord with the dissent 24 which states: "Appellant's due process rights were not violated by an unintentional failure of a juror to disclose a prior involvement as a victim of a 25 criminal act which might lead to a peremptory challenge. Perfect voir dire is 26 rarely attained. Since *People v. Williams* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392 ..., counsel may examine very broadly in voir dire. Given the opportunity to have a verdict 27 reversed based on nondisclosure, counsel may now choose to examine very narrowly or not at all during voir dire." 28 (*People v. Kelly* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 118, 125; italics added.) 59 RETURN TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES The defendant in *Kelly* was convicted of 17 felony sex crimes against two young boys. (*Id.* at p. 119.) During voir dire, the juror was never asked if the juror was a victim of child molestation, in fact, the juror was only asked, "[F]rom Thursday and this morning, is there anything you have heard that calls to mind that would prevent you from being a fair and impartial juror?" (*Id.* at p. 122, fn. 1.) The juror in *Kelly* told defense counsel post trial that when the juror was young, the juror's step uncle walked into the room, began to unbuckle his belt and said, "I'll show you mine if you show me yours." (*Id.* at p. 120.) However, the juror's grandmother walked in before anything else happened. (*Ibid.*)

In rendering its decision, the *Kelly* court remarked about the significant difference between appellant Kelly's case and the juror's experience stating, "Although [the juror's] past experience is certainly regrettable, it does not come close to rising to the seriousness of the crimes in the instant case. If anything, [the juror] was the victim of a misdemeanor of annoying or molesting a child under the age of 18. (Pen. Code, § 647a.)" (*Id.* at pp. 122-123.) Further, the *Kelly* Court also noted, unlike *Diaz*, the question posed to the juror in *Kelly*'s case was anything but a direct and unambiguous question. (*Id.* at p. 126.)

Following a review of *Resendez*, *supra*, the *Kelly* court found no misconduct and noted within its holding that the juror's "nondisclosure was not intentional" and the past experience of the juror "was dissimilar from the crimes in the instant case lessening the chance for bias" and that the juror "clearly denied any bias or impropriety." (*People v. Kelly, supra*, at pp. 128–129.)

Twenty years after *Diaz*, the California Supreme Court reviewed the issue of a juror who was alleged to have committed misconduct. (*People v. San Nicolas* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614.) San Nicolas was convicted of stabbing his wife and niece to death. (*Id.* at p. 627.) The juror questionnaire in Question No. 15 asked, "Have you ever been involved in criminal case as a victim, defendant or a witness?" (*Id.* at p. 644.) A juror failed to mention three incidents in response to this question: an arrest for possession of methamphetamine in 1991, an arrest where the juror spent time in jail based on mistaken identity and the fact the juror was stabbed repeatedly when the juror was 12, twenty-two years prior to the new trial hearing. (*Ibid.*) On the juror questionnaire, the juror also left Question No. 19 blank where he was asked if he was a

1	crime victim. (Id. at p. 645.)			
2	On voir dire, the following dialog took place with the juror:			
3	The Court: Have you ever been the victim of a crime?			
4	The Juror: No, not that—not that I can remember.			
5	The Court: How about an assault on your person, any kind of assault, battery on			
6	your person?			
7	The Juror: No.			
8	The Court: As a youth or as an adult?			
9	The Juror: No.			
10	The Court: You have never personally been the victim or the subject of any			
11	violence of any kind, is that correct?			
12	The Juror: That's right.			
13	(Ibid.)			
14	During the evidentiary hearing on San Nicolas's motion for new trial, the juror stated			
15	that he didn't even know he was being charged in the methamphetamine arrest until he was			
16	dismissed as a juror. ( <i>Id.</i> at p. 644.) The juror said he didn't mention the mistaken identity case			
17	because it was just a mistake made by the police. ( <i>Ibid.</i> ) As to the stabbing when he was 12 and			
18	being a crime victim, he just didn't think about it when responding to questions. Believing the			
19	juror was frank in his answers and that he wasn't trying to hide anything, the Court found the			
20	juror was fair and impartial and denied the motion. (Id. at p. 646.) The California Supreme			
21	Court found no prejudice, stating,			
22	Assuming <i>Diaz</i> is correct that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises when jurors fail to disclose their material prior history as crime victims, we conclude			
23	jurors fail to disclose their material prior history as crime victims, we conclude that the presumption was rebutted in the present case. In contrast to the juror in <i>Diaz</i> , [the juror] was consistent in his explanation that he "never thought about"			
24	the stabbing during voir dire or trial. The trial court found him credible based on its specific observations of his demeanor and on the fact that it made no sense			
25	for him to disclose this information voluntarily to defense counsel six months			
26	after the verdict if he intentionally failed to disclose it. Nor was there in the present case any evidence affirmatively indicating juror bias, as there was in <i>Diaz</i> . Thus, unlike in <i>Diaz</i> , any presumption of prejudice was surmounted by			
27	substantial evidence that [the juror] was in fact an unbiased juror.			
28	(People v. San Nicolas, supra, at p. 647.)			
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Petitioner, much like the defendant in San Nicolas, argues that Dyer v. Calderon (9thCir. 2 1998) 151 F.3d 970, is like the situation before this court. However, in *Dver* the juror failed to 3 mention the murder of her brother which happened six years before Dyer's trial. The juror also 4 failed to mention a few other incidents: when the juror was a child, the juror and the juror's 5 siblings were kidnapped by the juror's father, the juror was a victim of many burglaries, the juror's uncle was arrested for murder and robbery, the juror's brother was arrested for 6 7 possession of LSD, brass knuckles and marijuana and the juror's estranged husband had been 8 arrested for rape shortly after the guilt phase of the trial. (*Id.* at pp. 980-981.) The juror also 9 stated she believed the murder of her brother was accidental even though her brother was pistol whipped four times before being shot and killed. (Id. at p. 975.) In reviewing the case, Justice 10 11 Kozinski referred to the juror as "Pinocchio." (Id. at p. 980.)

> While the Ninth Circuit did reverse the conviction in *Dyer*, the Court also opined, One important mechanism for ensuring impartiality is voir dire, which enables the parties to probe potential jurors for prejudice. For voir dire to function, jurors must answer questions truthfully. Nevertheless, we must be tolerant, as jurors may forget incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand a question or bend the truth a bit to avoid embarrassment. The Supreme Court has held that an honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not bespeak a lack of *impartiality*.

(Dyer v. Calderon, supra, at p. 973; italics added.)

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Clearly with the evidence before it, it is no surprise the Ninth Circuit found prejudice. (*Id.* at p. 982.) However, those facts are readily distinguishable from the matters before this court. Here, a juror, untrained in the law, stated she had not been a party to a lawsuit and did not believe she was a victim of a crime. There are no similarities in Juror No. 7's situation to the murder of a pregnant Laci Peterson and her unborn child, Conner. Juror No. 7 plainly stated in her restraining order petition that she feared an early childbirth due to her then-boyfriend's exgirlfriend's behavior and in her declaration, she states that she did not and still does not view herself as a victim.

26 Another case cited by Petitioner is McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 27 (1984) 464 U.S. 548. However, the very holding of that case undermines his contentions in 28 support of his claim of prejudicial misconduct:

1	thoug	validate the result of a three-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, h honest response to a question, is to insist on something closer to	
2	perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give. A trial represents an important investment of private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the		
3	important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire		
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5	abstract imperfection, we think it is contrary to the practical necessities of		
6	judicial management reflected in Rule 61 and § 2111. We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on yoir dire, and then further show that a		
7	answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.		
8	The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.		
9	anect a juror's impartantly can trury be said to affect the faitness of a triar.		
10	(McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, supra, at pp. 555–556.)		
11	None of the other authorities cited or referred to by Petitioner aid in his argument.		
12	Boyette, Hamilton, Miles, San Nicolas, Manriquez and Cowan control in this case.		
13	IV.		
14	PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL WANTED JUROR NO. 7 ON THE JURY		
15	Petitioner fails to acknowledge in his petition that his trial counsel, Mr. Geragos, wanted		
16	Juror No. 7 to serve on the jury. Mr. Geragos even told Judge Delucchi that the judge was not		
17	being welcoming to Juror No. 7 (Prospective Juror No. 6756). The following exchange		
18	occurred between the court, Mr. Geragos and Juror No. 7 (HCP-000924):		
19	Q.	The first thing I want to ask you, will they pay you if you're here for five	
20	months?		
21	А.	No.	
22	Q.	I didn't think so. How long will they pay you for?	
23	А.	Two weeks.	
24	Q.	Two weeks. Then you wouldn't make it. Okay. You're excused.	
25	A.	That's it?	
26	Q.	That's it. We can't expect you to be here and not earn a living.	
27	A.	Thank you.	
28	MR. GERAGOS: Did you ask her if it was a hardship?		
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1	THE COURT:	What?		
2	MR. GERAGOS:	Did you ask her if it was a hardship?		
3	THE COURT:	Only gets paid for two weeks. I take judicial notice it's a		
4		hardship. ¶ That's right; you can't sit here for five months		
5		without getting paid, right?		
6	PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Okay.			
7	MR. GERAGOS:	I think she's willing to –		
8	THE COURT:	You want to sit here for five months without getting paid? If you		
9		want to that's fine. I'll go through the process.		
10	PROSPECTIVE JUR	COR: I mean I'm willing to, you know –		
11	THE COURT:	Okay. Sit down.		
12	PROSPECTIVE JUR	ROR: Okay.		
13	THE COURT:	I'll withdraw my judicial notice.		
14	MR. GERAGOS:	I was going to say you're not being so welcoming.		
15	THE COURT:	Well, only two weeks, most people would say –		
16	MR. GERAGOS:	Yeah, but we've got a couple of others who have said the same		
17	thing.			
18	(HCP-000923 to HCP-000924.)			
19	Notably, Mr. Gerago	s pointed out to the court that there were others who were willing to		
20	serve without being paid. Th	ne People argue this demonstrates that Juror No. 7 was no different		
21	from the other persons who take jury service seriously, and who harbored no ulterior motive in			
22	being willing to accommodate jury service.			
23	Juror No. 7's recollection comports with the transcript. In her Declaration she wrote,			
24		tion process, I was brought into the courtroom alone—just		
25	as other jurors before and after me—to answer questions. The judge began to excuse me from jury service because my employer would only pay me two (2)			
26	weeks of jury service. I thanked the judge and began to walk out of the courtroom. Before I could exit the courtroom, the attorney from [ <i>sic</i> ] Scott			
27	Peterson—Mark Geragos—interrupted my departure and asked the judge to inquire about me further instead of excusing me right away.			
28	(Declaration of Juror No. 7, paragraph 14.)			
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1 Juror No. 7 had gotten up to leave and was walking out. Her actions clearly belie any 2 suggestion by Petitioner that she was angling to get on the jury. Once it became clear to her that 3 she would be excused based on a hardship, Juror No. 7 did not protest or otherwise attempt to 4 avoid being excused: she got up and intended to leave, until Petitioner's trial counsel 5 intervened. 6 Further, in Petitioner's allegations (No. 20) he states that "[t]he extremely lengthy trial imposed a financial hardship on Ms. During the trial she was forced to borrow money 7 8 from a fellow juror, who loaned her \$1000. (Exh. 8 at HCP-000244.)" The reason for this is 9 made clear in the voir dire transcript. The court had told Juror No. 7 she would be there for the duration and could not say, "Gee, Judge, I need money." 10 11 The voir dire transcript provides: 12 You understand now if you get selected on this jury you'd be here for five Q. 13 months or more; you understand that? (Nods head) 14 A. 15 Q. And I can't let you go if something develops or you say Gee, Judge, I need the 16 money. You're here for the duration; do you understand that? 17 Yeah. We've talked about it. A. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. My family and I. 20 Good. Okay. Okay. A. 21 (HCP-000925, lines 10-20.) 22 Since Juror No. 7 had previously been told by the judge that there was no alternative if 23 she needed money, she turned to a fellow juror for a loan. As also explained before, Juror No. 24 7's financial situation was explained in We the Jury, had quit her job with the Stanford Credit Union shortly before 25 Richelle becoming a juror. Her youngest son took ill and she was missing work as she 26 shuttled him back and forth to the emergency room. At the beginning of the trial she was living on \$400/month in child support from the father of her 27 two youngest children. But another juror informed her that the credit union may have violated family-medical leave statutes. The credit union agreed to pay her salary and medical benefits for the duration of the trial. 28 65

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# (HCP-000244, Juror No. 7's Declaration paragraph 3.)

### V.

## JUROR NO. 7'S POST-VERDICT LETTERS TO PETITIONER DEMONSTRATE CONCERN FOR BOTH VICTIMS AND THE FAMILY MEMBERS INVOLVED, NOT ONLY CONNER.

Petitioner would have the court believe that Juror No. 7 demonstrated a fanatical interest in Conner through her written correspondence with Petitioner. This is untrue. Should they be properly authenticated, the letters attached to the habeas petition (Exh. 46) show that Juror No. 7 felt compassion for all of the parties involved: Laci, Conner, Laci's family, Petitioner and his family.

A. First Letter

In the first letter attached to the petition (HCP-000957), dated "8/8/05," Conner is mentioned seven times and six of those times also include mention of Laci. Only one time does Juror No. 7 mention Conner without reference to the other victim, his mother:

- "The spot where your beautiful *wife* washed ashore...and YOU robbed *her & your* beautiful son of a life with each other and the rest of the family who loved and cared about them so much!"
- 2. "What pushed you so far to the limit, where you felt that you needed to kill someone who not only loved you so much, but *someone who was carring [sic] part of you* inside her?"
- 3. "My heart aches for *your son*. Why couldn't he have the same chances in life as you were given. You should have been dreaming of *your son* being the best at whatever he did in life, not planning a way to get rid of him!"
- 4. "If you have any love whatsoever, for *Laci and Conner*, then give them justice."
- 5. "Laci and Conner deserve that. And your parents deserve the truth."
- 6. "I will continue to pray for Laci, Conner & the rest of the family...as well as you."
- 7. "I hope that one day before you pass, you will finally set their souls free."
  - (Italics added.)

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## B. Second Letter

In the second letter in Exhibit 46 (HCP-000962), dated "Dec. 3, 05," there is no specific mention of Conner at all. Juror No. 7 says only that Petitioner's "kids" would not have had to struggle and that he and Laci would have been wonderful parents:

1. You would have loved being a Dad, Scott. I wish you just would have tried. *Your kids* would have never known what it's like to struggle. *You and Laci* would have been wonderful parents.

(Italics added.)

# C. Third Letter

In the third letter that appears in Exhibit 47 (HCP-000966), dated "12/17/05," Juror No. 7 mentioned Conner three times by his name and each time she also mentioned Laci. Another sentence mentions Laci, and Conner is referred to as a "baby":

- 1. "All the pressure just hit me. I think it has been the time of year. Our verdict, *Laci & Conner*."
- 2. "I hope *Laci & Conner* will be able to hold each other on the 23rd. But my goal is to get better for my kids. But here I am still worried about *Laci & Conner*."
- 3. "I just pray god has givin [sic] *laci arms to hold her presous [sic] lil baby.*"
- 4. "...let [*Sharon*] have rest & a piece [sic] of mind with her *daughter and grandson*."
  (Italics added.)

# 20 D. Fourth Letter

- In the fourth letter (HCP-000971), dated "1/11/06":
- 1. Damit [sic] Scott that was *your* <u>son</u>!
- 23 2. Again Scott for the sake of *Laci & Conner (Lil man) & Sharon* to have some piece [sic]
  24 of mind & for Scott, come clean."

(Italics added.)

# **E.** Fifth Letter

In the fifth letter (HCP-000974), dated "3/17/06," Conner is mentioned once in a

1	sentence about how he would not have suffered the poverty that Juror No. 7's children have:			
2	1. "Conner would never have had to go through this. He would have had a wonderful			
3	life."			
4	(Italics added.)			
5	F. Sixth Letter			
6	In the sixth letter (HCP-000976), dated "3/30/06," Conner is mentioned once with Lac	:i:		
7	1. "Laci and Conner have been on my mind so much these last few days."			
8	(Italics added.)			
9	G. Seventh Letter			
10	In the seventh letter (HCP-000977), dated "5/30/06," Juror No. 7 writes that she can se	ee		
11	both Conner ("your son") and Laci:			
12	1. "You know what Scott, I see your son. I can visualize him, Dark hair, Dark skin,			
13	beautiful little boy. I can see him. I see Laci's big beautiful smile shinning [sic] down	1		
14	on him"			
15	(Italics added.)			
16	In sum, these letters do not demonstrate that Juror No. 7 was fixated on Petitioner's			
17	deceased child because she sought a restraining order when she was pregnant and therefore was			
18	biased against Petitioner. The letters show Juror No. 7's concern for Laci and Conner and the	ir		
19	family. These letters demonstrate only that Juror No. 7 was as traumatized by the evidence			
20	presented at the trial as were other jurors who wrote about their continual thoughts of Laci and			
21	Conner, years after the trial. The People need not repeat the impact the facts of this case had on			
22	the other jurors as already set forth ante.			
23	Lastly, Petitioner states on page 17, footnote 4 of his Points and Authorities, that Juron	•		
24	No. 7 wrote a book about her experience as a juror in petitioner's case suggesting "that she not			
25	only intended to pass judgment on petitioner, but to profit from the experience." Much like the	e		
26	letters, the book demonstrates no such fact; if it were true it would also mean that the other			
27	jurors that participated in the book must have been biased. Clearly, such an allegation cannot	be		
28	believed.			

# THE AFFIDAVITS OF JUROR NO. 1 AND JUROR NO. 6 DO NOT CONSTITUTE **COMPETENT EVIDENCE**

VI.

The affidavits of Jurors Nos. 1 and 6 (HCP-000176)<sup>11</sup> in Petitioner's Exhibits 51 and 50, respectively, present no competent evidence as to whether Juror No. 7 committed misconduct and was actually biased against Petitioner. The People will set forth the paragraph as stated in the jurors' declarations, and their objection(s) in bold after each line of the declaration. Given that the declarations do not constitute competent evidence and that they are largely irrelevant to the issue before this court, it would appear that Petitioner's intention is to divert the court's attention away from the shortcomings of his arguments and otherwise prejudice the court's view with unreliable and extraneous assertions.

# A. Specific Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Juror No. 6, Submitted July 14, 2018 as Exhibit No. 50 (HCP-000985.)

Paragraph 1: "I was a juror on Scott Peterson's trial in Redwood City, California, in 2004. (No Objection.) At the time that I reported for jury service, I was working as a firefighter and paramedic. (Irrelevant.) I am now Battalion Chief for the Fire Department of the City of South San Francisco." (Irrelevant.)

**Objection:** Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351).

Paragraph 2: "Being a juror on this trial was a long, difficult task. (No Objection.) The court paid us a very small stipend for each day we served on the jury. (Irrelevant; Lack of Foundation.) Even though my employer paid me during my jury service, the fifteen-dollar stipend would not cover what it cost me to be there every day. (Irrelevant.) During the trial, on days that I did not have to be in court, I had to be at work. (Irrelevant.) There were only about six days between June and December of 2004 when I wasn't either in court as a juror or working. (Irrelevant.) The stress and isolation of being a juror also took a toll on my personal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> As previously explained, pursuant to Civil Code of Procedure § 237(a)(2), the People will refer to jurors by their numbers, regardless of whether the jurors have publicly disclosed their identities.

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relationships. (Irrelevant.)"

**Objection:** Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351).

Paragraph 3: "The prosecutors and the defense lawyers were very different from each other: The prosecution was not flashy at all and often seemed disorganized in their presentation. Scott's defense lawyers were from Los Angeles and were both showy and dramatic. (Juror 6 7 Mental Process.) Geragos seemed to have a huge ego. (Improper Opinion; Juror Mental 8 **Process.)** In his opening statement, Geragos promised that he would show the jury that Scott 9 was totally innocent. (Hearsay; Irrelevant.) He said something like 'my client is a cad, but he 10 is not a murderer.' (Hearsay; Irrelevant.) Geragos never presented the witness testimony he 11 had promised would show that Scott was innocent. (Irrelevant.) I did not think he needed to 12 make such a bold promise to show the jury that Scott was undeniably innocent. (Irrelevant; 13 **Improper Opinion**; Juror Mental Process.) He told us that we would hear testimony from 14 people who saw Laci alive after she was reported missing and that it would prove Scott could 15 not have murdered Laci. (Hearsay.) He never produced that testimony. (Irrelevant.) His 16 failure to make good on that promise only made me more confident that there were no such 17 witnesses and there was no evidence that Scott did not do it." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental 18 Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800), Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150), Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 4: "The defense presented evidence that a burglary took place across the
street from Laci and Scott's house in Modesto around the time of Laci's disappearance.
(Hearsay; Irrelevant.) We did not hear evidence of a monitored telephone call to a Modesto
prisoner saying that the man arrested for the burglary had told someone that Laci Peterson had
seen him burglarizing the house. (Lack of Foundation; Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)
Any evidence that Laci was still alive when Scott was already at the marina would have been

important to me as a juror. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) We heard evidence that Laci
was a pretty bold person and even sometimes woke up homeless people and told them they
should move on. (Hearsay; Irrelevant.) Evidence showing that she may have confronted the
burglars would have been significant." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Lack of Foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150), and Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 5: "Several jurors were dismissed from the jury during trial. (Irrelevant.) The first juror to be dismissed was [redacted] [redacted] was caught on camera saying hello to Brent Rocha, Laci's Brother, when entering the courthouse. (Irrelevant, Lack of Foundation.) Soon after this happened, [redacted] was replaced by [redacted], an alternate who [redacted]." (Irrelevant.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Lack of Foundation (Evid. Code, § 403).

Paragraph 6: "Jurors and alternates spent a lot of time together and the time was often pretty intense. (Improper Opinion, Lack of Foundation.) [Juror No. 7] was one of the alternates who became a juror. (No Objection.) Although I did not know it until afterwards, there was apparently a rumor during the trial that [Juror No. 7] was pregnant with my child.
(Hearsay; Irrelevant.) I have no idea how this rumor started. (Irrelevant.) I learned that [Juror No. 7] had multiple children by different fathers. (Lack of Foundation; Hearsay, Irrelevant.) She told me that she got pregnant by a guy who had a girlfriend, and that during her pregnancy, she and the girlfriend had some problems and the woman threatened her."
(Hearsay.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Lack of
Foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800) and Hearsay (Evid.
Code, §§ 1200).

Paragraph 7: "[Redacted] the first foreman of the jury as we entered guilt phase deliberations. (Unable to determine if admissible due redaction.) [Redacted] took extensive notes and filled more notebooks than any of the other jurors. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) During guilt-phase deliberations, another juror, [redacted], told us that [redacted] had done [redacted] own internet research at home regarding some testimony from the trial. (Hearsay, Irrelevant.) We halted deliberations, informed the court, and [redacted] was dismissed. (Irrelevant.) At that point, we had just been working to determine a timeline by writing things on butcher paper on the wall. (Juror Mental Process.) After [redacted] was dismissed, the bailiffs came into the deliberation room and removed all of our papers from off of the wall. (No Objection.) We were instructed to start again from the beginning with the replacement, [Juror No. 7]." (No Objection.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150); Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 8: "We started again with [Juror No. 7] now in the deliberation room, and [redacted] was still the foreman. (No Objection.) Other jurors and I had problems with [redacted] process of going through the evidence. (Improper Opinion as to other jurors; Irrelevant as to Juror No. 6's statement; Juror Mental Process.) [Redacted] wore a baseball hat during deliberations. (Irrelevant.) When [redacted] had it on straight, with the bill in front, [redacted] said [redacted] was acting as foreman. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) But sometimes [redacted] turned it around and wore it backwards, saying that now [redacted] was just 'one of us,' a normal juror deliberating. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) I found this strange and childish. (Irrelevant.) I objected to [redacted] inserting information into deliberations that we had not received in evidence, and [redacted] seemed really offended. (Hearsay; Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) [Redacted] accused me of discussing the case outside of deliberations, but that was untrue. (Hearsay; Irrelevant.) Soon after that [redacted] left the jury and was replaced by [redacted]. (Irrelevant.) Shortly after, the other jurors chose

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me to be the foreman. (No Objection.) Again, the bailiffs removed all of our work from the walls, and we started the deliberation process over." (No Objection.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800), Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 9: "At both phases of deliberation, the verdicts were publically [*sic*] broadcasted in real-time, and members of the public came to the courthouse to voice their support for Scott being found guilty and receiving the death penalty. (Lack of Foundation; Irrelevant; Improper Opinion.) Both times – at the end of the guilt and penalty phases, we were in the courtroom when the verdict was read aloud. (Irrelevant.) There was a short delay, and then we heard loud cheering outside of the courthouse. (Irrelevant.) Public reactions to the case did not influence my decisions." (Juror Mental Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Lack of Foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1105).

Paragraph 10: "During penalty phase deliberations, some of the jurors were grasping at straws to try and settle for life in prison, rather than give Scott the death penalty. (Irrelevant as to guilt phase at issue here; Juror Mental Process.) People said things like 'it's not like he's Charles Manson, he didn't chop us their bodies up.' (Hearsay; Juror Mental Process.) As the foreman, I requested that the jury get to see the photos of Laci and Conner's remains. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) I felt that these photos were powerful reminders of what

we had found Scott guilty of doing." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150) and Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 11: "Being sequestered during deliberations for both guilt and penalty phases
of the trial was difficult. (Irrelevant.) We stayed at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Foster City.

(Irrelevant.) We were incredibly restricted in what we could do. (Irrelevant.) We could not watch any live television or socialize with one another unless we were in the mess room, where bailiffs were monitoring us. (Irrelevant.) I spent a lot of the time in our hotel working out in my room. (Irrelevant.) I convinced them to let us up on the roof of the hotel because I argued that even prisoners are allowed to go outside to the yard; we should be allowed that same privilege. (Irrelevant.) They let us go outside for an hour a day to get some fresh air and exercise." (Irrelevant.)

**Objection:** Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351).

Paragraph 12: "When the trial concluded after the penalty phase, we were told to speak to the media. (No Objection.) I did not want to, but I was told I had to. (No Objection.) I now realize that was not the case; I was not required to speak to the media. (No Objection.) Immediately after the trial, I spoke to the media, appearing on various shows and giving a few interviews. (No Objection.) I received numerous offers for large sums of money for exclusive interviews, but did not accept them. (Hearsay.) I was not interested in fame or making money off this case. (Irrelevant.) I had a life and a career, and I wanted to return to those things. (Irrelevant.) I was disgusted by how hungry the media was to keep attention on this case. (Irrelevant.) At one point, multiple female producers came to my house in Half Moon Bay; it was cold outside, so I let them into my house. (Irrelevant.) The trial was over and I was still living with my then-girlfriend. (Irrelevant.) While one of them was interviewing my girlfriend about how my jury service impacted her, a female producer took me into another room and asked for an exclusive interview about the trial in a sexually suggestive manner. (Irrelevant.) I was shocked and disgusted by the lengths that people were willing to go to get a story."

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

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Paragraph 13: "I feel strongly that it is wrong to try to profit from someone's death.

(Irrelevant.) I felt this way even after sitting on this jury for months. (Irrelevant.) When there were first discussions of book deals after the trial, the agreement was that the profit made off of any book that we jurors wrote would be donated to the Sund-Carrington Foundation; every penny was supposed to be donated. (Irrelevant.) When plans to donate the profits changed, I was no longer interested. (Irrelevant.) It felt wrong to me. (Irrelevant.) I am not surprised that other jurors looked to financially benefit from this case. (Irrelevant.) Other people were in much worse financial situations than I was and needed money, especially after being unpaid or minimally paid for nearly half a year while sitting on this jury. (Improper Opinion; Hearsay.) I heard that ultimately, though, the jurors who authored "*We, the Jury*" made very little money from it." (Improper Opinion; Hearsay.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351); Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800), and Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 14: "I understand that Hannah Gilson is an investigator working for the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, which represents Scott Peterson. (No Objection.) I have willingly giving [sic] this information to the best of my knowledge." (No Objection.)

No Objection.

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B. Specific Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Juror No. 1, Submitted July 12, 2018 as Exhibit No. 51 (HCP-000990.)

Paragraph 1: "I was on the jury of Scott Peterson's trial in Redwood City, California, in 2004." (No Objection.)

No Objection.

Paragraph 2: "There was a lot of media attention on this case, and on us as jurors.
(Irrelevant.) When the trial began, the jurors had to walk through the front doors of the
courthouse and go through the metal detectors, along with members of the media and other
people. (Irrelevant.) After a while, the court decided that the jurors should wait outside in a

small group and be escorted into the courthouse. (Irrelevant.) Getting us in and out of the courthouse and keeping the media away from us was pretty disorganized and chaotic throughout the trial." (Irrelevant.)

**Objection:** Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351).

Paragraph 3: "I did not know much about the case when the trial began. (Irrelevant.) It seemed like the prosecutors expected the jurors to know more than we did coming in (Speculation); early on in the trial, they often made statements that assumed some knowledge that I did not have. (Irrelevant; Hearsay.) For the first few months, the prosecution had not convinced me that Scott was guilty. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) Mark Geragos did a good job of casting doubt on the prosecution's theory of the crime. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) Ultimately there was not enough convincing evidence presented to me to believe that Laci was abducted and murdered by homeless people." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Speculation (Evid. Code, §§ 600, 702, 801), Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150), and Hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200).

Paragraph 4: "Amber Frey's testimony turned the tide in the courtroom for me. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) I do not think that Scott's infidelity necessarily meant that he was guilty of murder, but the tapes and Scott's lies really showed me his true colors." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150).

Paragraph 5: "There are a few things that particularly stuck with me during the trial.
(Irrelevant.) One of them was Scott's fishing license. (Irrelevant.) He bought a two-day
license that was not filled out and signed at the Bait and Tackle shop. (Irrelevant.) I had never
seen this before, and it made me very skeptical. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) I relied a

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lot of [*sic*] my sense of reasonableness and rationality. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)
When thinking through Scott's actions leading up to and on the day of the crime, I asked
myself: 'Is it reasonable for Scott to have made this decision? Would I, as a reasonable person,
have made that decision?' Most of his decisions did not make sense to me, and those added
up." (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150).

Paragraph 6: "I believe the most compelling evidence overall was the location where Laci and Conner's bodies were discovered. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) If they had not showed up in the Bay where Scott claimed to be fishing, I do not think that he would be in prison." (Irrelevant.)

Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150).

Paragraph 7: "[Redacted] had taken so many notes that [redacted] had filled multiple notebooks [redacted] wanted to meticulously go through each notebook and reconsider each piece of evidence. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.) We felt that if [redacted] had just listened instead of taking so many notes, [redacted] would not have had to refer to his notebooks so much. (Irrelevant.) [Redacted] seemed pretentious to me and during the trial [redacted] did not chat or get lunch with any of the other jurors [redacted] was constantly on [redacted] cellphone." (Irrelevant.)

Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150).

Paragraph 8: "Early in deliberations, a juror was dismissed for doing [redacted] internet research. (Irrelevant.) [Juror No. 7], an alternate juror, replaced [redacted]. (No Objection.) [Juror No. 7] came in with an attitude. (Speculation, Improper Opinion, Vague and Overbroad.) She told us she was from East Menlo Park, which is a rough area. (Lack of Foundation; Hearsay.) Already during the trial, she seemed like an emotional wreck. (Speculation; Irrelevant.) She seemed to enjoy the attention the trial was getting; it was as though being a part of the trial became part of her identity. (Speculation; Irrelevant.) When she walked into the deliberation room, she came in talking a big game about how we should 'get Scott for what he did to Laci and Little Man.' (Hearsay; Juror Mental Process.) Little man was the nickname [Juror No. 7] used to refer to Laci and Scott's unborn son, Conner. (No Objection.) I found this attitude very frustrating. (Irrelevant.) The other jurors immediately told [Juror No. 7] that she was in no place to come in and tell us what we should do; there was a process to follow in looking at the evidence and coming to a thoughtful conclusion." (Hearsay; Juror Mental Process.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351), Lack of Foundation (Evid. Code, § 403), Speculation (Evid. Code, §§ 600, 702, 801), Improper Opinion (Evid. Code, § 800), Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150) and Hearsay (Evid. Code, §§ 1200), and Vague and Overbroad.

Paragraph 9: "[Redacted]. While we were sequestered over the weekend, [redacted] acted differently than [redacted] had throughout the trial [redacted] was more social and even danced suggestively [redacted] one evening in the recreation room at the hotel. (Irrelevant.) After that weekend, [redacted] got off of the jury by reporting some sort of misconduct. (Irrelevant.) Another alternate was seated, and [redacted], was voted foreman." (No Objection.)

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Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351).

Paragraph 10: "While we were sequestered, I felt like a prisoner. (Irrelevant.) We
were always supervised by bailiffs and mostly confined to our rooms. (Irrelevant.) Our
families were permitted to bring supplies and drop them off at the hotel for us, but we didn't get
to spend time with them. (Irrelevant.) One juror, [redacted], got cases of beer dropped off at

[redacted] door. (Irrelevant.) I joked that [redacted] must have been taking baths in beer, because I did not see how [redacted] could drink it all. (Irrelevant; Speculation) [Redacted] was also a heavy smoker and, although our floor was supposed to be non-smoking, [redacted] smoked in [redacted] hotel room so much that I [*sic*] my room down the hall reeked of cigarette smoke. (Irrelevant.) While sequestered, [redacted] rarely left [redacted] room, even for meals. (Irrelevant; Speculation.)

Summary of Objections: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351); Speculation (Evid. Code, §§ 600, 702, 801).

Paragraph 11: The crowds of people who stood outside the courthouse started cheering after the verdicts were read. (Irrelevant.) This was very disturbing to me; it was not a cheerful event. (Irrelevant.) It was a lose-lose situation, and I did not understand how people could cheer for it. (Irrelevant; Juror Mental Process.)

Objection: Irrelevant (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 351) and Juror Mental Process (Evid. Code, § 1150).

Paragraph 12: "I understand that Hannah Gilson is an investigator with the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, which represents Scott Peterson. (No Objection.) I have willingly giving [*sic*] this information to the best of my knowledge." (No Objection.)

No Objection.

#### **CONCLUSION**


Even if Juror No. 7 may be reasonably characterized as unsophisticated or somewhat naïve when it comes to legal matters, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she committed prejudicial misconduct in the manner in which she answered certain questions in the juror questionnaire. Even assuming Juror No. 7 should have disclosed the contested information, she did not intentionally withhold the information and acted in good faith. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Juror No. 7 harbored actual bias towards him and as such he has not carried his

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1	burden of proof. In summary, it cannot be said that Juror No. 7 "committed prejudicial				
2	misconduct by not disclosing her prior involvement with other legal proceedings, including but				
3	not limited to being the victim of a crime, as alleged in Claim 1." The People contend that Juror				
4	No. 7's declaration is sufficient for this court to ma	ke a finding – no showing of prejudicial			
5	misconduct occurred – but it is within this court's discretion to proceed to an evidentiary				
6	hearing.				
7	Dated: December 11, 2020	Respectfully Submitted,			
8 9		BIRGIT FLADAGER District Attorney County of Stanislaus			
10		David P. Harris			
11		DAVID P. HARRIS Assistant District Attorney			
12		Attorneys for Respondent			
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#### DECLARATION OF JUROR #7 IN THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. SCOTT PETERSON

I, Juror #7, declare as follows:

I have personal knowledge of the below, and if called upon to testify as a witness,
 I would and would competently testify to the facts set forth in this declaration.

2. I was summoned to the San Mateo County Superior Court pursuant to a jury summons in March of 2004. stated upon information and belief, I believe them to be true.

3. At the time, I was employed as a teller at Stanford Credit Union. My highest educational attainment was high school, and I had no training as a lawyer or paralegal.

4. I was provided with a long prospective juror questionnaire containing 116 questions, many of which contains subparts.

5. I responded to the juror questionnaire candidly, truthfully, and to the best of my ability.

6. Question 54 was separated into two subparts—"54a." and "54b." The former asked me whether I had ever been involved in a "lawsuit (other than divorce proceedings)" and the latter asked "if yes, were you: The plaintiff . . . The defendant . . . Both."

7. I read the two subparts together because they were labeled as being part of the same question—54.

8. I had never been a plaintiff or defendant to my memory, and therefore placed an "X" in the response field to question "54a."

9. Because I had answered no to "54a.," I left "54b." blank.

10. At the time that I answered these questions—together and right in the middle of a twenty-page questionnaire—I understood the word "lawsuit" to mean and refer to a suit for money or property. I did not think that the question was a reference to any other appearance in court.

11. I am not a lawyer and have no legal education, so my understanding of the word "lawsuit" at the time that I filled out the form excluded other types of court proceedings. I also looked to the language of question "54b.," which referred to a "plaintiff" and "defendant" to confirm my understanding of the questionnaire.

12. I was not asked to clarify this written response by the judge or either of the parties or their representatives. No one followed up with me to explain what the word "lawsuit" meant to me. No one defined the word "lawsuit" to include being in court for any reason.

13. At the time that I was summoned, my employer provided two (2) weeks of paid leave in the event of my jury service.

14. During the jury selection process, I was brought into the courtroom alone—just as other jurors before and after me—to answer questions. The judge began to excuse me from jury service because my employer would only pay me for two (2) weeks of jury service. I thanked the judge and began to walk out of the courtroom. Before I could exit the courtroom, the attorney from Scott Peterson—Mark Geragos—interrupted my departure and asked the judge to inquire about me further instead of excusing me right away.

15. The judge decided to keep me in the jury pool after Mark Geragos made this request.

16. I answered all the questions that were asked of me by the judge, the prosecutors, and the defense attorneys. I clarified my oral responses when I was asked to do so, an opportunity I was not given when I filled out my written questionnaire.

17. I do not remember being orally questioned about my answers to "54a." and "54b." on the questionnaire.

18. At no time during the jury selection process did any court case in which I was involved cross my mind.

19. Though I did not recall this at the time of jury selection or during the trial, I did request a restraining order against a woman named M K in November of 2000.

20. The restraining order request was made because Ms. K are came to the home where I lived and caused a disturbance. At the time, my boyfriend E W was the exboyfriend of M K S. She was not happy with the current arrangement, and came to my apartment to confront me about it.

21. I sought a restraining order based on that behavior. I did not hire an attorney, I filed the petition myself. Since I am not a lawyer, I attempted to fill out the petition to the best of my ability.

23. I did not interpret the circumstances leading to the petition for a restraining order as a crime. I still do not.

24. Minor indignities, shoving matches, raising of voices, and other undignified means of communicating frustration do not stick out to me, let alone cause me to feel "victimized" the way the law might define that term.

25. I have been involved in many loud verbal disagreements. I have never considered myself a victim and I do not know whether lawyers and judges would agree or disagree with my opinion.

26. By way of example, I recall getting into a heated argument with E W in November of 2001, my boyfriend at the time.

27. During the argument, he threatened and did call the police. I did not call the police and did not consider doing so because I did not consider Mr. W**Markov**'s behavior a crime, nor did I think my own conduct was a crime.

28. Nonetheless, police officers arrived at my residence. Since I did not call them and did not believe they would alleviate the situation, I refused to allow them into my residence and I did not cooperate in any investigation.

29. I did not seek any assistance from law enforcement that night or anytime thereafter regarding this incident. I was never consulted by law enforcement, the District Attorney, or any court regarding the incident. No one followed up with me to address the incident, to inquire whether I believe a crime was committed, or to otherwise consult me about any decision to reject or prosecute a criminal offense.

30. No one has ever contacted me about this incident and it never crossed my mind during jury selection or the trial of Scott Peterson. This incident did not stick out to me as

anything out of the ordinary, nor did it ever cross my mind when I was responding to the juror questionnaire. Had it crossed my mind, or had I been asked about it, I would have immediately disclosed the incident.

31. At no time before, during, or after the Scott Peterson trial did I ever for a moment harbor any personal animus toward Scott Peterson, nor was I biased against him or in favor of the prosecution.

32. I did not purposely withhold any information from the court during the jury selection process. I have had countless unpleasant experiences in my life. Those outlined above did not cross my mind during any portion of the jury selection process or during the trial. They did not play any role in my evaluation of the evidence or my verdicts.

33. I did not form any conclusions regarding the evidence in the case until I was called into the jury deliberation room. I recall discussing the evidence with the remaining jurors before a unanimous verdict was reached.

34. I have an abiding conviction that the charges are true based on the evidence that was presented at trial. This abiding conviction is based solely on the strength of the evidence presented at trial.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

12 / 10 / 2020

RIO

Dated

Signed

# Exhibit 2

### Post OSC Documents

(Personal or identifying information has been redacted from this exhibit but can be provided to Petitioner's Counsel upon request)

From:	<u>Craig Grogan</u>
To:	<u>Birgit Fladager; Dave Harris</u>
Subject:	FW: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance
Date:	Wednesday, October 21, 2020 12:39:41 PM
Attachments:	image004.png
	image001.jpg
	CIV415040.pdf

Update:

I am working on getting the records from San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties.

San Mateo forwarded the below information where King has rejected 166 cases, and a 20002. Wing has a DV case.

Santa Clara is working on getting the vandalism report and court records for the case mentioned in the restraining order narrative.

My question is do you want me to have San Mateo to follow up on the 166 cases or the DV? And try to get reports?

Craig

From:	<	>
Sent: Wednesday	, October 21,	2020 11:26 AM
To: Craig Grogan	<	>
Cc:	<	>

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

Craig,

I suspect the meat of what you are looking for will be located in Santa Clara County. It appears the vandalism report was taken by Mountain View PD (Santa Clara County), M K wrote in her affidavit that she spent time in Elmwood Jail (Santa Clara County), etc. I will do a virtual introduction in a few minutes with a Lieutenant in Santa Clara County who should be able to get you what you need from their Santa Clara County records, and hopefully Mountain View PD as well. If not, I have some really good contacts at Mountain View PD, so just let me know. Pasted below is what I found in our county systems for all three of your individuals (Ri . M K , and E ). Per our discussion, I did not provide you with everything, I just limited my scope to W events around the discussed timeframe. I can dig into and provide you more on anything below, just let me know.

\*\*\* Note- The restraining order case out of 2000 did not contain any documents in the court system, likely because the case file is so old. \*\*\*

(Juror)

Nothing in PBK in or near the 2000 timeframe

Odyssey (SMCO Court System): CIV415040 Riesen v Mersee K File Date: 11-27-2000/ Closed (PDF Attached)

#### MK

594 PC on CH (Mountain View/ Santa Clara County Conviction)

From SMCO PBK Offense: 01-13-1989 CHP Report #LH 57877 PBK File #081-0595408 CV39532- CV 20002(A) Misdemeanor Disposed- Closed

Offense: 8-23-2001 EPA PD Report #EP0120219 PBK File #081-0470422 CV18722- PC 166(A)(1)- Contempt of Court Misdemeanor Refused- Rejected

Offense: 9-5-2002 EPA PD Report #EP0218218 PBK File #081-0494977 CV18738- PC 166(A)(4)- Contempt of Court/ Disobey Court Order Misdemeanor Refused- Rejected

#### EW

Offense: 11-2-2001 Domestic Violence case (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

Odyssey (SMCO Court System):

9-5-2001 Family and Civil Court filing/ Department of Child Support Services (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

San Mateo County District Attorney's Office 400 County Center, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Redwood City, CA 94063 Direct



From: Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 10:01 AM To: Sent: Vednesday, October 21, 2020 10:01 AM Cc: Sent: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

Attached, is the Scott Peterson request for assistance due to possible Juror misconduct.

Please assign as appropriate and keep me advised of the outcome.

Thanks

Jw

From: Craig Grogan <	>	
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 4:14 PM		
To: <jg></jg>		
Cc: Birgit Fladager <	>; Dave Harris < <u>D</u>	g>
Subject: FW: Exhibit 45.pdf		

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

The attached documents represent the information the defense provided regarding Juror R and her involvement as a victim or suspect in a crime.

We were hoping to locate documents that might not be included regarding the restraining order case.

Also, there is a mention in a narrative on page 8 of 20 regarding Mr. Warnen 's vehicle being vandalized by Ms. Karnen I presume this is the vandalism case on Ms. Karnen 's record that Ms.

was a witness on. We would like to have the police reports and court documents related to that case to see if Ms. Now was ever required to appear in court. Did the case plea at an early stage, or was there a jury trial where Ms.


Thank you,

Craig Grogan Criminal Investigator Bureau of Investigation Stanislaus County District Attorney 832 12<sup>th</sup> Street Rm 300 Modesto CA. 95354





#### **Case Information**



#### **Cause of Action**

	File Date	Cause of Action	Туре	Filed By	Filed Against
0	11/27/2000	Complaint	Action	NI,	К, М

#### **Disposition Events**

#### Details

12/13/2000 Judgment▼	
Judgment Type Completed	
Party Name: Kanada, Manada Comment: 0001 COMPLAINT	
Party Name: NI Comment: 0001 COMPLAINT	

### **Events and Hearings**

11/27/2000 Petition •	•
Comment PIPH: PETITION I	FOR INJUNCTION PROHIBITING HARASSMENT FILED.
11/27/2000 Conversi	on Action 👻
Comment OSCTR: ORDER FILED BY R	TO SHOW CAUSE RE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HARASSMENT , SIGNED BY JUDGE PFEIFFER.
	d Case
11/27/2000 New File	
11/27/2000 New File 11/27/2000 Cause O	f Action ▼

### 10/21/202000006

12/13/2000 Order to Sh	ow Cause Hearing ▼
Original Type	
Order to Show Cause H	learing
Judicial Officer	
PFEIFFER, ROSEMAR	Ŷ
Hearing Time	
9:00 AM	
Result	
Held -	
Comment	
	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(HARASSMENT) FILE	AND SIGNED BY JUDGE PFEIFFER ON 11/27/00
12/13/2000 Conversion	Hearing -
12/10/2000 00/10/13/0/1	ricaning
Judicial Officer	Comment
PFEIFFER,	HEARING: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: TEMPORARY
ROSEMARY	RESTRAINING ORDER (HARASSMENT) FILED BY R AND SIGNED BY JUDGE PFEIFFER ON 11/27/00
	e melon herene fin a onne proz ostr ne 4 1 da p 2 fine 2 fine 4 de dente (12
12/13/2000 Conversion	Minute -
Judicial Officer	Comment
PFEIFFER,	JCR: HONORABLE ROSEMARY PFEIFFER, JUDGE PRESIDING.
ROSEMARY	CLERK: DONNA CARTER. COURT REPORTER: LORETTA DURAN.
12/13/2000 Conversion	Minute -
Commont	
Comment PTYPP: R	PRESENT IN PRO PER.
8	
12/13/2000 Conversion	Minute 💌
Comment	
PTYPP: M	K PRESENT IN PRO PER.
12/13/2000 Conversion	Minute 💌
0	
Comment COM: R	AND MENT KEEK WERE EACH SWORN AND TESTIFIED.
12/13/2000 Conversion	Minute -

#### PGRA: PETITION GRANTED.

12/13/2000 Conversion Minute -

Comment

COM: DEFENDANT TO STAY 100 YARDS AWAY AND HAVE NO CONTACT IN PERSON, BY PHONE OR MAIL.

12/13/2000 Conversion Minute -

Comment

MICMS: ENTERED BY DONNA ON 12/13/00.

12/13/2000 Conversion Minute -

Comment

12/13/2000 Restraining Order After Hearing -

Comment

OAHHAR: ORDER AFTER HEARING ON PETITION FOR INJUNCTION PROHIBITING HARRASSMENT FILED BY RIGHT SIGNED BY JUDGE PFEIFFER, ON 12/13/00. ORDER EXPIRES 12/13/03

#### Financial

No financial information exists for this case.

#### **Dave Harris**

From:	Craig Grogan
Sent:	Wednesday, October 21, 2020 3:02 PM
То:	Birgit Fladager; Dave Harris
Subject:	FW: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

 From:

 >

 Sent:
 Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:26 PM

 To:
 Craig Grogan 
 >

 Subject:
 RE:
 Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

I'll see what I can do for you. Stay tuned!

From: Craig Grogan <	>		
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020	0 1:25 PM		
То: <	>		
Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out Air	d request for assistance	2	

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

### CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

I am just going to make the call as they appear to have some relevance to the issue, please see if you can locate the reports for the 166.4 cases along with the best evidence the cases were rejected / dismissed. I need to determine if they made it over to the court and then were dismissed or if they were not filed cases.

Thank you,

From: <	>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2	2020 1:08 PM
<b>To:</b> Craig Grogan <	>
Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out	-Aid request for assistance

Yes, these contacts are related to the dismissed cases from earlier. I'm not sure of the chances they might still exist, but I can check fairly quickly once the prosecutors decide if they want me to inquire. Off the cuff, I would say we have a 50/50 chance of the reports still existing.

Let me know.

From: Crai	g Grogan <		>
Sent: Wed	nesday, Octo	ber 21, 2020 1:0	3 PM
To:	<		>
over eliminate set service	10 100 m the factor for	2548 63 54 25 25	10 1220 122

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply. Copy thank you.

These are the two dismissed cases from the prior info you sent meT assume. So would those reports still exist?

I am checking with the prosecutors first, but what are the odds of recovering the reports?

<b>fo:</b> Craig Grogar C <b>c:</b>	n < <j< th=""><th>&gt; 21, 2020 12:21 PM &gt;  &gt; : Out-Aid request for :</th><th>assistance</th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></j<>	> 21, 2020 12:21 PM >  > : Out-Aid request for :	assistance					
Craig, can't provide r Person		but this is M		cord in the EPA		12 	Return	
Name K Adrs 2 City EAST P Phone	2 Page 3 , MJ PALO ALTO Igt 5 2	Notes	DOB Apt 94303	Age 53	Race Hair Eyes Dr Lic Veh Lic	BLACK BLACK BROWN	FBI SSN StID C/	
	Code	Text			Inc/Cite	e	Case/FI	
Date	code	ICAL .			inter ence			A
Date 09/28/1898	Cl	4000(A)(1)			707712			A) Ef
-	1213		L COURT by EMAY	(				1000
09/28/1898 07/24/2001	CI	4000(A)(1)	L COURT by EMAY	(			E01-202-19	EF

happened. Associated Persons for KINSEY, MARCELLA

EA	ST PALO ALTO POLICE	DEPARTMENT	- Multi-Agency RIM	S Return
Associated Person Name	Connection	Nature	Event #	Date
	S-V	C	101202191	07/21/2
W , E	S-W	C	102182181	07/01/2
	S-W	C	102182181	07/01/2

W

Ε

is listed as a Witness in the E02-182-18 EPA PD case in which K is list

is listed as a suspect.

Hope this helps.

From: Craig Grogan < Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 11:42 AM

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

Copy thank you.

Am I correct in assuming that Ms. Now was not listed as a witness in any of those reports related to K or it would have appeared under her name search?

or W

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 11:26 AM To: Craig Grogan

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

Craig,

I suspect the meat of what you are looking for will be located in Santa Clara County. It appears the vandalism report was taken by Mountain View PD (Santa Clara County), Matter K wrote in her affidavit that she spent time in Elmwood Jail (Santa Clara County), etc. I will do a virtual introduction in a few minutes with a Lieutenant in Santa Clara County who should be able to get you what you need from their Santa Clara County records, and hopefully Mountain View PD as well. If not, I have some really good contacts at Mountain View PD, so just let me know. Pasted below is what I found in our county systems for all three of your individuals (Right W PD, so provide you with everything, I just limited my scope to events around the discussed timeframe. I can dig into and provide you more on anything below, just let me know.

\*\*\* Note- The restraining order case out of 2000 did not contain any documents in the court system, likely because the case file is so old. \*\*\*

(Juror) R Nothing in PBK in or near the 2000 timeframe

Odyssey (SMCO Court System): CIV415040 Risk WM K File Date: 11-27-2000/ Closed (PDF Attached)

M K

#### 594 PC on CH (Mountain View/ Santa Clara County Conviction)

From SMCO PBK Offense: 01-13-1989 CHP Report #LH 57877 PBK File #081-0595408 CV39532- CV 20002(A) Misdemeanor Disposed- Closed

Offense: 8-23-2001 EPA PD Report #EP0120219 PBK File #081-0470422 CV18722- PC 166(A)(1)- Contempt of Court Misdemeanor Refused-Rejected

Offense: 9-5-2002 EPA PD Report #EP0218218 PBK File #081-0494977 CV18738- PC 166(A)(4)- Contempt of Court/ Disobey Court Order Misdemeanor Refused-Rejected

#### E W

Offense: 11-2-2001 Domestic Violence case (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

Odyssey (SMCO Court System): 9-5-2001 Family and Civil Court filing/ Department of Child Support Services (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

San Mateo County District Attorney's Office 400 County Center, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Redwood City, CA 94063



From: Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 10:01 AM

To:

Cc:

Subject: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

>

Attached, is the Scott Peterson request for assistance due to possible Juror misconduct.

Please assign as appropriate and keep me advised of the outcome.

Thanks

From: Craig Grogan <	>
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 4:14 PM	
<	
Cc: Birgit Fladager < E	>; Dave Harris <
Subject: FW: Exhibit 45.pdf	

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

The attached documents represent the information the defense provided regarding Juror Riesen and her involvement as a victim or suspect in a crime.

We were hoping to locate documents that might not be included regarding the restraining order case.

Also, there is a mention in a narrative on page 8 of 20 regarding Mr. We was 's vehicle being vandalized by Ms. Ke I presume this is the vandalism case on Ms. Ke 's record that Ms. We was a witness on. We would like to have the police reports and court documents related to that case to see if Ms. We was ever required to appear in court. Did the case plea at an early stage, or was there a jury trial where Ms. We to the testified?

Thank you,

Craig Grogan Criminal Investigator Bureau of Investigation Stanislaus County District Attorney 832 12<sup>th</sup> Street Rm 300 Modesto CA. 95354



#### **Dave Harris**

From:	Craig Grogan
Sent:	Wednesday, October 21, 2020 3:01 PM
To:	Dave Harris; Birgit Fladager
Subject:	FW: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

 From:
 >

 Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 2:13 PM

 To: Craig Grogan 

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

The "confidential victim" in the arrest of W in 2001 was R

Case Display Record				
EAST PALO ALT	O POLICE DEI	PARTMENT - Multi-	Agency RIMS F	Return
Page 1 Offenses, Vehicles, Property Narra	tives & Photos			
Case #       E01-306-17       Inc #       0         Date       11/02/2001       -       -         Time       2057       -       0       Area       4	Address Place City EPA	Δ.	Apt Zip 94303	L.,
Date/Time Reported 11/02/2001 2057	People		- 1990 - P	
DispositionPATROL ARREST11/02/2001Preprd By11/02/2001Assistd By11/02/2004	Connection CV SA W	Name Water , Riquinitia and A		
PREV		ik	Ţ	300
	8			

From: Craig Grogan <
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:39 PM
To: >

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

#### CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

enior Inspector <b>energy</b> ,
lease see what you can find on the DV case involving W <b>eek and a set on a set on a set on a set on a set of the set of th</b>
rom: <b>Constant of the second second</b>
ent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:26 PM
o: Craig Grogan <
ubject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance
Il see what I can do for you. Stay tuned!
rom: Craig Grogan <
ent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:25 PM
o: <
ubject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance
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the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

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Thank you,

From: <	>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21,	2020 1:08 PM
To: Craig Grogan <	>
Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Ou	t-Aid request for assistance

Yes, these contacts are related to the dismissed cases from earlier. I'm not sure of the chances they might still exist, but I can check fairly quickly once the prosecutors decide if they want me to inquire. Off the cuff, I would say we have a 50/50 chance of the reports still existing.

Let me know.

From: Crai	g Grogan <	>
Sent: Wed	nesday, October 21, 20	020 1:03 PM
To:	<	>
22 1201 N 1201		

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

#### Copy thank you.

These are the two dismissed cases from the prior info you sent met assume. So would those reports still exist?

I am checking with the prosecutors first, but what are the odds of recovering the reports?

I can't provide much more, but this is Martine K sperson record in the EPA PD RIMS System:

From:		>			
Sent: Wednesda	ay, October 21, 202	20 12:21 PM			
To: Craig Grogar	n < <u>C</u>	>			
Cc:		>			
Subject: RE: Sco	tt Peterson: Out-A	id request for assi	stance		

Craig,

Person										
	E	AST PALC	) ALTO P	OLICE DE	EPARTM	IENT - Mult	ti-Agency	y RIMS	Return	
Page 1 Pag	e 2   Page 3	N <u>o</u> tes								
Name K	, M			DOB		Age 53	Race	BLACK	FBI	
Adrs 📕				Apt			Hair	BLACK	SSN	
City EAST	PALO ALTO	Stat	e <b>E</b>	Zip	94303		Eyes	BROWN	St ID	
Phone 🚺		Cell	E				Dr Lic		C	A
Sex F	Hgt 5 2	3.4	170		ID	114875	Web 12a	-	C C	A
Cmt		Wi	170	Ofcr Safe		TIAOLO	Veh Lic	1		A
Cmt Age Range 0		as of	170	Ofcr Safe		114073	Ven Lic	<u></u>		
Cmt			170	Ofcr Safe		114073	Inc/Cit		Case/FI	
Cmt Age Range 0	- 0	as of		Ofcr Safe		114073		e		
Cmt Age Range 0 Date 09/28/1898	<b>– 0</b> Code	as of Text 4000(A)(1	)	Ofcr Safe	ty <b>I</b>	114073	Inc/Cit	e		
Cmt Age Range 0 Date	– 0 Code Cl	as of Text 4000(A)(1	) : 5 NEWEL		ty <b>I</b>		Inc/Cit	e		

In cross referencing Riese and 's person record in the EPA PD RIMS system, it appears Riese and was likely the listed victim out of the 7-21-2001 incident. Nothing shows up on Record of the 2001 incident of the EPA PD RIMS system earlier than 2006, so I don't know if she was listed as a confidential victim in the 2001 incident or what happened.

EA	ST PALO ALTO POLICE	DEPARTMENT	- Multi-Agency RIM	S Return
As ted Person Name	Connection	Nature	Event #	Date
	S-V	C	101202191	07/21/2
W BERNER, E	S-W	C	102182181	07/01/2
	S-₩	C	102182181	07/01/2

W

is listed as a Witness in the E02-182-18 EPA PD case in which K is listed as a suspect.

Hope this helps.

 From: Craig Grogan <</td>
 >

 Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 11:42 AM

 To:

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

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Copy thank you.

Am I correct in assuming that Ms. was not listed as a witness in any of those reports related to Kingdo or Wing or it would have appeared under her name search?

From:		>
Sent: Wedne:	day, October 21	, 2020 11:26 AM
To: Craig Gro	gan < <mark>C</mark>	>
Cc:	<	>

Subject: RE: Scott Peterson: Out-Aid request for assistance

Craig,

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\*\*\* Note- The restraining order case out of 2000 did not contain any documents in the court system, likely because the case file is so old. \*\*\*

## (Juror) R Nothing in PBK in or near the 2000 timeframe

Odyssey (SMCO Court System): CIV415040 R v M K File Date: 11-27-2000/ Closed (PDF Attached)

M K 594 PC on CH (Mountain View/ Santa Clara County Conviction)

From SMCO PBK Offense: 01-13-1989 CHP Report #LH 57877 PBK File #081-0595408 CV39532- CV 20002(A) Misdemeanor Disposed-Closed

Offense: 8-23-2001 EPA PD Report #EP0120219 PBK File #081-0470422 CV18722- PC 166(A)(1)- Contempt of Court Misdemeanor Refused-Rejected

Offense: 9-5-2002 EPA PD Report #EP0218218 PBK File #081-0494977 CV18738- PC 166(A)(4)- Contempt of Court/ Disobey Court Order Misdemeanor Refused-Rejected

#### EW

Offense: 11-2-2001 Domestic Violence case (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

Odyssey (SMCO Court System): 9-5-2001 Family and Civil Court filing/ Department of Child Support Services (please let me know if you want more information on this.)

San Mateo County District Attorney's Office 400 County Center, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Redwood City, CA 94063



From: <	>
Sent: Wednesday, October	21, 2020 10:01 AM
To: <	>
Cc: <	>
Subject: Scott Peterson: Ou	t-Aid request for assistance

Attached, is the Scott Peterson request for assistance due to possible Juror misconduct.

Please assign as appropriate and keep me advised of the outcome.

Thanks



CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

The attached documents represent the information the defense provided regarding Juror Right and her involvement as a victim or suspect in a crime.

We were hoping to locate documents that might not be included regarding the restraining order case.

Also, there is a mention in a narrative on page 8 of 20 regarding Mr.	. W 's vehicle being vandalized by Ms. K
I presume this is the vandalism case on Ms. K	was a witness on. We would like to have the
police reports and court documents related to that case to see if Ms.	was ever required to appear in court. Did the
case plea at an early stage, or was there a jury trial where Ms.	estified?

Thank you,

Craig Grogan Criminal Investigator Bureau of Investigation Stanislaus County District Attorney 832 12<sup>th</sup> Street Rm 300 Modesto CA. 95354





### 2020\_00021

From:	Craig Grogan
To:	Birgit Hadager; Dave Harris
Subject:	FW: Informal Copy of Odyssey (Court) Case from 2001/ E
Date:	Wednesday, October 21, 2020 5:31:53 PM
Attachments:	image001.jpg
	SM315961A.pdf

From: <	>	
Sent: Wednesday, C	October 21, 2020 4:58 P	M
<b>To:</b> Craig Grogan <c< td=""><td></td><th>&gt;</th></c<>		>
Subject: Informal Co	opy of Odyssey (Court) (	Case from 2001/ E

Craig,

Attached is an informal copy of the 2001 case against E**GEN** W**EACHED** that we have been discussing. This is from our court/ Odyssey system. There are no documents in our internal PBK or Court Odyssey system, due to the age of this case. As we discussed, EPA PD's original report also has likely been purged by that agency, like the other 2001/2002 reports. I have not checked that yet.

I will work with our staff to get a complete copy of the criminal complaint, plea, minute order, etc. ordered for this case. Since they will have to get it through our Court Clerk's Office, I'm not sure how quickly we can make that happen with Covid considerations, but we will ask that it be expedited. For now, I figured this informal copy might at least help.

Thank you.

San Mateo County District Attorney's Office 400 County Center, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Redwood City, CA 94063 Direct

## **Case Information**

| The People of the State of California vs. E

Case Number

File Date 12/07/2001

Criminal Case Type Complaint

Court

Case Status Sentenced

## Party

Plaintiff The People of the State of California

Address 400 County Center, 3rd Floor Redwood City CA 94063

Defendant Weine I, E		
DOB 08/26/1978		
Gender Male		
Race Black		
Height 5' 3''		
Weight 195 lbs		
Drivers License		
Address		

## Charge

Charges W**arden (**, E**rgeneration**)

r				
	Description	Statute	Level	Date
001	PC273.5(A)-MISD-INFLICT CORPORAL INJURY ON SPOUSE/COHABITANT	273.5(A)	Misdemeanor	11/02/2001
002	PC243(E)-MISD-BATTERY FORMER SPOUSE, BOY/GIRL FRIEND, NON-COHABITANT	243(E)	Misdemeanor	11/02/2001
003	PC236-MISD-FALSE IMPRISONMENT	236	Misdemeanor	11/02/2001
004	PC273A(B)-ENDANGER-MISD- CRUELTY TO CHILD BY ENDANGERING HEALTH	273A(B) -ENDANGER	Misdemeanor	11/02/2001
005	PC242-MISD-BATTERY	242	Misdemeanor	11/02/2001

## **Disposition Events**

12/11/2001 Plea -

Judicial Officer

SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY

001	PC273.5(A)-MISD-INFLICT CORPORAL INJURY ON	Not Guilty
	SPOUSE/COHABITANT	

12/11/2001 Plea -

#### Judicial Officer SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY

002 PC243(E)-MISD-BATTERY--FORMER SPOUSE, BOY/GIRL

FRIEND, NON-COHABITANT

Not Guilty

12/11/2001 Plea -

Judicial Officer SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY

https://odyportal.sanmateocourt.org/portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0

#### PC273A(B)-ENDANGER-MISD-CRUELTY TO CHILD BY ENDANGERING HEALTH

01/02/2002 Disposition -

005 PC242-MISD-BATTERY

Pled Nolo Contendere

#### **Events and Hearings**

12/07/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDCJR: AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE, RECEIVED.

12/07/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.

12/07/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

BBBBP: \$25,000.00 BAIL BOND NUMBER AL25-742563 POSTED ON 11/03/2001 BY ALISTAR SURETY COMPANY ALADDIN BAIL BOND COMPANY FOR DEFENDANT APPEARANCE ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. .

12/10/2001 Conversion Event -


Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT AR OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 29 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 12/11/01 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 29 . HON. JOSEPH N GRUBER, COURT COMMISSIONER, PRESIDING. CLERK: IRENE GRAY. REPORTER: TRACY WOOD. CLERK2: URSULA HAWKINS. DEPUTY D.A. MAHONEY. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.



#### Details

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHADV: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINT ARRAIGNMENT

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDSPT: STIPULATION RE: JUDGE PRO TEMPORE HEARING MATTER.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

RAACR: DEFENDANT ARRAIGNED AND ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: TO THE VARIOUS PLEAS AVAILABLE; TO A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL FROM THE DATE OF ARRAIGNMENT, WITHIN 30 DAYS IF IN CUSTODY, WITHIN 45 DAYS IF NOT IN CUSTODY, OTHERWISE, THE MATTER MUST BE DISMISSED; TO THE AID OF THE COURT TO SUBPOENA AND PRODUCE WITNESSES ON OWN BEHALF, TO CONFRONT AND EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES; TO A TRIAL BY JURY; IF CONVICTED, TO BE SENTENCED NOT SOONER THAN 6 HOURS NOR LATER THAN 5 DAYS OR WITHIN 20 COURT DAYS IF REFERRED TO PROBATION OFFICE; TO THE AID OF AN ATTORNEY AT ALL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS; THAT THE COURT WILL APPOINT AN ATTORNEY IF DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO EMPLOY OWN; TO A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY; DEFENDANT ADVISED, IF NOT A CITIZEN, THAT CONVICTION OF THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED MAY RESULT IN DEPORTATION, EXCLUSION OF ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, OR DENIAL OF NATURALIZATION PURSUANT TO THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

PAAPT: APPOINT PRIVATE DEFENDER. DEFENDANT ADVISED THAT UPON CONCLUSION OF THE CASE THE COURT MAY CONDUCT A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE DEFENDANT'S THEN ABILITY TO PAY FOR ALL OR ANY PART OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AND THAT DEFENDANT MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY ALL OR THAT PART OF SAID COSTS WITHIN DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

ARWVE: FURTHER ARRAIGNMENT AND ADVISE OF RIGHTS WAIVED.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

10/2020 00027

#### Comment

PDREF: THE COURT WILL MAKE A DETERMINATION OF YOUR ABILITY TO PAY ALL OR A PORTION OF THE COST OF THE ATTORNEY. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT YOU HAVE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO PAY ALL OR SOME OF THOSE COSTS. THE COURT WILL MAKE AN ORDER THAT YOU REIMBURSE THE COUNTY TO THE EXTENT AND IN THE MANNER. THAT THE COURT FINDS REASONABLE , AN ORDER TO REIMBURSE THE COUNTY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FEES WILL HAVE THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION. BEFORE THE COURT MAKES SUCH AN ORDER, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO REQUEST AND HAVE A HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO PAY SOME OR ALL OF THE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FEE. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN PERSON. PRESENT WITNESSES AND OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. TO CONFRONT AND CROSS EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES, HAVE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST YOU DISCLOSED TO YOU AND A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT. IF YOU DO NOT REQUEST SUCH A HEARING, YOU WILL BE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH A HEARING. IF AN ATTORNEY IS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT YOU, YOU WILL BE ORDERED TO APPEAR TODAY BEFORE THE REVENUE SERVICES MANAGER FOR A DETERMINATION OF YOUR ABILITY TO PAY THE COST OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED. SHOULD YOU FAIL TO APPEAR BEFORE THE REVENUE SERVICES MANAGER TODAY AS ORDERED. S/HE WILL REPORT SUCH FAILURE AND RECOMMEND THAT THE COURT ORDER PAYMENT OF THE FULL COSTS.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

SECAG: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO REPORT TO REVENUE SERVICES TODAY PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE 987.81 TO DETERMINE ABILITY TO REIMBURSE COST OF COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

PLEDA: DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO ALL COUNTS.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

WTIMJ: TIME WAIVED FOR JURY TRIAL.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRE-TRIAL .

10/21/202000029

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 02/04/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. JT FOR JURY TRIAL
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPW: PROTECTIVE ORDER PENDING TRIAL. DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE PEACEFUL CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAME ABOVE FOR COURT-ORDERED VISITATION AS ORDERED IN PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT FAMILY COURT AND JUVENILE COURT ORDERS AS AN EXEMPTION TO THE "NO CONTACT" AND "STAY AWAY" PROVISIONS OF THIS ORDER.
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPA: PERSON TO BE RESTRAINED E
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPD: THIS PROCEEDING WAS HEARD ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPT: 29 BY JUDICIAL OFFICER JNG
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPE: DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY PRESENT AT THE COURT HEARING AND NO ADDITIONAL PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER IS REQUIRED.
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPF: GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER, STALK, DESTROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.
12/11/2001 Conversion Event -
Comment MIPPG: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ATTEMPT TO OR ACTUALLY PREVENT OR DISSUADE ANY VICTUM OR WITNESS FROM ATTENDING A HEARING OR TESTIFYING OR MAKING A REPORT TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR PERSON.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPI: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT MUST SURRENDER TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SELL TO LICENSED GUN DEALER ANY FIREARM IN OR SUBJECT TO HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OR CONTROL WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER ISSUANCE OF THIS ORDER.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPM: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE NO PERSONAL, TELEPHONIC, OR WRITTEN CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPO: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, TH COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE NO CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, EXCEPT AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPP: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT COME WITHIN 100 YARDS OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPS: NAME OF PROTECTED PERSONS: CONFIDENTIAL

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

OTHER: REGULAR VISITS WITH REGARD TO CHILD ONLY AS PRESCRIBED BY DOMESTIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPV: IF NO DATE IS LISTED, THIS ORDER EXPIRES THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE.

12/11/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY U. HAWKINS ON 12/11/2001 .

12/31/2001 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/02/02 AT 1:29 P.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-SUPERIOR CT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KIM BRANSCUM. REPORTER: ELENA VARELA. CLERK2: SARAI MORENO. DEPUTY D.A. JOO. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHPDV: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRE TRIAL

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWAT: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITH ATTORNEY SCOTT .

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDWOR: DEFENDANT IS ADVISED OF, UNDERSTANDS, AND KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVES ALL THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: WAIVES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL; TO TRIAL BY JURY; TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES; THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTANDS THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES, THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFENSE THERETO, THE CONSEQUENCES OF PLEAS AND THE RANGE OF PENALTIES THERETO. WAIVER OF RIGHTS SIGNED.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

AMCDF: COMPLAINT AMENDED ORALLY.


01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

AMABC: COMPLAINT AMENDED TO ADD COUNT 5 : MISDEMEANOR, VIOLATION OF PC 242, ON MOTION OF THE PROSECUTION.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment PLPLF: DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE TO COUNT 5 IN AMENDED COMPLAINT. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment CDFRC: UPON MOTION OF THE PEOPLE ALL REMAINING COUNTS DISMISSED. REASON: NEGOTIATED PLEA. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment WTSTB: TIME WAIVED FOR SENTENCING. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment ARWFS: DEFENDANT WAIVES FORMAL ARRAIGNMENT FOR SENTENCING. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROOF OF ENROLLMENT . 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment MIVJT: JURY TRIAL SET ON 02/04/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. ORDERED VACATED. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SESCC: COUNT 5 IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE SUSPENDED. DEFENDANT IS PLACED ON SUPERVISED PROBATION FOR 0 YEARS; 18 MONTHS; 0 DAYS. FOLLOWED BY COURT PROBATION FOR 0 YEARS; 18 MONTHS; 0 DAYS FOR A TOTAL OF 3 YEARS; 0 MONTHS; 0 DAYS.


01/02/2002 Conversion Event -



HOU	R(S) IN THE COUNTY JAIL.
1/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	
	TS: CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED OF 2 DAYS PLUS 0 DAYS GOOD AND WORK TIME FOR TAL OF 2 DAYS.
/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	
SEN	AF: COUNT 5 TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE OF DEFENDANT.
/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	ment EJ: DEFENDANT TO SURRENDER TO COUNTY JAIL ON 02/16/2002 AT 10:00 A.M.
3531	EJ. DEFENDANT TO SURRENDER TO COUNTY JAIL ON 02/16/2002 AT 10:00 A.M
/02/2	002 Conversion Event 💌
Com	
SES	MP: DEFENDANT IS RECOMMENDED TO THE SHERIFF'S WORK PROGRAM.
/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	ment
	ET: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO PAY \$110.00 TO STATE RESTITUTION FUND. THIS MENT IS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
/02/2	002 Conversion Event 👻
Com	
SEFE	EA: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE OF \$178.00 ORDERED PAID TO EPA PD .
/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	ment
	RO: DEFENDANT TO PAY FINE AND ASSESSMENTS THROUGH PROBATION ARTMENT.
/02/2	002 Conversion Event -
Com	nent
SEO.	AL: OBEY ALL LAWS. FOLLOW ALL ORDERS OF THE COURT/PROBATION OFFICER AND

# $2020_{10/21/2020}00033$

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SESIA: DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT PERSON / VEHICLE / PLACE OF RESIDENCE TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT, BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT AND WITH OR WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SEFAM: DEFENDANT IS NOT TO OWN OR HAVE POSSESSION. CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF ANY FIREARM OR AMMUNITION. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SENFA: DEFENDANT NOT TO OWN OR HAVE POSSESSION, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF ANY WEAPON. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SERPR: REPORT TO THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT WITHIN 3 DAYS OF SENTENCING. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SEFDV: DEFENDANT TO PAY A \$100.00 FINE TO A BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTER. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SEDVF: DEFENDANT TO PAY \$200.00 TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FUND. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SECDV: COMPLETE AT LEAST 104 HOURS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNSELING WITHIN 12 MONTHS, ENROLL AND SHOW PROOF OF ENROLLMENT TO THE COURT/PROBATION DEPARTMENT WITHIN 14 DAYS. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -



SHAL DEST	nent F: GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT L NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER, STALK, ROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE OF THE ECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -
EXCE	nent F: DEFENDANT TO PAY A SUPERVISED PROBATION FEE IN THE AMOUNT NOT TO ED \$180.00 , PURSUANT TO PC 1203.1B, PAYABLE THROUGH THE PROBATION RTMENT.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -
Comn CSOF	nent RI: MAKE ALL APPEARANCES/APPOINTMENTS AS DIRECTED.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -
1000 - 000 <del></del>	nent O: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO ENROLL IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNSELING IN 13 DAYS.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event 💌
	nent IO: DEFENDANT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EDUCATION, REHABILITATION OR TMENT PROGRAM AS DIRECTED BY PROBATION OFFICER.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -
Comn SEAC	P: DEFENDANT ACCEPTED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -
Comn MIASI	ent E ALL SENTENCE ELEMENTS FOR THIS PROCEEDING ENTERED.
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event 🝷
Comn MIPP	A: PERSON TO BE RESTRAINED E
01/02/20	02 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

MIPPD: THIS PROCEEDING WAS HEARD ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPT: 3 BY JUDICIAL OFFICER JUDGE FREEMAN

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

MIPPE: DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY PRESENT AT THE COURT HEARING AND NO ADDITIONAL PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER IS REQUIRED.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPF: GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER, STALK, DESTROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPG: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ATTEMPT TO OR ACTUALLY PREVENT OR DISSUADE ANY VICTUM OR WITNESS FROM ATTENDING A HEARING OR TESTIFYING OR MAKING A REPORT TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR PERSON.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

MIPPI: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT MUST SURRENDER TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SELL TO LICENSED GUN DEALER ANY FIREARM IN OR SUBJECT TO HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OR CONTROL WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER ISSUANCE OF THIS ORDER.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPM: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE NO PERSONAL, TELEPHONIC, OR WRITTEN CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPO: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, TH COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE NO CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, EXCEPT AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD. 01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPP: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT COME WITHIN 100 YARDS OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPR: THE PROTECTED PERSON MAY RECORD ANY PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS MADE TO HIM OR HER BY THE RESTRAINED PERSON.

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPS: NAME OF PROTECTED PERSONS: RICHELLE NIQ, BABY DOE

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIPPU: THE ORDER EXPIRES ON 01/02/2005

01/02/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY S.MORENO ON 01/02/2002 .

01/10/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

BBEXD: BAIL BOND NUMBER AL25-742563 FOR \$25,000.00 EXONERATED.

01/15/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/16/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-SUPERIOR CT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI. REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ. CLERK2: SARAI MORENO. DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE. 01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHPOE: PROOF OF ENROLLMENT

01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APPRO: PROBATION OFFICER ARMIJO PRESENT IN COURT.

01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROOF OF ENROLLMENT .

01/16/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY S.MORENO ON 01/16/2002 .

01/17/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDCII: CII FORWARDED TO ARRESTING AGENCY.

01/17/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SECJF: CERTIFICATION OF JUDGEMENT FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE SIGNED AND ISSUED.

01/22/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

01/23/2002 Conversion Event -

# Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/23/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: ELENA VARELA . CLERK2: SANDY HARRIS . DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE . 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment HHPOE: PROOF OF ENROLLMENT 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL. 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment APPRO: PROBATION OFFICER ARMIJO PRESENT IN COURT. 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT. 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED. 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment DVPOE: DEFENDANT SHOWED PROOF OF ENROLLMENT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BATTERERS'TREATMENT PROGRAM. 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT . 01/23/2002 Conversion Event -Comment MIENT: ENTERED BY S.HARRIS ON 02/27/2002 .

Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT .	OF
SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼ Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT .	OF
SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼ Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼	OF
SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT .	UF
DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event  Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼ Comment HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼	
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HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼	
HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼	
BRANCH , D- 3 . HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE , PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event ▼	
ANTONINI . REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ . CLERK2: GINA POTTER . DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT . 2/27/2002 Conversion Event -	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event 🝷	
Comment	
Comment	
HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event -	
Comment	
APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event -	
Comment	
DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event -	
Comment	
DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.	
2/27/2002 Conversion Event -	
Commont	
Comment SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 05/29/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FC	٦R
PROGRESS REPORT .	- N
2/27/2002 Conversion Event 👻	
Comment	
MIENT: ENTERED BY GPOTTER ON 02/27/2002 .	

#### Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 05/29/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 05/29/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

#### Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 05/29/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3. HON. BETH LABSON FREEMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JAN ANTONINI . REPORTER: ELENA R VARELA . CLERK2: DINA LEWIS . DEPUTY D.A. HOLT . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE .

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 08/28/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT .

05/29/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY DLEWIS ON 05/29/2002 .

06/04/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment MISEN: FILE SENT TO JUDGE BERGERON FOR 987 06/12/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIRFL: FILE RETURNED TO CLERK'S OFFICE.

06/12/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDPJA: PETITION AND JUDGEMENT, APPOINTED ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO PC 987.8/987.81 FILED.

06/12/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

FDJCA: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT PLAINTIFF, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, HAVE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT HEREIN IN THE SUM OF \$363.00.

08/27/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 08/28/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 08/28/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 08/28/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3. HON. BETH FREEMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KIM POUNDS. REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ. CLERK2: DINA LEWIS. DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT. 08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT .

08/28/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY DLEWIS ON 08/28/2002 .

12/17/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 12/18/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 3. HON. BETH FREEMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JAN ANTONINI. REPORTER: ELENA VARELA. CLERK2: KETA WILLIAMS. DEPUTY D.A. MAZZEI. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.

#### Details

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT .

12/18/2002 Conversion Event -

Comment

MIENT: ENTERED BY KETAW ON 12/18/2002 .

03/18/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment

SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 7 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .

03/19/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment

HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 03/19/03 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 7. HON. STEVE L DYLINA, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KETA WILLIAMS . REPORTER: DONNA LOWE . CLERK2: ALMA CASTILLO . DEPUTY D.A. MAZZEI . DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE .

03/19/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT

03/19/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment

APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.

03/19/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment PROBE: PROBATION IS MODIFIED.

03/19/2003 Conversion Event -

Comment

# PROBS: SUPERVISED PROBATION IS CONVERTED TO COURT PROBATION. 03/19/2003 Conversion Event -Comment SEACP: DEFENDANT ACCEPTED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION. 03/19/2003 Conversion Event -Comment MIENT: ENTERED BY KETAW ON 03/19/2003. 10/11/2005 Conversion Event -Comment MIPPB: PARTIAL PAYMENT THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES OF \$110.00 REMAINING BALANCE IS \$.00. 10/11/2005 Conversion Event -Comment MIPPB: PARTIAL PAYMENT THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES OF \$133.34 REMAINING BALANCE IS \$.00 . 10/11/2005 Conversion Event -Comment MIPRF: RESTITUTION PAID IN FULL THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES. 10/11/2005 Conversion Event -Comment OTHER: PAID \$133.34 BAL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FUND THRU R/S

#### **Financial**

No financial information exists for this case.

#### **Dave Harris**

From:	Craig Grogan
Sent:	Thursday, October 22, 2020 2:41 PM
To:	Dave Harris; Birgit Fladager
Subject:	FW: Informal Copy of Odyssey (Court) Case from 2001/ E
Attachments:	E W

From:	>
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 2:35 PM	1
To: Craig Grogan <	>
Subject: RE: Informal Copy of Odyssey (Co	ourt) Case from 2001/ E

Hi Craig,

The Court Clerk provided us with the only thing they have on the E**GEN** W**INCOME** case from 2001. The attached 15 page Case Summary (similar to what I sent you yesterday), comes directly from the Court. They do not have the criminal complaint, any other minute order or plea, and they do not have the East Palo Alto Police report in support of the arrest and charging. All of this is simply based upon the age of the case.

I'm happy to help you with anything else you need. Please let me know what that may be.

Thanks, Craig.

From: Craig Grogan < C	
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 9:27 AM	
To:	
Subject: Re: Informal Copy of Odyssey (Court) Case from 2001/ Edited W	
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address	and know
the content is safe, do not click links, onen attachments or renky	

#### Thank you

Sent via the Samsung Galaxy S9, an AT&T 5G Evolution capable smartphone Get Outlook for Android

From:	>	
Sent: Thursday, October	22, 2020 7:56:28 AM	
To: Craig Grogan <	>	
Subject: RE: Informal Co	ppy of Odyssey (Court) Case from 2001/ E	

I confirmed with East Palo Alto PD this morning that all of the 2001/ 2002 police reports, including the DV report where W was arrested have in fact all been purged. They checked all of their systems, as well as archives. I have put a

request in for the criminal complaint, plea minute order, and the police report if it still exists in the court file. I'll be back in touch. Please don't hesitate to let me know if you need anything else, Craig.

Thanks.

From: Craig Grogan < > > Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 5:30 PM To: > >

Subject: RE: Informal Copy of Odyssey (Court) Case from 2001/ Eddie Whiteside

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of San Mateo County. Unless you recognize the sender's email address and know the content is safe, do not click links, open attachments or reply.

Got it thank you

From:	 b	>	
Sent: Wedne	sday, October 21,	, 2020 4:58 PM	
To: Craig Gro	gan <	>	
Subject: Infor	mal Copy of Odys	ssey (Court) Case from 2001/ E	

Craig,

Attached is an informal copy of the 2001 case against E Websel Websel that we have been discussing. This is from our court/Odyssey system. There are no documents in our internal PBK or Court Odyssey system, due to the age of this case. As we discussed, EPA PD's original report also has likely been purged by that agency, like the other 2001/2002 reports. I have not checked that yet.

I will work with our staff to get a complete copy of the criminal complaint, plea, minute order, etc. ordered for this case. Since they will have to get it through our Court Clerk's Office, I'm not sure how quickly we can make that happen with Covid considerations, but we will ask that it be expedited. For now, I figured this informal copy might at least help.

Thank you.

San Mateo County District Attorney's Office 400 County Center, 3<sup>rd</sup> Floor Redwood City, CA 94063 Direct



00:00:00:00:00:00

The People of the State of California



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Location: Criminal Filed on: 12/07/2001 District Attorney Number: DMV Docket Number:

			CASE INFO	ORMAT	ION		
Offense			Statute	Deg	Date	Case Type:	Complaint
Jurisdiction:	East Palo Alto			_			
INJU	3.5(A)-MISD-INFLI RY ON SPOUSE/CO	DHABITANT	273.5(A)	М	11/02/2001		
	e #: 001 ACN: Unk						
Ап	est: 11/02/2001	EPAPD - East Department	Palo Alto Police				
SPOL	8(E)-MISD-BATTEI SE, BOY/GIRL FR ABITANT		243(E)	М	11/02/2001		
Charg	e #: 002 ACN: Unk	nown					
Агг	est: 11/02/2001	EPAPD - East Department	Palo Alto Police				
003. PC23	6-MISD-FALSE IM	PRISONMENT	236	М	11/02/2001		
Charg	e #: 003 ACN: Unk	known					
Arr	est: 11/02/2001	EPAPD - East	Palo Alto Police				
		Department					
004. PC27	BA(B)-ENDANGER	-MISD-	273A(B)-	М	11/02/2001		
CRUI	ELTY TO CHILD B	Y	ENDÀNGER				
END	<b>NGERING HEALT</b>	ΓH					
Charg	e #: 004 ACN: Unk	nown					
Arr	est: 11/02/2001	EPAPD - East Department	Palo Alto Police				
005. PC24	2-MISD-BATTERY		242	М	11/02/2001		
Charg	e #: 005 ACN: Unk	known					
-	est: 11/02/2001		Palo Alto Police				
		Department					

DATE

**CASE ASSIGNMENT** 

**Current Case Assignment** Case Number Court Date Assigned

Criminal 12/07/2001

#### PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

The People of the State of California

Defendant W, E

DATE	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	INDEX
10/11/2005	Conversion Event OTHER: PAID \$133.34 BAL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FUND THRU R/S	
10/11/2005	Conversion Event MIPRF: RESTITUTION PAID IN FULL THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES.	

r r 1 4

	CASE NO.
10/11/2005	Conversion Event <i>MIPPB:</i> <i>PARTIAL PAYMENT THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES OF \$133.34 REMAINING</i> <i>BALANCE IS \$.00</i> .
10/11/2005	Conversion Event MIPPB: PARTIAL PAYMENT THROUGH REVENUE SERVICES OF \$110.00 REMAINING BALANCE IS \$.00.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY KETAW ON 03/19/2003.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event SEACP: DEFENDANT ACCEPTED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event PROBS: SUPERVISED PROBATION IS CONVERTED TO COURT PROBATION.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event PROBE: PROBATION IS MODIFIED.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.
03/19/2003	Conversion Event HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT
03/19/2003	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 03/19/03 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-7. HON. STEVE L DYLINA, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KETA WILLIAMS. REPORTER: DONNA LOWE. CLERK2: ALMA CASTILLO. DEPUTY D.A. MAZZEI. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
03/18/2003	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 7 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY KETAW ON 12/18/2002.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 03/19/2003 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.

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	CASE SUMMARY
· ·	CASE NO.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.
12/18/2002	Conversion Event HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT
12/18/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 12/18/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JAN ANTONINI. REPORTER: ELENA VARELA. CLERK2: KETA WILLIAMS. DEPUTY D.A. MAZZEI. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
12/17/2002	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY DLEWIS ON 08/28/2002.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 12/18/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.
08/28/2002	Conversion Event HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT
08/28/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 08/28/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KIM POUNDS. REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ. CLERK2: DINA LEWIS. DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
08/27/2002	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 08/28/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 08/28/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
06/12/2002	Conversion Event <i>FDJCA:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED</i>

#### CRIMINAL

## CASE SUMMARY CASE NO.

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ENDANT C
c
DV FOR
BRANCH , ONINI .
DV OF A.M. IN
OV FOR

• • •

	CASE NO.
02/27/2002	Conversion Event DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.
02/27/2002	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
02/27/2002	Conversion Event APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.
02/27/2002	Conversion Event HHPRT: PROGRESS REPORT
02/27/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 02/27/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI. REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ. CLERK2: GINA POTTER. DEPUTY D.A. ELAINE TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT.
02/26/2002	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY S.HARRIS ON 02/27/2002.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 02/27/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROGRESS REPORT.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event DVPOE: DEFENDANT SHOWED PROOF OF ENROLLMENT IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BATTERERS'TREATMENT PROGRAM.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event DVPRR: PROGRESS REPORT RECEIVED.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event APPRO: PROBATION OFFICER ARMIJO PRESENT IN COURT.
01/23/2002	Conversion Event <i>APWOC:</i> <i>DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL</i> .
01/23/2002	Conversion Event HHPOE: PROOF OF ENROLLMENT

01/23/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/23/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-LABSON, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI. REPORTER: ELENA VARELA. CLERK2: SANDY HARRIS. DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
01/22/2002	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
01/17/2002	Conversion Event SECJF: CERTIFICATION OF JUDGEMENT FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE SIGNED AND ISSUED.
01/17/2002	Conversion Event FDCII: CII FORWARDED TO ARRESTING AGENCY.
01/16/2002	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY S.MORENO ON 01/16/2002.
01/16/2002	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/23/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROOF OF ENROLLMENT.
01/16/2002	Conversion Event APPRO: PROBATION OFFICER ARMIJO PRESENT IN COURT.
01/16/2002	Conversion Event APWOC: DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.
01/16/2002	Conversion Event HHPOE: PROOF OF ENROLLMENT
01/16/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/16/02 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-SUPERIOR CT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: JANICE ANTONINI. REPORTER: CHRIS PEREZ. CLERK2: SARAI MORENO. DEPUTY D.A. TIPTON. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
01/15/2002	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
01/10/2002	Conversion Event BBEXD: BAIL BOND NUMBER AL25-742563 FOR \$25,000.00 EXONERATED.
01/02/2002	Plea (Judicial Officer: SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY) 005. PC242-MISD-BATTERY

## CRIMINAL

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO.

	CASE III.
	No Contest / Nolo Contendere Charge #: 005 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Disposition 005. PC242-MISD-BATTERY Pled Nolo Contendere Charge #: 005 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Disposition 004. PC273A(B)-ENDANGER-MISD-CRUELTY TO CHILD BY ENDANGERING HEALTH Dismissal: Negotiated Plea Charge #: 004 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Disposition 003. PC236-MISD-FALSE IMPRISONMENT Dismissal: Negotiated Plea Charge #: 003 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Disposition 002. PC243(E)-MISD-BATTERYFORMER SPOUSE, BOY/GIRL FRIEND, NON- COHABITANT Dismissal: Negotiated Plea Charge #: 002 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Disposition 001. PC273.5(A)-MISD-INFLICT CORPORAL INJURY ON SPOUSE/COHABITANT Dismissal: Negotiated Plea Charge #: 001 Allegation:
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY S.MORENO ON 01/02/2002.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPU: THE ORDER EXPIRES ON 01/02/2005
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPS: NAME OF PROTECTED PERSONS: RICHELLE NIQ, BABY DOE
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPR: THE PROTECTED PERSON MAY RECORD ANY PROHIBITED COMMUNICATIONS MADE TO HIM OR HER BY THE RESTRAINED PERSON.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPP: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT COME WITHIN 100 YARDS OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPO: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, TH COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT

CRIMINAL

# CASE SUMMARY CASE NO.

•	CASE NO.
	SHALL HAVE NO CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, EXCEPT AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>MIPPM:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL HAVE NO PERSONAL, TELEPHONIC, OR WRITTEN CONTACT WITH THE</i> <i>PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>MIPPI:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>MUST SURRENDER TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SELL TO LICENSED GUN</i> <i>DEALER ANY FIREARM IN OR SUBJECT TO HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OR</i> <i>CONTROL WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER ISSUANCE OF THIS ORDER.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPG: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ATTEMPT TO OR ACTUALLY PREVENT OR DISSUADE ANY VICTUM OR WITNESS FROM ATTENDING A HEARING OR TESTIFYING OR MAKING A REPORT TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR PERSON.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>MIPPF:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER,</i> <i>STALK, DESTROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE</i> <i>OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPE: DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY PRESENT AT THE COURT HEARING AND NO ADDITIONAL PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER IS REQUIRED.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPD: THIS PROCEEDING WAS HEARD ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPT: 3 BY JUDICIAL OFFICER JUDGE FREEMAN
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIPPA: PERSON TO BE RESTRAINED E
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIASE: ALL SENTENCE ELEMENTS FOR THIS PROCEEDING ENTERED.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEACP: DEFENDANT ACCEPTED TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEEMO: DEFENDANT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EDUCATION, REHABILITATION OR TREATMENT PROGRAM AS DIRECTED BY PROBATION OFFICER.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event DVECO: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO ENROLL IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNSELING WITHIN 13 DAYS.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event

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	CASE NO.
	CSORI: MAKE ALL APPEARANCES/APPOINTMENTS AS DIRECTED.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SESUF: DEFENDANT TO PAY A SUPERVISED PROBATION FEE IN THE AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED \$180.00. PURSUANT TO PC 1203.1B, PAYABLE THROUGH THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>MIPPF:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER,</i> <i>STALK, DESTROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE</i> <i>OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SECDV: COMPLETE AT LEAST 104 HOURS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNSELING WITHIN 12 MONTHS, ENROLL AND SHOW PROOF OF ENROLLMENT TO THE COURT/PROBATION DEPARTMENT WITHIN 14 DAYS.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEDVF: DEFENDANT TO PAY \$200.00 TO THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FUND.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEFDV: DEFENDANT TO PAY A \$100.00 FINE TO A BATTERED WOMEN'S SHELTER.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SERPR: REPORT TO THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT WITHIN 3 DAYS OF SENTENCING.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SENFA: DEFENDANT NOT TO OWN OR HAVE POSSESSION, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF ANY WEAPON.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEFAM: DEFENDANT IS NOT TO OWN OR HAVE POSSESSION, CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF ANY FIREARM OR AMMUNITION.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SESIA: DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT PERSON / VEHICLE / PLACE OF RESIDENCE TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT, BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT AND WITH OR WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEOAL: OBEY ALL LAWS. FOLLOW ALL ORDERS OF THE COURT/PROBATION OFFICER AND REPORT AS DIRECTED. NOTIFY THE COURT/ PROBATION OFFICER IMMEDIATELY OF ANY CHANGE OF RESIDENCE ADDRESS.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SEPRO: DEFENDANT TO PAY FINE AND ASSESSMENTS THROUGH PROBATION DEPARTMENT.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event

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	CASE NO.
	SEFEA: CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE OF \$178.00 ORDERED PAID TO EPA PD .
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SERET: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO PAY \$110.00 TO STATE RESTITUTION FUND. THIS PAYMENT IS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SESWP: DEFENDANT IS RECOMMENDED TO THE SHERIFF'S WORK PROGRAM.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SESEJ: DEFENDANT TO SURRENDER TO COUNTY JAIL ON 02/16/2002 AT 10:00 A.M
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SENAF: COUNT 5 TO BE SERVED CONSECUTIVE TO ANY OTHER CASE OF DEFENDANT.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SECTS: CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED OF 2 DAYS PLUS 0 DAYS GOOD AND WORK TIME FOR A TOTAL OF 2 DAYS.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SECJL: AS TO COUNT 5, DEFENDANT TO SERVE 0 YEAR(S), 0 MONTH(S), 10 DAY(S), 0 HOUR (S) IN THE COUNTY JAIL.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SESCC: COUNT 5 IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE SUSPENDED. DEFENDANT IS PLACED ON SUPERVISED PROBATION FOR 0 YEARS; 18 MONTHS; 0 DAYS. FOLLOWED BY COURT PROBATION FOR 0 YEARS; 18 MONTHS; 0 DAYS FOR A TOTAL OF 3 YEARS; 0 MONTHS; 0 DAYS.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event MIVJT: JURY TRIAL SET ON 02/04/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. ORDERED VACATED.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/16/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR PROOF OF ENROLLMENT.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event ARWFS: DEFENDANT WAIVES FORMAL ARRAIGNMENT FOR SENTENCING.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event WTSTB: TIME WAIVED FOR SENTENCING.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>CDFRC:</i> <i>UPON MOTION OF THE PEOPLE ALL REMAINING COUNTS DISMISSED. REASON:</i> <i>NEGOTIATED PLEA.</i>

01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>PLPLF:</i> <i>DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE TO COUNT 5 IN AMENDED</i> <i>COMPLAINT.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>AMABC:</i> <i>COMPLAINT AMENDED TO ADD COUNT 5 : MISDEMEANOR, VIOLATION OF PC 242 ,</i> <i>ON MOTION OF THE PROSECUTION.</i>
01/02/2002	Conversion Event AMCDF: COMPLAINT AMENDED ORALLY.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event FDWOR: DEFENDANT IS ADVISED OF, UNDERSTANDS, AND KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVES ALL THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: WAIVES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL; TO TRIAL BY JURY; TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES; THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTANDS THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES. THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE, THE DEFENSE THERETO. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PLEAS AND THE RANGE OF PENALTIES THERETO. WAIVER OF RIGHTS SIGNED.
01/02/2002	Conversion Event <i>APWAT:</i> <i>DEFENDANT APPEARED WITH ATTORNEY SCOTT</i> .
01/02/2002	Conversion Event HHPDV: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRE TRIAL
01/02/2002	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 01/02/02 AT 1:29 P.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D-3. HON. BETH FREEMAN-SUPERIOR CT, JUDGE, PRESIDING. CLERK: KIM BRANSCUM. REPORTER: ELENA VARELA. CLERK2: SARAI MORENO. DEPUTY D.A. JOO. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: SCOTT.
12/31/2001	Conversion Event SHRES: CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPARTMENT DV OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN DEPARTMENT 3 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH.
12/11/2001	Plea (Judicial Officer: SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY) 004. PC273A(B)-ENDANGER-MISD-CRUELTY TO CHILD BY ENDANGERING HEALTH Not Guilty Charge #: 004 Allegation:
12/11/2001	Plea (Judicial Officer: SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY) 003. PC236-MISD-FALSE IMPRISONMENT Not Guilty Charge #: 003 Allegation:
12/11/2001	Plea (Judicial Officer: SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY) 002. PC243(E)-MISD-BATTERYFORMER SPOUSE, BOY/GIRL FRIEND, NON- COHABITANT Not Guilty Charge #: 002 Allegation:

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12/11/2001	Plea (Judicial Officer: SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE, SAN MATEO COUNTY) 001. PC273.5(A)-MISD-INFLICT CORPORAL INJURY ON SPOUSE/COHABITANT Not Guilty Charge #: 001 Allegation:
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIENT: ENTERED BY U. HAWKINS ON 12/11/2001.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPV: IF NO DATE IS LISTED, THIS ORDER EXPIRES THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUANCE.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event OTHER: REGULAR VISITS WITH REGARD TO CHILD ONLY AS PRESCRIBED BY DOMESTIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPS: NAME OF PROTECTED PERSONS: CONFIDENTIAL
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>MIPPP:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL NOT COME WITHIN 100 YARDS OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED</i> <i>BELOW.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPO: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, TH COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE NO CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, EXCEPT AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>MIPPM:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL HAVE NO PERSONAL, TELEPHONIC, OR WRITTEN CONTACT WITH THE</i> <i>PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>MIPPI:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>MUST SURRENDER TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OR SELL TO LICENSED GUN</i> <i>DEALER ANY FIREARM IN OR SUBJECT TO HIS OR HER IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OF</i> <i>CONTROL WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER ISSUANCE OF THIS ORDER.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPG: GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT SHALL NOT ATTEMPT TO OR ACTUALLY PREVENT OR DISSUADE ANY VICTUM OR WITNESS FROM ATTENDING A HEARING OR TESTIFYING OR MAKING A REPORT TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OR PERSON.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>MIPPF:</i> <i>GOOD CAUSE HEARING, THE COURT ORDERS THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT</i> <i>SHALL NOT ANNOY, HARASS, STRIKE, THREATEN, SEXUALLY ASSAULT, BATTER,</i> <i>STALK, DESTROY PERSONAL PROPERTY OF, OR OTHERWISE DISTURB THE PEACE</i>

## CRIMINAL

# CASE SUMMARY

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`	CASE NO.
	OF THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAMED BELOW.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPE: DEFENDANT WAS PERSONALLY PRESENT AT THE COURT HEARING AND NO ADDITIONAL PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER IS REQUIRED.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPD: THIS PROCEEDING WAS HEARD ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPT: 29 BY JUDICIAL OFFICER JNG
12/11/2001	Conversion Event MIPPA: PERSON TO BE RESTRAINED E
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>MIPPW:</i> <i>PROTECTIVE ORDER PENDING TRIAL. DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE PEACEFUL</i> <i>CONTACT WITH THE PROTECTED PERSONS NAME ABOVE FOR COURT-ORDERED</i> <i>VISITATION AS ORDERED IN PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT FAMILY COURT AND</i> <i>JUVENILE COURT ORDERS AS AN EXEMPTION TO THE "NO CONTACT" AND "STAY</i> <i>AWAY" PROVISIONS OF THIS ORDER.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 02/04/2002 AT 9:00 A.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. JT FOR JURY TRIAL
12/11/2001	Conversion Event SHOTA: CASE CONTINUED TO 01/02/2002 AT 1:29 P.M. IN REDWOOD CITY IN DEPT. DV FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRE-TRIAL.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event WTIMJ: TIME WAIVED FOR JURY TRIAL.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>PLEDA:</i> <i>DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO ALL COUNTS.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event SECAG: DEFENDANT ORDERED TO REPORT TO REVENUE SERVICES TODAY PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE 987.81 TO DETERMINE ABILITY TO REIMBURSE COST OF COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event PDREF: THE COURT WILL MAKE A DETERMINATION OF YOUR ABILITY TO PAY ALL OR A PORTION OF THE COST OF THE ATTORNEY. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT YOU HAVE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO PAY ALL OR SOME OF THOSE COSTS, THE COURT WILL MAKE AN ORDER THAT YOU REIMBURSE THE COUNTY TO THE EXTENT AND IN THE MANNER THAT THE COURT FINDS REASONABLE . AN ORDER TO REIMBURSE THE COUNTY FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FEES WILL HAVE THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS A JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION. BEFORE THE COURT MAKES SUCH AN ORDER, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO REQUEST AND HAVE A HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT YOU

# CRIMINAL CASE SUMMARY

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	HAVE THE FINANCIAL ABILITY TO PAY SOME OR ALL OF THE COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FEE. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN PERSON, PRESENT WITNESSES AND OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, TO CONFRONT AND CROSS EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES, HAVE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST YOU DISCLOSED TO YOU AND A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT. IF YOU DO NOT REQUEST SUCH A HEARING, YOU WILL BE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO SUCH A HEARING. IF AN ATTORNEY IS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT YOU, YOU WILL BE ORDERED TO APPEAR TODAY BEFORE THE REVENUE SERVICES MANAGER FOR A DETERMINATION OF YOUR ABILITY TO PAY THE COST OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED. SHOULD YOU FAIL TO APPEAR BEFORE THE REVENUE SERVICES MANAGER TODAY AS ORDERED, S/HE WILL REPORT SUCH FAILURE AND RECOMMEND THAT THE COURT ORDER PAYMENT OF THE FULL COSTS.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event ARWVE: FURTHER ARRAIGNMENT AND ADVISE OF RIGHTS WAIVED.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event
	PAAPT: APPOINT PRIVATE DEFENDER. DEFENDANT ADVISED THAT UPON CONCLUSION OF THE CASE THE COURT MAY CONDUCT A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE DEFENDANT'S THEN ABILITY TO PAY FOR ALL OR ANY PART OF APPOINTED COUNSEL AND THAT DEFENDANT MAY BE ORDERED TO PAY ALL OR THAT PART OF SAID COSTS WITHIN DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PAY.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event
	RAACR: DEFENDANT ARRAIGNED AND ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: TO THE VARIOUS PLEAS AVAILABLE; TO A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL FROM THE DATE OF ARRAIGNMENT, WITHIN 30 DAYS IF IN CUSTODY, WITHIN 45 DAYS IF NOT IN CUSTODY, OTHERWISE, THE MATTER MUST BE DISMISSED; TO THE AID OF THE COURT TO SUBPOENA AND PRODUCE WITNESSES ON OWN BEHALF, TO CONFRONT AND EXAMINE ADVERSE WITNESSES; TO A TRIAL BY JURY; IF CONVICTED, TO BE SENTENCED NOT SOONER THAN 6 HOURS NOR LATER THAN 5 DAYS OR WITHIN 20 COURT DAYS IF REFERRED TO PROBATION OFFICE; TO THE AID OF AN ATTORNEY AT ALL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS; THAT THE COURT WILL APPOINT AN ATTORNEY IF DEFENDANT IS UNABLE TO EMPLOY OWN; TO A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY; DEFENDANT ADVISED, IF NOT A CITIZEN, THAT CONVICTION OF THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED MAY RESULT IN DEPORTATION, EXCLUSION OF ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, OR DENIAL OF NATURALIZATION PURSUANT TO THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event <i>APWOC:</i> <i>DEFENDANT APPEARED WITHOUT COUNSEL.</i>
12/11/2001	Conversion Event FDSPT: STIPULATION RE: JUDGE PRO TEMPORE HEARING MATTER.
12/11/2001	Conversion Event HHADV: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINT ARRAIGNMENT
12/11/2001	Conversion Event HHELD: HEARING HELD ON 12/11/01 AT 9:00 A.M. IN SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH, D- 29. HON. JOSEPH N GRUBER, COURT COMMISSIONER, PRESIDING. CLERK: IRENE GRAY. REPORTER: TRACY WOOD. CLERK2: URSULA HAWKINS. DEPUTY D.A. MAHONEY. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESENT: NONE.
12/10/2001	Conversion Event SHRES:

CRIMINAL

CASE S	UMMARY
CASE NO.	

	CASE NO.
	CASE SHIFTED FROM HEARING ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT AR OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH TO HEARING ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPARTMENT 29 OF SUPERIOR COURT SOUTHERN BRANCH .
12/07/2001	Conversion Event BBBBP: \$25,000.00 BAIL BOND NUMBER AL25-742563 POSTED ON 11/03/2001 BY ALISTAR SURETY COMPANY ALADDIN BAIL BOND COMPANY FOR DEFENDANT APPEARANCE ON 12/11/2001 AT 9:00 A.M
12/07/2001	Conversion Event DVCOM: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BASED COMPLAINT.
12/07/2001	Conversion Event FDCJR: AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION FEE, RECEIVED.

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DISTRICT ATTORNEY

From:	Craig Grogan			
To:	Birgit Fladager; Dave Harris			
Subject:	FW: Contact info			
Date:	Thursday, October 22, 2020 3:59:19 PM			
Attachments:	BI-2010-21418 K			
	Purge Letter MVPD Case 009371.pdf			
	image001.png			

From: Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2020 3:29 PM To: Craig Grogan < > Subject: RE: Contact info

Investigator Grogan,

Attached please find the documents you requested.

Please let me know how else I can be of assistance.

Kind regards,

Team Leader for the Homicide, Gangs, CSU and CalWrap Units Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office – Bureau of Investigation Desk:

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From: Craig Grogan <	g>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 4:54 PM	
To: <	>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Contact info	

Regarding the vandalism case I would like to request just the criminal complaint from the DA's Office and the minute order, or change of plea, or entry of plea form.

I will request additional information if needed but that is all we need for right now.

Thank you,

Craig Grogan Criminal Investigator Bureau of Investigation Stanislaus County District Attorney 832 12<sup>th</sup> Street Rm 300 Modesto CA. 95354





From: < <u>r</u>	>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020	) 2:16 PM
<b>To:</b> Craig Grogan <	>
Subject: Contact info	

Craig,

This is a follow up email to provide my contact info.

I will be in touch.


# 2

Team Leader for the Homicide, Gangs, CSU and CalWrap Units Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office – Bureau of Investigation Desk:

Cell:

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## SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA PALO ALTO FACILITY COMPLAINT FOR ARREST WARRANT(S)



The undersigned is informed and believes that:

#### COUNT 1

On or about September 22, 2000, in the County of Santa Clara, State of California, the crime of VANDALISM -- LESS THAN FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS, in violation of PENAL CODE SECTION 594(a)/(b)(2)(A), a Misdemeanor, was committed by M K who did maliciously damage and destroy property, car tires, not his/her own, in the amount of less than four hundred dollars (\$400).

#### COUNT 2

On or about September 22, 2000, in the County of Santa Clara, State of California, the crime of VANDALISM -- LESS THAN FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS, in violation of PENAL CODE SECTION 594(a)/(b)(2)(A), a Misdemeanor, was committed by M

#### **DISCOVERY REQUEST**

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 1054 through 1054.7, the People request that, within 15 days, the defendant and/or his/her attorney disclose: (A) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he/she intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the statements of those persons, including any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case, and including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial; (B) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial. This request is a continuing request, to cover not only all such material currently in existence, but all material which comes into existence to the conclusion of this case.

Further, attached and incorporated by reference are official reports and documents of a law enforcement agency which the complainant believes establish probable cause for the arrest of defendant Matter Karatan, for the above-listed crimes. Wherefore, A WARRANT OF ARREST IS REQUESTED.

Complainant therefore requests that the defendant(s) be dealt with according to law. I certify under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct. Executed on October 5, 2000, in SANTA CLARA County, California.

Warrant received for service by:

on\_\_\_\_\_ Cash or Bond \$\_\_\_\_\_ Johnston J8444 (Ledang L3953) MVPD (650) 903-6344 009371 \*\*\* DURMAN/ D441/ MISDEMEANOR/ rc

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

## DISTRICT ATTORNEY CASE STATUS REPORT

File No: <u>001</u>	028711				
Facility: <u>PA</u> Arresting As	LO ALTO FA	<u>CILITY</u> FAIN VIEW POLIC	Docket No E DEPARTMENT	:Officer: <u>LEDANG</u>	_
				J:	
Charg	ges: <u>PC594(a)</u>	/(b)(2)(A), PC594(a)	/(b)(2)(A)		_
Lab N	No.:	BA%:	Drugs:	-	_
Defer	nse Attorney: .				
DMV/SUSP:		OFCN No	: <u>009371</u>	Date: Date: Div:	
Time Est:		Offer:		Review:	
DATE					DEPUTY
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## RECORDS DIVISION • POLICE DEPARTMENT 1000 Villa Street • Mountain View, California 94041-1294 650-903-6344 • FAX 650-964-2202

On October 21, 2020, you requested case 00-09371, which this department no longer retains. As of May 2010, the City of Mountain View Police Department's retention schedule authorized purging of these cases. The retention period for these types of cases is 10 years. Therefore, we no longer have the report you are requesting for the incident which occurred in the year 2000.

If you are requesting final court disposition, this information must be obtained through the courts. If an arrest happened in Mountain View, contact the Palo Alto Superior Court at (650) 462-3811.

If you have any further questions, please contact the Records Unit at (650) 903-6344.



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